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The Resistance Movement in Antique during the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945

Florentino Z. Ponan

The Story of the Philippine Guerrillas during the Second World War

Documents — Notes and Comments — Book Review

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PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

HISTORICAL BULLETIN

Ambeth Ocampo

AMBETH R. OCAMPO

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The Resistance Movement in Antique during the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 *

Florentino Z. Ponan

AT THE TIME WAR WAS DECLARED, an estimated 112,400 composed the U.S. Army Group Forces, consisting of 22,400 Philippine Scouts, 3,000 Philippine Constabulary men, and 87,000 Philippine Army men (one regular and ten reserve)[1] under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. There was an estimated 9,600 Air Force troops including 1,500 belonging to the Philippine Air Force commanded by General Lewis H. Brereton.[2] The Navy was under the charge of Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet. Under his disposal were two cruisers (one heavy and one light), some submarines, destroyers, gunboats, and minesweepers.[3] The fate of the country, therefore, was pinned on these three Major Commands — Land, Air, and Sea.

Barely had the Philippines mustered an effective striking force when the powder keg that would bring about the awaited global conflagration was finally ignited into a real shooting war.

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* A part of an unpublished Thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School, University of Santo Tomas, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Social Science), January, 1968.

[1] Walter D. Edmonds, *They Fought With What They Had* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1951), p. 65. Cf. Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief Military History, Department of the Army, 1955), p. 12.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[3] Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, Vol. III, (Boston: Brown and Co., 1959), p. 159.

The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor precipitated the immediate cause of armed conflict between the United States and Japan. One of the victims in the armed struggle was the Philippines which was subjected to a "blitz" that finally tarnished the United States military career in the Far East with the fall of Corregidor.

Mobilization: The first mobilization prior to the outbreak of the war was called in the early part of 1939. On February 12, 1940, Antique became one of the mobilization centers. The Sixty-first Division organized a Second Battalion, the Sixty-first Infantry Regiment and the town of San Jose, Antique, was chosen as its Headquarters. The officers of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company was composed of Captain Calixto O. Zaldivar, Battalion Commander; First Lieutenant Dalmacio Dy Buco, Executive Officer and Adjutant; Second Lieutenant Osias del Rosario, Intelligence Officer; Second Lieutenant Alfredo A. Villavert, Planning and Operation Officer; and First Lieutenant Felipe Alpas, Company Commander.

The second "call to arms" was made on March 19-29, 1941.[4] That was the last rehearsal. In December 1941, hostilities broke out.

Preparatory to the Japanese occupation of Panay, Iloilo City was bombed on December 18, 1942. Thirty-six Japanese bombers pounded the city at will for half an hour. Twenty-one persons were reported killed and 100 injured.[5] The strafing that followed inflicted casualties among the men of Captain Dalmacio Dy Buco by Company "G"[6] including the Romblon contingent which had just arrived in Iloilo.

The defense of Antique was entrusted to the Sixty-first Division. In anticipation of the Japanese invasion, the force had stocked in Baloi 500 heads of cattle, 15,000 bags of rice, hundred of cases of canned goods, and machine shops had been constructed.[7] At the first days of its organization, a skeletal force was dispatched to Antique on December 20, 1941, to serve as a standby unit with Lieutenant Mariano Griño as Commanding Officer. His staff was tentatively composed of Lieutenant Arcadio Mendoza, Executive Officer; Lieutenant Mariano X. Rojo, Adjutant; and Lieutenant Angel Salazar, Jr., Mess Officer. Captain Ricardo Perez headed the Provincial Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Lieutenant Wenceslao Villanueva, the Company Commander with a strength of only 38 men.

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[4] "Call to Arms! — 1941 Rehearsal for Defense," *Philippines Free Press*, March 1, 1941, p. 2.

[5] "Enemy Planes Bomb Iloilo," *The Tribune*, Manila, December 18, 1941, p. 1.

[6] From the 201 file of Dy Buco, Non-Current Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, Fort Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

[7] Morton, *op. cit.*, p. 507.

On January 11, 1942, two battalions arrived in Antique from Dingle, Iloilo, under the command of Captains Silverio Nietes and Pedro Sabino. Incorporated to the unit under Lieutenant Griño, the Sixty-fifth Infantry Regiment was formed. The newly ushered force was to serve as scouts in line with their tasks to observe the movements of the enemy vessels along the Sulu Sea, guard the coasts, and submit reports to the Sixty-first Division from time to time.

In order to effectively execute the mission, the reorganization of the regimental staff was expanded in March 1942. Mariano Griño who was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel assumed the post of Regimental Commander; Major Salazar, Jr., Executive Officer; Major Santiago Villalona, Adjutant; Major Alfredo A. Villavert, Plans and Training Officer; Major Adriano Olivar, Supply Officer; and Cresenciano Vicedo, Intelligence Officer. The Base Quartermaster was Captain Alberto Villavert assisted by Captain Cleto Elequin. Captain Delfin M. Encarnacion, Medical Officer; First Lieutenant Antero Sison, Dental Officer; Captain Jesus Santa Romana, Summary Court Officer; and Arcadio Mendoza of Company "D" Engineering Unit was in charge of the Demolition Team. His mission was to cover the withdrawal of the troops to their respective security areas by blasting bridges after infantry units have crossed.

On account of the difficulty of securing arms for the whole regiment, only around thirty per cent of the total number of men was provided with arms. Several battalions were orgenized but only in skeletal form.[8] The First Battalion was assigned to Major Andres Clemente, Jr.; Second Battalion, to Major Silverio Nietes;

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[8] Interview with Mariano X. Rojo, Captain Infantry Reserve, Sibalom, Antique, on December 27, 1965.

and the Third Battalion, to Captain Pedro Sabino. The last outfit was never armed and never saw action.

Daily drills of troops were a common sight. Night and day one could hear trucks rumbling to and from the highways displaying whatever available weapons on hand. The civilians' morale was at its peak as they saw heavily armed platoons parading the thoroughfares in steel helmets on vehicles with mounted machineguns. The intelligence men of Captain Vicedo combed the areas in plain clothes.

More and more civilians were recruited to bolster the strength of their intelligence network. Flashes and reports from the fields were relayed with dispatch to the headquarters. Even travelling civilians were closely shadowed for fear that they be fifth columnists. Sailboats on sea were strictly checked as to their destination and cargoes. But when the reports were received that the Japanese had landed in Oton, Iloilo, they finally disappeared in the thin air.

The Engineering Unit diligently did the job entrusted to it. To protect the Regimental Headquarters and to delay the probable penetration of enemy mechanized units, road blocks were laid from Ilaures to Valderrama using trunks of coconut trees. Barbed wire entanglements were constructed from Tigmamale to Buluañgan. At the foot of big bridges, land mines were planted, ready to be blasted in the event the enemy passed by. In Lublub, caches and tunnels were constructed to mislead the enemy and facilitate the withdrawal of the army.[9]

The infantry men were too busy as to the disposition or deployment of their units. With the regimental headquarters located at the foot of Mount Baloi, several units were assigned along the beaches. A composite group under Major Alfredo A. Villavert was time-tabled for San Remigio. Company "A" under Captain Pedro Cerdeña with units covering the seacoast from Bugasong to Patnoñgan was stationed in barrio Peneñgayan, Bugasong. Company "D" under Lieutenant Jovito Pesayco was posted to guard the coast from Bugasong to Tibiao. A unit under Major Silverio Nietes, which was covering the beach from Patnoñgan to Dao, was quartered in Pañgalcagan, Bugasong. Company "C" under Captain Antonio Romero took charge of the area from Tibiao to Pandan. Lieutenant Modesto Nagrampa of Company "C" was in Pandan when the enemy landed in San Jose.[10]

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[9] From the 201 file of Lieutenant Cesar Jardeliza, Non-Current Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, Fort Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

The regiment had high hopes of receiving reinforcements from the United States, but nothing tangible arrived after several months of tedious waiting. The reports on the fall of Bataan adversely affected the USAFFE's strategy. Instead of resisting the enemy as previously planned, "lie-low" tactics were adopted. Troops assigned along the beaches withdrew to the interior. The last line of defense was established at Ticantican mountain.[11] Likewise, the Motor Pool and Base Supply No. 1, previously stationed in Igpatani, Bugasong and Tagudtud, were also ordered to move out to a safer place.

The Enemy Landing: Aid was still the paramount prayer of the army at this critical moment. As the days dragged on it was evident that the much awaited U.S. aid would not come. Hope, however, was not given up.

The Visayas-Mindanao Forces, previously under United States Major General William Sharp, was divided and the Visayas Force was assigned to United States Brigadier General Bradford G. Chynowet. Latest developments in the theatre of war necessitated re-designation of command to insure the most "effective defense of each area . . ."

On the other hand the Japanese time-table to conquer the Philippines in the shortest possible period suffered a hitch when the operation dragged on for months. The conquest of Bataan had reached stalemate. The situation prompted General Masaharu Homma to immediately request for reinforcements from the Imperial General Headquarters. On April 5, 1942, the elements of the 5th Division consisting of General Saburo Kawamura's 9th Infantry Brigade and the 41st Infantry, engaged in the Malaya theatre of operations, were dispatched to Lingayen, Pangasinan.[12] Out of this force General Homma formed the Kawamura Detachment which was responsible for the landing and subsequent occupation of Panay.[13]

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[10] Interview with Antonio Romero, Captain Infantry Reserve, Barbaza, Antique, December 25, 1965.

[11] Interview with Vicente Manzanilla, 2nd Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, at his residence in Pasay City on May 22, 1966.

[12] Morton, *Op Cit.*, pp. 502-503.

The detachment was assigned to make a three-pronged landing. In accordance with its schedule the detachment would hit three beachheads landing simultaneously in the three Panay Island provincial capitals on April 16, 1942. They succeeded in Iloilo and Capiz but fortunately failed in Antique.

On April 16, 1942, at 4:00 p.m., army intelligence service reported the presence of transport ships steaming northward. The army was anticipating enemy landings on that day. The army command became jittery and vacillated as to what course of action to take. In a rapid succession the townsfolk thinned out making the town a real dreaded place. The foot patrols assigned to defend the beaches also withdrew to the interior. What was left behind was the demolition squad of Captain Arcadio Mendoza stationed in Sibalom.

The enemy finally landed at 2:00 a.m. on April 17, 1942. Low tide and unregistered coral reef's scattered along the Hamtic-San Jose area caused unnecessary delay in the enemy invasion schedule. The enemy then waded ashore without the slightest resistance. The reluctance of the army to make a show-down with the enemy was due to the inferiority of their arms not to mention the fact that most of the officers came from the reserve rolls composed mostly of public school teachers. Together with the enlisted men they did not have any battle experience.

The transports disembarked an estimated 150 engineers and foot soldiers and assorted arms.[14] Upon reaching San Jose they ransacked vacant government buildings and some private houses in search for supplies. They herded male laborers to help them haul their heavy war shipments. In no time, a platoon proceeded to Sibalom. When they reached Supa bridge they overtook Captain Arcadio Mendoza and his men on the verge of blasting the bridge. Mendoza became the first military captive.

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[13] Uldarico S. Baclagon, *Philippine Campaigns* (Manila: Liwayway Publishing Inc., 1952), p. 217. Cf. Morton, p. 507.

[14] Information furnished by Ramon Marzoña in San Jose, on December 20, 1965. Mr. Marzoña was one of those rounded up in his house in the early morning of April 17, 1942, together with Benito Cepe. He identified one of the ships as *Fukin Maru IV.*

While waiting for additional reinforcements, the Japanese repaired bridges and removed roadblocks on highways linking San Jose and Sibalom. They pitched their headquarters at the high school site. After a sufficient number of soldiers had arrived they penetrated the interior as a start for flushing out the army. Freely treading the highways and scaling the mountains several times without local resistance, the Japanese announced on April 24, 1942, that "all key points on the coastal lines connecting Antique, Iloilo and Capiz have been brought under their control and the enemy in the mountains of the island had also been subjugated."[15]

The Japanese announcement was too premature since the army was just waiting for an opportunity to strike when the enemy least expected it. To dispel the impression that the army was too scared to face the enemy, two ambuscades against the enemy were staged. The first was in San Remigio and the second in Malbog, Patnoñgon.

The masterminds in both ambuscades had interesting tales to tell. The strategy in the first was engineered by the dashing young Regimental Planning and Training Officer, Major Alfredo A. Villavert. A composite group was organized to raid the Japanese garrison in San Remigio. The group was composed of the the elements of Company "D", Company "B", and the Cavalry Unit. The Composite group was under the charge of Captain Damian Marfil, Executive Officer of Company "B". In consonance with troop disposition, Lieutenant Jose Aligno of the Cavalry unit bivoacked in Lay-on, Lieutenant Jovito Pesayco of Company "D" occupied Timbalan, and Captain Damian Marfil stood by as lookout across Agusipan River. The group was armed to the teeth with automatic Browning rifles.[16]

The unit of Lieutenant Pesayco which was stationed in Valderrama marched on for two tedious days to the designated rendezvous site. After lunch, while they were preparing for the last lap of their march to Lay-on, they saw, to their consternation, Japanese soldiers advancing toward their position. The unnoticed presence of the enemy afforded them no chance whatsoever to take a better position much less to withdraw. In a moment Lieutenant Pesayco's men had deployed after which firing ensued. The firing lasted from 2:30 to 4:30 a.m. That was on May 20, 1942.[17]

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[15] *The Tribune,* Manila, April 25, 1942, p. 1.

[16] Related by Alfredo A. Villavert, Major Infantry Reserve, when interviewed in his Office, Bureau of Public Schools, on December 12, 1965.

The army was outnumbered and outgunned. Conscious that they were fast running short of ammunition they managed to retreat only to find out that their rear flank was an open field while their right flank was a far distance to the mountains. They were caught between "hell and high water." But what a luck! It began to rain hard thereby causing formation of thick fog. They took advantage of the dark visibility to conceal their withdrawal. Minutes after they had withdrawn the firing was resumed. It was thought that some of the men of Lieutenant Pesayco stayed behind to cover the retreat but upon verification to their dismay, the firing, came from another group of Japanese soldiers who occupied their former position. Strangely incredible it seemed but true, they exchanged fire for fifteen minutes among themselves. Civilian information revealed later on that the Japanese suffered heavy losses. It was indeed a miracle that saved the army from being routed.

Another encounter of the army took place in Malbog, Patnoñgon. This time the leader of the team was Lieutenant Pedro Hipoña.[18] At around 1:00 p.m., sometime in the latter part of May 1942, the army received confidential information that the enemy was scheduled to penetrate the north. On the expected date, Lieutenant Hipoña and his soldiers deployed at the eastern side of the bridge approaching Malbog. The ambushers were confident that the Japanese would slow down upon reaching the place because the bridge had been blasted earlier. An excited doughboy, upon seeing the Japanese advance party, started firing with his automatic rifle. Thinking that an order had been given, his co-soldiers joined the firing. Minutes later they withdrew. Reaching the place the Japanese were enraged for they saw no army except empty cartridges. Luis Magbanua and Valentin

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[17] Personal account of Jovito Pasayco, Major Infantry, when interviewed in Manila on June 6, 1966. The same information was narrated by Damian Marfil, Captain Infantry Reserve, when interviewed in Sibalom, Antique, on December 22, 1965.

[18] Related by Pedro Hipoña, First Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, when contacted in Pikit, Cotabato, on April 16, 1964.

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Chico[19] who accidentally happened to pass by were skinned alive for no justification at all. The horror spread far and wide the whole town. From that time on the Japanese became very much feared.

With the growing enemy pressure after the surrender of the army in Iloilo and the spreading of the propaganda about Japan's armed might, an ultimatum for the Antique force to surrender was issued. Those who were not prepared for a hard life surrendered to the enemy, while those who were tougher of spirit and stouter of hearts were resigned to the worst and fled to the mountains.

The Surrender: The two engagements herein mentioned were the only ones officially registered. The army's enthusiasm to resist aggression faded out with the announcement over Radio KZRH of Wainwright's order for "the complete and immediate surrender of all American and Filipino soldiers."[20] Through the chain of command Major General William Sharp, Jr., Commander of the Visayan-Mindanao Forces, radiogrammed Brigadier General Albert F. Christie, Sixty-first Division Commander stationed in the mountains of Baloi, Panay, to decide for himself inasmuch as he (Sharp) had signified to comply with the order of the Headquarters.

General Wainwright's letter to General Sharp relative to the matter reads in part:

> To put a stop to future useless sacrifice of human life on the fortified islands, I tendered . . . the surrender of the four harbor ports of Manila Bay.
>
> You will therefore be guided accordingly, and will . . . surrender all troops under your command both in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao . . .
>
> Colonel Jessie T. Traywick, Jr., G.S.C., my assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, who will deliver this to you, is fully empowered to act for me.
>
> You are hereby ordered by me as the senior American Army officer in the Philippine Islands to scrupulously carry out the provisions of this letter . . .

---

[19] From the Patnoñgon Historical and Cultural Data, compiled in consonance with General Memorandum No. 34, s. 1952, of the Bureau of Public Schools, dated April 28, 1952.

[20] *The Tribune*, Manila, May 8, 1942, p. 1.

Failure to fully and honesty carry them out can have only the most disastrous result.[21]

In compliance with Wainwright's final stand, General Sharp on May 12, 1942, sent the following radiogram to all military commanders of the Visayas —

> ALL MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE PLACES DESIGNATED IN THE ORDERS FURNISHED THE SECTOR COMMANDERS NOT LATER THAN THE DATES SPECIFIC THEREIN STOP THOSE ABSENT ON THOSE DATES BE CONSIDERED DESERTERS AND WILL BE REPORTED TO THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES STOP UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF THE JAPANESE FORCES YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROPER RATIONING OF YOUR TROOPS . . .[22]

This radiogram was not received well by General Christie. He acknowledged receipt of the message but questioned General Sharp's authority to issue such an order. He also doubted the authority of either General Wainwright or General Sharp to issue the order.[23]He had in mind of continuing a passive resistance against the enemy until the final liberation of the country shall have been realized as promised by General MacArthur.

As a follow-up to his message, General Sharp personally dispatched his aide, Colonel Allan Thayer,[24] to Panay Island to discuss the *pros* and *cons* of the order. After painstakingly weighing the matter for two days, General Christie finally gave in to the demands of his superior officer. He then called a staff meeting and drew the grim picture that resistance against a formidable enemy force was futile. Many officers heeded the surrender order in the province of Antique.

The difficulty to contact some officers who were scattered in the mountains prompted the army in Antique to request for extension of the surrender date. Captain Crescenciano Vicedo and Lieutenant Jose Aligno were commissioned by Colonel Griño to arrange with the Japanese the date, time and place of surrender. Upon the return of Captain Vicedo, a memorandum was issued to the field for the information of all concerned.[25]

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[21] Claro M. Recto, *Three Years of Enemy Occupation* (Manila: People's Publishers, 1946), p. 155.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 156.

[23] Morton, *op. cit.*, p. 579.

[24] Morton, *Ibid.*, p. 781.

[25] Related by Crescenciano Vicedo, Captain Infantry Reserve, when interviewed on July 3, 1966, at the residence of Mr. Emmanuel M. Solis in Quezon City.

In the early morning of Saturday, May 30, 1942, officers and enlisted men made an exodus to barrio Ilaures, Bugasong, the designated assembly point. Out of curiosity many civilians also went to the assembly area to witness the surrender rites and probably to have a vivid glimpse of how the Japanese look like.[26] A detail was formed to supervise the stacking up of arms and another to meet the coming of the Japanese.

At around 9:00 a.m. a platoon of Japanese soldiers commanded by Captain S. Nonomura arrived. The ceremonial rites began. In a short speech, Nonomura sought the cooperation of the surrendering soldiers to help build the Philippines under the auspices of the Japanese for a progressive East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere:

1. I am the Defense Commander of the Imperial Japanese Army for the Province of Antique.
2. You have surrendered and disarmed; being Asiatics, I want to explain to you here today, that this is your chance to start for a brighter future.
3. Until yesterday, we were enemies here in Antique, though we tried in our campaign, I am planning to annihilate all resistance by the enemy in the whole island of Panay.
4. Your complete surrender makes me glad, for even if you are only a small portion of the whole Army, it will facilitate the realization not only of our program of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, but also for the peace of the whole world.

x x x x x

10. Think of your past actions and the sufferings you brought upon yourselves; open your eyes to the realities of the present and the benefits that they will bring to you; and then look into the future, for you will be rewarded with the blessings of happiness and peace. Then we will be working together in the establishment of a New Philippines and a Greater East Asia, under the guidance and leadership of the Japanese Empire."[27]

There was emotional tension as viewed from the facial expressions of some soldiers. Personally, they loathe to see themselves in custody of a much-talked-about cruel enemy. It was too late. The army motto is "obey first before you complain." And so they did.

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[26] The writer had the occasion to witness the rite.

[27] Copy of his speech is filed in the *Guerrilla Records*, Central Philippine University, Iloilo City, Vol. CCXVII, p. 3.

On the other hand there was no unanimity of opinion among the soldiers whether to abide or not with the order. Out of around 2,000 men comprising the Sixty-fifth Infantry Regiment, only around thirty per cent showed up and the proportion of the enlisted men to officers was very negligible. Officers who preferred easier life decided to surrender but most enlisted men who were exposed to hardships chose to stay behind, determined to continue the fight. They found refuge in the mountains. A few weeks later they banded together for mutual strength.

From Ilaures the surrenderees marched forty-three kilometers to San Jose under the scorching heat of the sun passing over the night in Barrio Igbobon, Patnoñgon, where two soldiers escaped. From thence, the Japanese became strict.[28] When they reached San Jose, the capital, they were immediately confined in the Catholic church. Army sympathizers attempted to rescue the prisoners on account of reliable reports circulated that raw treatment was accorded them in the detention cells. On July 1, 1942, they were ferried to Camp Delgado, Iloilo City. Together with the surrenderees from Capiz and Iloilo, they were later on transferred to Camp O'Donnell, Capas, Tarlac, to joint the rest of their brother prisoners of war.[29]

The army temporarily lost all hopes because of the surrender. However, a new era was in the transition state — the era that promised redemption.

The Crucial Moment: A short lull reigned in the province after that pathetic Ilaures rites. The civilians thought their chance had come to rehabilitate their homes which were wrecked by the army with its scorched-earth tactics.

Loose firearms, favorable mountainous terrain and thick vegetation abetted lawlessness. Commission of crimes right in the heart of the community was very common for no agent of the law dared to enforce the laws of the land. The renegades used high-powered arms retrieved from the mountains. They easily gathered followers who blindly obeyed their orders. Bloodshed was the clamor of these trigger-happy outlaws, reaping heavy toll on the lives of the innocent civilians.

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[28] Interview with Agaton Grasparil, Captain Infantry Reserve, on August 22, 1965, in Manila.

[29] Interview with Felizardo Ponan, First Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, in Pigcawayan, Cotabato, on April 14, 1965. He was one among those who surrendered and were brought to Camp O'Donnell.

Provincial Board Member Alfredo Pedrosa was ambushed by one of these armed bands while on his way home to Barbaza.

Meanwhile, the Japanese busied themselves hunting for the remaining soldiers who have not surrendered. Frequent enemy patrols were made to see to it that the hiding soldiers observe the order of their superior officers. But even the Japanese were ambushed. The foxy bandits perplexed the Japanese for in spite of the continuous patrols, commission of dastard acts was still on the rise. This situation reduced the people's morale to its lowest ebb. As a consequence, the civilians abandoned their farms and domestic animals in quest for security in the towns. The deserted fields caused a decrease in production. Slowly, starvation was felt throughout the province. There was also marked decreased in supply of domestic animals. The economic needs of the people became scarce and illness became rampant. The people, caught between two fatal forces, had to choose whether to return to their farms and risk their lives to the mercy of the bandits whom they dreaded so much or to submit to a despised regime. An immediate decision had to be made. To act tomorrow would be too late. "A stitch on time saves nine," so the proverb goes.

The Puppet Government: Following the surrender of the army the civil government was formed. Tobias Fornier was appointed governor. He immediately called a conference of the municipal mayors. In the conference, it was resolved that the operation of the local government should immediately begin and an intensive pacification campaign should be undertaken. Civilians who evacuated to the mountains were told to return to the towns. Many responded and returned but a sizeable portion evaded it and remained puzzled by the Japanese procedure of moral suasion.

The civil government officials and civilians who accepted the Japanese offer and lived in the towns were branded "ipso facto" pro-Japanese. Among the puppet officials who vowed to

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help maintain peace and order in cooperation with the enemy occupation forces were the following:[30]

Provincial Officials:

Governor — Tobias Fornier[31]
Board Members — Bernabe Tordesillas and Alfredo Pedrosa
Secretary — Ramon Jabili
Treasurer — Jose Quimpo
Auditor — Leonardo Avila, Sr.
Engineer — Rodolfo Maslog
Superintendent — Jose P. Abrera

Municipal Officials:

Barbaza —
  Mayor — Pedro Gindap[32]
  Vice Mayor — No record
  Secretary — Rafael Nietes
  Treasurer — Alfredo Tayo
Bugasong —
  Mayor — Felino Blase
  Vice Mayor — Candido Arangote
  Secretary — Felix Barte
  Treasurer — Perfecto Varona
Caluya —
  Mayor — Claro Erodias
  Vice Mayor — Francisco Madarcos
  Secretary — Aurelia Cahilig
  Treasurer — Juan Anacleto
Culasi —
  Mayor — Esperanza S. Javier[33]
  Vice Mayor — Simeon Aloro
  Secretary — Bartolome Toboso
  Treasurer — Pedro Lagunday

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[30] Most of the above officials served only for a short number of days, especially in municipalities which fell under the control of the guerrillas.

[31] "Vargas Names 7 Governors," *The Tribune*, Manila, August 15, 1942, p. 1.

[32] Pedro Gindap fled to San Jose when the Japanese left the town of Barbaza.

[33] Mrs. Javier was the vice-mayor, but when the incumbent Marciano Magsipoc died, she took over.

Dao —
Mayor — Sotero Valdellon
Vice Mayor — No record
Secretary — No record
Treasurer — M. Orquez
Laua-an —
Mayor — Baltazar Baladjay
Vice Mayor — Maximo Yabello
Secretary — Manuel Pecaoco
Treasurer — Pablo Orcajada
Pandan —
Mayor — Francisco Candari
Vice Mayor — Juan Dioso
Secretary — Conrado Tua
Treasurer — Gerardo Agravante
Patnoñgon —
Mayor — Juan Abellon[34]
Vice Mayor — Andres Elio
Secretary — Jose B. Aguillon
Treasurer — Simeon P. Abiera
San Jose —
Mayor — Alberto Villavert
Vice Mayor — Catalino Balonon
Secretary — Ricardo Pedriña
Treasurer — Francisco Elizalde
San Remigio —
Mayor — Agustin Marfil
Vice Mayor — Constancio Race
Secretary — Francisco Mecenas
Treasurer — Silvestre Udani
Sibalom —
Mayor — Melquiades Melo
Vice Mayor — Pedro Morales

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[34] When Abellon joined the guerrilla movement on August 12, 1942, he was succeeded by Andres Elio (August 31, 1942, to September 16, 1942), and later on by Bernardino Hernandez (March 1943-January 1944), and later on by Anselmo Alvañis.

Secretary — Francisco Maza
Treasurer — Jose Trinidad, Sr.

Tibiao —
Mayor — Eriberto Bandoja
Vice Mayor — Inocentes Garcia
Secretary — Arsenia Bandong
Treasurer — Nicolas Flores

Valderrama —
Mayor — Gervacio Abrico
Vice Mayor — Leon Mandigal
Secretary — Braulio Mendoza
Treasurer — Braulio Mendoza (acting)

The gigantic task of reconstruction began following the organization of the municipal governments. To effect easy means of transportation, blasted bridges were repaired. In the absence of durable construction materials, coconut trunks and bamboo trees were utilized. Able-bodied males were rounded up by the barrio lieutenants in each locality to work in the reconstruction projects, an example of which was the repair of *grande* bridge in Bugasong. Barrio lieutenant Antonio Varona supervised the cutting and transporting of coconut trunks. Those who evaded the forced labor were arrested.

The puppet officials performed their duties well to satisfy the whims and caprices of the enemy, but often times there were some excesses. They had to be reminded by the guerrillas that collaboration with the enemy was unpatriotic, that they must be careful with their actuations because the final victory of the Japanese was not yet certain.

The Japanese-sponsored civil government functioned smoothly and harmoniously during the first few months of its operation. Military policies were followed to the letter by the officials. Whenever projects were to be undertaken, the "Japanese type" of punishment was applied to exact obedience. The procedure proved successful to the satisfaction of the Japanese, but this was viewed with hatred by the people. The people believed that they were being robbed of their precious time which they could devote to their fields. The forced labor policy bred hatred as proven later.

To guide the provincial executive and the provincial treasurer of their duties under the new order, the Japanese-sponsored Chairman of the Executive Commission in Manila issued Executive Order 42, dated May 18, 1942, defining the powers and duties of provincial government officials. Among the functions of the governor were:

> To be the Chief Executive and Administrative officer of the province and shall be responsible for the efficient administration of the government thereof . . . His decision on administrative matters within his jurisdiction shall be final, unless revoked or modified by the Commissioner of Interior.
>
> To have the power to promulgate provincial ordinances, and consultation with the provincial board, and submit a copy thereof through the Director of local government to the Commissioner of the Interior. . .
>
> To have the power to promulgate provincial ordinances, and consultation with the provincial board, and submit a copy thereof through the Director of local government to the Commissioner of the Interior. . . Such ordinance shall be effective thirty days after the receipt thereof by the Director of Local Governments, unless the Commissioner of the Interior finds the same or any provision thereof to be in violation of existing laws, orders, proclamations or instructions or not in conformity with sound government policy, in which case he may disapprove or modify said ordinances or any portion thereof.[35]

Likewise, the powers and duties of the provincial treasurer as outlined in the order were:

> The Provincial Treasurer shall be the chief financial officer and assessor of the province. He shall have general supervision over the offices of municipal treasurers in the province and it shall be his duty to collect all taxes, fees and charges throughout the province whether they are national, provincial or municipal; have charge of the disbursement of which may be entrusted to him by competent authority; acquire for the provincial government all necessary supplies, materials and equipment for which appropriation has been authorized by competent authority; have custody and supervision of all provincial funds and property, including the provincial buildings and grounds; assess all real property in the province and perform the duties of provincial assessor prescribed

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[35] "Full Text of Executive Orders Nos. 42, 43, 74," *The Tribune*, Manila, August 15, 1942, p. 5.

in the Assessment Law; and prepare financial statement which may be required by the governor.[36]

In the desire of the Executive Commission to meet the pre-war requirements of a province, more appointments were made. Calixto O. Zaldivar was appointed provincial fiscal early in October 1942.[37] For speedy administration of justice, different Justices of the Peace were appointed with two or more towns under the jurisdiction of a judge. Bugasong, Valderrama, Patnoñgon and Laua-an were under the direct judicial charge of Judge Teodoro Alcalin; San Jose was assigned to Judge Arturo Villanueva; Sibalom, San Remigio, and Dao to Judge Perpetuo A. Lotilla; Tibiao, Culasi, Barbaza, and Pandan to Judge Everardo Javier.[38]

In like manner, on May 1, 1944,[39] new municipal executives were appointed replacing the incumbents who either resigned or left their posts for fear of guerrilla reprisal. The following were the new municipal mayors appointed. Pedro Gindap for Barbaza (reappointed); Sotero Valdellon, Dao; Anselmo Alvañis, Patnoñgan; Felipe Operiano, San Jose; Manuel Omallao, San Remigio; and Agaton Grasparil, Sibalom. Bernardino Hernandez and Bernabe Tordesillas were appointed members of the Provincial Board.[40]

Conrado Barrios and Felix Bautista Angelo were appointed judges of the fifth district with seats in Iloilo to preside over cases in Iloilo and Antique.[41]

Of all the personages who served the puppet government, Melquiades Melo was the most controversial. He was the incumbent mayor of Sibalom when the war broke out. When the town was occupied by the guerrillas in October 1942, he fled to San Jose. On the first weak of December the Japanese drove the guerrillas out and established their permanent garrison. Melo was reinstated mayor. Since there were no inhabitants in the *poblacion*, his first job was to campaign and convince the people to return to the town. They were assured of their safety by the Japanese from guerrilla harrassment.[42] Fausto Armada assisted Melo in this ticklish job. In Sibalom, Melo began implementing Japanese policies, helping the invaders in their drive against the "deserters."

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[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Official Gazette*, Vol. I, No. 10, October-November, 1942, p. 711.
[38] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 7, April 1944, p. 759.
[39] *Ibid.*, May 1944, pp. 866-867.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 865.
[41] *Ibid.*, November 1943, p. 393.

The unwarranted activities and utterances of Melo were interpreted by the opposite camp as seditious. He was labelled a thoroughly brain-washed Japanese collaborator and a number one Fifth Columnist. Heading the blacklist prepared by the guerrillas, he "deserved to be liquidated." Others who were included in the blacklist were:[43] Luis Gatela, Olympia Gatela, Juan Abancio, Domingo Melo, Valeriano Cabrejas, Nicolas Vego, Sinforoso Pagunsan, Betolio Duazo, Fernando Brown, Apolinario Yambog, Victorino Yagaya, Alipio Arnejo, Juan Obsiana, Juan Algura, Pedro Candelario, Eustaquio Pagunsan, Vicente Abancio, Rustico Abancio, Dionisio Ayson, Juan Onanad, Martin Duatin, Pedro Ecraela, Lucas Ecraela, Cleto Gargueña, Flaviano Tordesillas, and many others. Melo was suspected to have acted on several occasions as a Japanese guide in locating the army's hideouts and as a tool of the Japanese in the cold-blooded murder of several innocent lives. Despite several attempts to liquidate him, Melo emerged unscatched.

To counteract the brazen charges that he was a die-hard collaborator and anti-Filipino, Melo boasted of having saved several lives from the dreaded "samurai" of the Japanese. He claimed to have saved the lives of Plutarco Salvani, Baldomero Cagalawam, Acelopio Galedo, Jesus Molvizar, Ernesto Echalar, Filemon Barrios, Uldarico Jarandillo, and Filemon Aldea. When three suspected men were about to be burned alive in Barrio Millamena by the Japanese he again used the influence of his office to save the life of an innocent aged man, Gorgonio Abosolo, one of the suspects.

However, Melo's usefulness would be diminished as the days dragged on. On February 1, 1944, he was replaced by Agaton Grasparil.[44] Grasparil was a bureau of education district supervisor of Dao, Antique, when the war broke out. Being a reserve officer he was called to active duty in December 1941. Designated Assistant G-3, 61st Division, he was entrusted with the construction of five caches in Mount Baloi. He was a strong proponent of the "no surrender" slogan. But when he returned from a mission in Capiz he found out that the members of the division staff were nowhere to be found. He crossed the mountains for Antique where at the prodding of Captain Horney he surrendered together with the Antique contingent on May 30, 1942, at Ilaures, Bugasong. After he was released from the concentration camp he returned to Antique. He was offered the mayorship of Sibalom after Melquiades Melo became *persona non grata* to the Japanese. Grasparil set the following conditions before accepting the position:[45]

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[42] Interview with Mr. Melo in Sibalom, Antique, on December 24, 1965.

[43] Report of the Chief of Police of Sibalom to the Deputy Governor, First Administrative District, dated November 18, 1943.

[44] Melo was ousted from his position when he failed to pay the laborers hired by the Japanese to cut bamboos. The Japanese gave Melo money and rice for that purpose.

1. That no Japanese patrol would be organized under the jurisdiction of Sibalom without his prior knowledge;
2. That recruitment of Sibalom residents who were to work in the Ishiwara Mines be coursed through him;
3. That items, materials, and foodstuffs procured in Sibalom be duly paid;
4. That suspected persons be killed only after he was notified;
5. That he be given a free hand in the administration of Sibalom.

When these conditions were accepted, he solicited the approval of the underground leader. Having a double role — a municipal mayor and as underground informer — he curbed the activities of the enemy and minimized the killings of suspected civilians.

Another puppet official who played an important role during the Japanese occupation was Tobias Fornier. Like Melo, he too saved countless lives. Among those he saved were Melquiades Melo, Santiago Marquez, Graciano Delgado, Severo Osunero, Feliciano Jordan, Delfin Nava and Rosauro Apayart. To the Antiqueños, Fornier was a patriot and a tested leader in times of distress. He did not falter from his duties to serve his people well. Although aware of his official limitations, he was, however, always guided by principles in all his actuations. When confronted with a dilemma on whether to surrender or not, he chose the latter to alleviate the sufferings of his people. In the darkest hours of the Japanese occupation in 1944, he was formally asked by the Japanese Air Corps commander to provide them with "first class women" entertainers, but he bluntly rejected the request, contending that the women in his province were not trained to become entertainers, and that they were well-bred and came from decent and highly educated families.[46] Fornier's defense of the Filipino womenhood endeared himself later to the Antiqueños.

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[45] Interview with Agaton Grasparil, Major Infantry Reserve, San Juan, Rizal, April 15, 1966.

Another puppet official who represented Antique in the national government was Alberto Villavert. He was commissioned captain in the Reserve Force, USAFFE. When his comrades-in-arms were brought to Capas, Tarlac, he was retained and appointed by the Japanese mayor of San Jose. In 1943, he was elected representative of Antique to the National Assembly of the Philippines. He was a member of the Civil Service Committee, Committee on Revision of Laws, and Committee on Labor in the National Assembly.[47]

Pedro G. Velasco and Bernabe Tordesillas were the delegates to the Special General Assembly of the *Kalibapi* that ratified the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines submitted by the Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence.[48] When Villavert was elected representative of Antique, Tordesillas acted as mayor of San Jose from September 21, 1943, to November 23, 1943.[49]

The Enemy Zone: It was thought at first that the primary purpose of the Japanese in establishing different garrisons around their zone was to help the civil government maintain peace and order in the wake of the reported sporadic raids by armed bands against the innocent civilians. The turn of events, however, proved otherwise. The garrisons instead were used as centers for disseminating Japanese culture, and as base of operation against the guerrillas who did not only oppose their military administration but also secretly worked for their dislodgment.

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[46] Interview with Albino Abiera in San Jose, Antique, on January 21, 1966. The same information was conveyed by Agaton Grasparil. He was then mayor of Sibalom and he was given a quota to produce five women.

[47] "Assembly Forms 9 Committees," *The Tribune,* Manila, November 7, 1943, p. 1.

[48] *Official Gazette,* Vol. I, No. 12, September 1943, pp. 866-877.

[49] *Ibid.,* No. 2, November 1943, p. 131.

Two schools of opinion cropped up in the enemy zone; one supported the Japanese political doctrine and the other advocated adherence to the status quo. The group who supported the first school of opinion believed that the victory of Japan was permanent and they therefore deserved whole-hearted support. The second group was of the conviction that in the long run the United States forces would come back to liberate the country. These two opposing schools of opinion remained *de facto* up to the last days of the Occupation.

The enemy zone was comprised of the towns of Patnoñgan, Sibalom, San Jose, and San Remigio. In these towns garrisons or outposts were manned by the Japanese army, Philippine Constabulary, and Coastal Defense Corps (CDC). The latter was locally known as the standing army. The rest of the towns were under the influence of the army.

The town of San Jose was well fortified. Being the seat of the enemy military government, outposts were established at its fringes. The purpose was to protect the civilians inside the towns and to warn the main force of any impending danger. The defenses of San Juan were never threatened by the army considering that the complement of its force was comparatively small. The Japanese were confident of the mobility of their forces in other capitals to come to their rescue in case their position was endangered. To conceal their numerical inferiority, the Japanese put up ruses, like boarding their motor boat for Iloilo during the night and returning to San Jose on foot the next day to impress the people that reinforcements had arrived.[50]

The next garrison of equal impregnability was located in the town of Sibalom. The Japanese deemed it reasonable to make it invincible to protect their mining intererst in Bongboñgan. Early in July 1942, the Japanese began the construction of roads linking the copper-rich barrio to the Sibalom town proper. At the start of the guerrilla movement Sibalom was abandoned by the Japanese. On December 3, 1942, when enemy reinforcements arrived, the army was repulsed. From thereon two platoons of soldiers were permanently stationed there. They built a half-kilometer long tunnel from the garrison extending westward to the rice field. The tunnel saved them in November 1944, when they were hard-pressed by the army.

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[50] Interview with Aurelio Salazar, ex-USAFFE and former member of the Japanese-sponsored PC, in Manila on September 29, 1965.

At the early part of the occupation of Antique Captain S. Nonomura took charge of the security measures of the town including the outlaying barrios of Villar, Mantarawis and Bongboñgan. During the daring ambuscade by the army in Villar, Captain Nonomura was critically wounded and was brought to Iloilo City for emergency treatment.[51]

Captain S. Nonomura was succeeded by another officer whom they called Captain Tanaka.[52]

The last garrison commander was Captain Kai.[53] He was admired by the civilians because of his humanitarian observance of international law governing countries at war. He was a refined officer and had a working knowledge of democratic processes. It was gathered that he studied and stayed long in the United States. Unlike other Japanese officers who were extremely secretive, Captain Kai showed a marked difference for he often divulged certain military information, like the rendezvous of the United States submarines in northern Antique. He also revealed, based from intercepted messages, the return of General MacArthur to the Philippines along with the Liberation Forces. When conditions in Sibalom became critical he allowed puppet mayor Agaton Grasparil to slip out of town.

The Patnoñgon garrison ranked third as to its defensibility. Well-entrenched inside the Roman Catholic convent with sufficient supply of foodstuffs and water, this position was never endangered. A platoon of Japanese soldiers was assigned to guard the place.

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[51] Interview with Alipio Cordero, Captain Infantry Reserve, in Sibalom, Antique, on December 26, 1965.

[52] Letter of Fructuoso Sabug to the writer, dated October 19, 1965. Mr. Sabug was the Assistant Secretary of the puppet mayor of Sibalom and at the same time an undercover man of the guerrilla. The same information was related by Gervacio Abrico, former puppet mayor of Valderrama.

[53] Interview with Agaton Grasparil, Major Infantry Reserve, in San Juan, Rizal, on April 15, 1967. He was the last puppet mayor of Sibalom.

The garrison established in Laua-an was quite weak. Because it was far from the supply base in San Jose, the Japanese abandoned it on September 16, 1942, after it was raided by the men under Lieutenant Benjamin Empestan.[54] The garrison in San Remigio was occupied in 1942. When the guerrillas intensified their campaign in November and December 1942, the Japanese abandoned it. But when Japanese reinforcements arrived, it was reoccupied in 1943. The headquarters was established in Carawisan and outposts were set up in Calagitan, Batuan and Loy-a. The stay of the Japanese in San Remigio inconvenienced the civilians who stuck it out with the Japanese. Those residing outside of the town were suspected to be supporting the guerrillas. While the Japanese were on patrol one day, they caught with Severo Marfil. He was suspected a guerrilla, so he was killed. In December 1943, the Japanese transferred their headquarters in Barangbang. Their stay in Barangbang cost the lives of Jose Pablo, Gloria Petinglay, Necitas Vegafria, Manuel Villasor, Pacifico Villasor and Mr. Maghari. Mr. Nicolas Fabila and Federico Miguila were caught but freed.

When the Japanese abandoned San Remigio, the army established their headquarters in Barangbang. They also killed the following civilians on the suspicion that they were collaborators:

1. Maximo Banusing
2. Portivillar Cabrillos
3. Aparicio Teodoro
4. Bonifacio Cabrejos
5. Miguel Masmellas
6. Arcadio Rafol
7. Francisco Cabrillos
8. Francisco Garces
9. Fr. Vicente Toding
10. Esteban Aduana.

The Guisang-an garrison was also abandoned for security reasons. After the Japanese left Laua-an, another garrison was established in Magarang, Patnoñgon. The Japanese detail stayed there up to the latter part of 1944.

Some of the Japanese outposts were set up in Vego Hill, Villar, Bongboñgan Taripis Hill, Cansadan Hill, Tubudan Hill, and Malandog. The Villar outpost was the last to be abandoned.

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[54] Interview with Benjamin Empestan, First Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, in San Jose, Antique, on December 22, 1965.

Apart from garrisons and outposts, check-points were also posted at strategic places to safeguard the garrisons or outposts as they afforded the Japanese the chance to counter-check the activities of the civilians entering and going out of the zone. The check-points also benefited the civilians in many ways.

The Japanese employed Filipinos as spies in the check-points to detect suspicious-looking persons. These spies also told on local officials and reported to the Japanese those whom they suspected of disloyalty. Their "catch" were reported to the Japanese who grilled the suspects in a gruesome style. One Japanese "spy" the common *tao*. When the local government machinery started blacklisted by the army for his nefarious activities was Elias Santillan of San Pedro, San Jose. He was allegedly responsible for the sufferings of several persons whom he reported as spies of the army.

The indiscriminate killings based on mere suspicion and hearsay proved disastrous to the Filipinos as a whole. Many suffered without having been given a chance to be heard. In return the informers were also blacklisted by the army and those caught were liquidated in conformity with the ancient adage, "Eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth." The vindictiveness of one group against the other generated a chain of vendetta killings in many places which continued long after the war was over. Severino Iglesias was one of the unfortunate victims of these vendettas.

Mr. Iglesias was a former member of the Japanese controlled Philippine Constabulary (PC) during the occupation. When the enemy fled the capital he fell into the hands of the army. After he was duly identified, he was manhandled. After the restoration of the civil government, he became a "tough guy" in San Jose.[55] He began looking for his tormentors. He manhandled anybody he suspected to be a former guerrilla. His notoriety reached its height when he killed his girl friend Virginia Conlu. He met his doom in the hands of a public official in San Jose, Antique, in 1946.

At the beginning, the Japanese Occupation Forces displayed friendliness toward the people. They did many things to attract the common *tao.* When the local government machinery started to function efforts were made to give employment to the laboring class. Construction of roads and the operation of the Ishiwara Copper Mines (Ishiwara-Sangyo Kabusiki Kaisha Ltd.), in Bongboñgan were among the projects that necessitated steady supply of laborers. Idle laborers were herded to work in the mines. Puppet mayors were given "quotas." As expected, many from far-flung places came and presented themselves for work. The local labor was later augmented with the released prisoners of war from Capas, Tarlac.

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[55] Interview with Antonio de los Reyes, National Media Production Center, Manila, January 24, 1967.

There were around 1,500 workers employed in the mines, ranging from laborers to technicians. Five hundred worked in the mines, five hundred in road construction and maintenance, and five hundred performed miscellaneous jobs like carpentry, electrical, security, and messengerial.[56] The workers were recruited from the idle labor in the province and most of them were ex-prisoners of war who volunteered to work in the mines. The first batch that arrived to Antique was mostly composed of civilians and was headed by Captain Delfin Baylen; the second batch and the biggest comprised ex-prisoners headed by Captain Damian Marfil; the third, by Captain Santiago Villalona; the fourth, by Lieutenant Amado Yangson; and the fifth, by Lieutenant Estanislao Santos. The organizational set-up of the mining company included the General Utility Department Health Department, and Administrative Department. Masao Tubo headed the Administrative Department.[57] He married a Filipina and became sympathetic with the Filipino laborers. With his knowledge of English he befriended many laborers in the mines. Taminiti Kamituri, who also married a Filipina, was the cashier of the mines.[58] Other Japanese officials of the mines were Sibamura San (Superintendent of the mines) and Kato San (construction engineer.[59]

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[56] Interview with Dionisio Marfil, former foreman in the above-mentioned mines, in Sibalom, Antique, on December 21, 1965.

[57] Interview with Amado Yangson, a former foreman in the mines, in Manila on November 28, 1966. Masao Tubo married Salvacion, daughter of Zacarias Cadaldaban of San Jose, Antique.

[58] Related by Juanita Española, wife of Kamituri who is presently connected with the Antique School of Arts and Trade when interviewed in Sibalom, Antique, on December 21, 1965.

[59] Related by Amado Yangson, Dionisio Marfil, Damian Marfil, and Ramon Marzoña when interviewed in San Jose, Antique, and Manila.

Kato was cruel. He was responsible for the death of Rufo Gordon of Egaña and Bonifacio Abad and his wife Victoria of Ilabas, Sibalom.

The laborers were required to work ten hours a day starting 7:30 a.m. Rain or shine there was no let-up in their work. The motto of the hour was "time is gold." Oftentimes the laborers were forced to work even if they were indisposed. The Japanese seemed to put into actual test the biological adage "elimination of the unfit and the survival of the fittest." In simple parlance, "those who shall not work shall not eat." For a whole month's labor they were only allowed two days vacation leave. The dire necessity of raw materials to carry on the war to a successful finish was very indispensable. Premier Hideki Tozyo emphasized during his meeting with mine workers in Japan that the "task in the mines is a responsibility which needs not differ in importance to the work of officials and men of the Imperial Forces in the frontline."[60]

The laborers and employees of the mines were quartered in three different barrios and sitios under the municipality of Sibalom. The first and the second batches were housed in Villar; the third batch in Cadoldolan, and the fourth and fifth in Igdagmay. A company composed of Japanese Army, Philippine Constabulary and Ishiwara Mines Police served as security of the workers.[61]

Another manifestation of the enemy's pacification program was the opening of the schools in San Jose and Sibalom. The opening of classes, the enemy believed, would induce parents to return to their homes in the *poblacion*. As prescribed under Order No. 2 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Army, subjects to be offered should conform with the "six basic principles of education[62] and that Nippongo would be taught."[63] The opening of classes commenced in July 1943,[64] in line with the policy enunciated by the Japanese Military Administration. In San Jose, P. Abrera served as Acting Division Superintendent of Schools; Mr. Arturo A. Villavert, principal; Aurora Tordesillas, Nippongo teacher; and Roquita Tordesillas, Tagalog teacher in charge. The Sibalom elementary school was headed by Mariano X. Rojo as principal, with Francisco Occeña, Juan Vego, Alfredo Tordesillas Rosario Magbanua and Marietta Cordeña as classroom teachers. Three of these teachers were sent to Manila as pensionados to specialize on certain subjects.[65]

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[60] *The Tribune,* Manila, April 2, 1942, p. 1.

[61] Related by Damian Marfil, Captain Infantry Reserve, a foreman in the Ishiwara Copper Mines during the Japanese Occupation, when interviewed in Sibalom, Antique, on December 22, 1965.

[62] The six basic principles are: 1) To stress the position of the Philippines as a member of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. 2) To eradicate the old idea of the reliance upon the Western nations especially upon the U.S.A. and Great Britain, and to foster a new Filipino culture based on the self-consciousness of people as orientals. 3) To endeavor to elevate the moral of the people, giving up to over emphasize of materialism. 4) To strive for the diffusion of the Japanese language

Comparatively speaking, the residents in the enemy zone had a fair measure of prosperity from the economic standpoint than the civilians living in the army zone. The enemy advantage was that they controlled the rice producing towns of Sibalom, San Jose, and San Remegio. Furthermore, the enemy zone was sparsely populated because people who evacuated to other towns before the enemy landing failed to return to their homes. Added to the boom was the opening of the Bongboñgan Copper Mines. Supplies, materials, and goods for both Filipino workers and Japanese nationals began to arrive in considerable quantities. Textiles, rice, soap, dried fish, and other vital home necessities could be bought either in San Jose or in Bongboñgan for moderate prices in Japanese currency. The lure of these prime commodities prompted some people to return to the occupied area.

While the civil government of Fornier's puppet administration was busy with the peace formula to win the support of the people, the Japanese soldiers were also occupied with their mopping-up operation. To force the guerrillas to come to terms, the Japanese laid out a master plan designed to crush the resistance of the army in a short period. Believing that the civilians were pampering the guerrillas, it was thought wise to expand their zone

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in the Philippines, and to terminate the use of English in due course. 5) To put an importance to the diffusion of elementary education and to the promotion of vocational education. 6) To inspire the people with the spirit to love labor. "Army Lays Down Educational Aims," *The Tribune*, Manila, February 18, 1942, pp. 1-2.

[63] "Nippongo in All Schools in 1943," *The Tribune*, Manila, December 30, 1942, p. 1.

[64] Related by Mariano X. Rojo, *loc. cit.*

[65] Alfredo Tordesillas and Aurora Tordesillas specialized in Nippongo and Juan Vego, Tagalog. Related by Vego when interviewed in San Pedro, San Jose, on December 28, 1966.

by establishing a garrison in Dao in the south and in Bugasong in the north to deprive the army of its supplies. With this vast areas under control, there would be no more room for the guerrillas to hide. The sources of their supplies would also be affected, hence, they would be compelled to surrender or abandon their cause. The plan did not materialize because of the limited supply of manpower, funds, and, above all, the risk involved. The guerrilla organization was gaining rapidly in strength and the Japanese authorities were fairly aware of their handicaps not to mention the fact that Governor Fornier was not receptive to the idea at the expense of the Philippine Constabulary.[66]

In spite of the drawback, the Japanese did not stop apprehending *guerrilleros.* In the middle part of November 1942, after reinforcements arrived, they attacked the army outposts in Bulalacao, Telegrafo, and Mantarawis and successfully occupied them. Thereafter, they sent patrols to areas known to be occupied by the army but failed to make contacts. Instead they were ambushed in their return trip. The enemy became tired of the hide-and-seek tactics of the local fighters. Thinking that they could win by publicity and by labeling the guerrillas as disturbers of the peace, the General Headquarters in Manila issued the following statement:

> The pick of Imperial Japanese Army troops, which in cooperation with the Navy units, opened the punitive drive against the marauders in the Visayan areas about the middle of November, this year, are at present actively engaged in annihilative operations all over the region.
>
> At the time when the Imperial Forces were landed in April, this year, the enemy in the Visayan region surrendered to the Japanese Army in large numbers. Some of the beaten soldiers who ran into the mountainous areas, however, have turned regular bandits later due to the food shortage.
>
> In recent months, moreover, these remnants began inciting the local residents with groundless rumors that the American forces were coming back, and they began perpetrating disturbances. . . It was in the face of such disturbance of public welfare in the Visayan region that the Army authorities had decided to carry out a punitive operation against the marauders.[67]

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[66] Aurelio Salazar, *loc. cit.*

[67] "Army, Navy War on Guerrilla," *The Tribune,* Manila, December 1, 1942, p. 1.

It was during this punitive drive that the Japanese became frantic. Whenever they were ambushed and in their failure to locate their enemy, they turned against the civilians. To remedy the wanton killing of civilians they initiated the "return to town" campaign. Civilians were told to leave their evacuation places to save themselves from the cross fire between the guerrillas and the Japanese patrols. Putting pressure on the campaign, the Japanese dropped propaganda leaflets by airplanes, urging the people to come down from their mountain hideouts and live in the towns.

The first attempts did not pay dividends. The civilians lent them a deaf ear. Weird tales of Japanese sadism had sown terror upon their minds. To them, flight to an unaccessible interior served to offer them the sanest alternative. "After all," they said, "by keeping away from the enemy and hiding in the hillside did not mean they were supporting the guerrillas." Leaflets were again dropped giving them ultimatum to heed the order otherwise patrols would be sent to comb the mountains and they would have to suffer the consequences. This time the civilians took the bait and in a matter of few days they tropped back to their respective barrios and towns. Their stay, however, did not last long for the army began to intensify the campaign against the enemy to show off their newly acquired submarine-shipped Thompsons, carbines, garands, bazookas, and grenades. This worsening condition began to be felt in 1944 when the Japanese suddenly abandoned the majority of their outposts and garrisons for security reasons.

The civilians who relied on Japanese assurance of protection later realized their mistakes. Sensing that pandemonium would likely follow, the civilians clandestinely slipped back to their mountain hideouts for safety's sake. The mass escape of the civilians from the enemy-held areas was preceded by the defection of two members of the Philippine Constabulary who reported to the army.[68] Finally, the siege of the capital town followed. The Japanese left their last defenses in Antique and withdrew to the mountains only to be sniped at one by one.

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[68] Aurelio Salazar and Francisco Gindap were the first members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) who defected to the army. (Interview with Mr. Salazar on November 29, 1965.)

Peace and Order Agencies: After the terms of surrender were finalized, a company of Japanese soldiers was garrisoned in San Jose. Inspired by their partial successes in other parts of the country, they entrusted the job of maintaining peace and order to the Philippine Constabulary and the Neighborhood Association. The workability of the plan, of course, would relieve the military men from performing civil tasks and reducing the military burden of the Japanese forces who were needed in other battle fronts. In fact from the time they landed in April 1942, up to the time they were driven out of the province in 1945, the Japanese forces' strength was never so big to warrant the annihilation of the Antique guerrillas.[69] What swelled their ranks and files were the Philippine Constabulary and the Coastal Defense Corps which they organized.

The idea of reviving the Philippine Constabulary to serve as peace and order agency was conceived in May 1942.[70] It was primarily aimed to "foster the police officers to be ready to sacrifice themselves for the cause of the construction of the new P.C. and to pioneer the mission, the cornerstones of the improvement and elevation of the police."[71] A Filipino historian on the other hand viewed the training as a retaliatory measure "against the guerrillas or bandits, as the Japanese called them."[72]

The call for volunteers in the Philippine Constabulary was publicized in *The Tribune*, the lone metropolitan Japanese-controlled paper at the time. Many jobless youngsters registered for for training in the constabulary service. Those who desired to qualify should at least be from 21 to 23 years of age. The training expected to foster "spiritual discipline and understanding of the Japanese Nationality," and its special objective was to "cultivate moral character and acquisition of their business rather than on legal and theoretical education."

The maintenance of peace and order in the province of Antique was entrusted to the constabulary which started with a token force of one platoon and later expanded into two companies with an estimated strength of two hundred.[73] The commanding officer was Captain Oscar P. Rialp, with Lieutenant Basilio T. Henson as Executive Officer. Among the junior officer were Lieutenants Jacinto Tadique, Manuel Chavez, Angel Sanchez,[74] Emmanuel Padpad, Macel, and Ramirez. The Japanese-sponsored Philippine Constabulary (PC) had its Headquarters in the San Jose Central Elementary School. The contingent was divided into several platoons and assigned to different garrisons, outposts, and check-points, after finishing two to four months refresher course for the USAFFE's and six months for the volunteers. In the training schools, subjects taken up were history and ideology of the war, Japanese military discipline, Niponggo, and Japanese patriotic songs.[75] The nature of their work as enunciated in the directive issued by the higher headquarters called for the maintenance of peace and order in places falling under their jurisdiction. Inasmuch as the local municipalities did not have their police force at the time, the constabulary was the one who policed the towns. They enforced the ordinance passed by the provincial board and the municipal councils and cooperated with the Japanese military authorities. But the most important job of the PC, according to Commissioner Jorge B. Vargas was the "outright extermination of those outlaws and the establishment of lasting peace and order throughout the land..."[76]

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[69] Interview with Valentin V. Grasparil, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry Reserve, Sibalom, Antique, December 21, 1965.

[70] *The Tribune*, Manila, May 28, 1942, p. 1.

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years*, Vol. I (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1965), p. 362.

To give encouragement to the rank and file of the constabulary who fell victims while discharging their duties, the Commissioner issued Executive Order No. 134, dated January 10, 1943. The fiat provided funds covering burial and miscellaneous expenses incurred by members of the bereaved family of a dead soldier. Likewise, disabled members of the Constabulary were also entitled to receive "disablement compensation equivalent to six months salary and allowances at the rate of pay at the time of his separation."[77] It was no wonder then that many young men wanted to join the PC in spite of the risk involved.

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[73] Interview with Juan Cebuano, former member of the Japanese-sponsored constabulary, San Jose, Antique, December 22, 1965.

[74] Lieutenant Sanchez was later on transferred to Iloilo as Instructor in the PC Academy.

[75] *The Sunday Tribune Magazine,* Manila, August 14, 1942, p. 1.

[76] *The Sunday Tribune Magazine,* Manila, December 20, 1942, p. 1.

During the mopping up operation and/or penetration conducted by the Japanese, the PC soldiers joined the patrols. This practice afforded the enemy good psychological advantage over the army. Seeing a sizeable composition of enemy patrols, the army avoided the encounters. Primarily, the job of the PC was to help "eliminate misguided elements, bandits, marauders, and disturbers of peace." To all intents they were sworn in to perform such solemn duty as to satisfy the Japanese ego. By force of circumstances, the guerrillas were obliged to snipe at any patrol either Japanese or PC in retaliation. The enmity between the two forces — the PC and the guerrillas — ended only in the middle part of 1944 when it became apparent that the submarine shipment of arms and ammunition from the United States had come. Thereafter, secret collaboration between the PC and guerrillas were forged. The feeling of brotherhood and camaraderie between them was awakened. With the brotherly compact inked, information concerning Japanese troop concentration and deployments the type and locations of enemy installations, the type and quantity of resources, the nature of their control over local economy, and the character of the support they might expect from the native population, were easily relayed to the underground army.

The arrival of US aid came to the attention of the PC and Japanese during the exchange of fires during encounters and from captured arms. In fact in October 1943, in a secret meeting between the PC headed by Captain Luis Magbanua in Bia-an, San Jose, the former were amazed to see new arms sported by the latter.[78]

The Neighborhood Association was another agency that helped in the maintenance of peace and order through extension of work to the barrios. In fact it was the pulse-feeler of the Japanese Propaganda Corps aimed at attracting civilians outside and within their zone. The objectives and purposes of this organization were grand but meaningless. The "Concern was neighborhood program of mutual helpfulness, group uplift, and common protection." It resembled the "Bayanihan System" — a practice known to every Filipino long before the Japanese came. As announced, the objectives of the Association were the following:[79]

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[77] *The Tribune,* Manila, March 18, 1943, p. 1.

[78] Interview with Alberto Javier, Jr., First Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, on January 16, 1967, in Quezon City. Together with Rialp were Angel Sanchez and Jose Abrera; on the army side were Alberto Javier, Jr. and Dariyes Nacionales. The meeting was initiated by Rialp for the purpose of convincing the guerrillas to lay down their arms. The meeting was a failure.

1. To insure the maintenance of peace and order;
2. To function as an administration's lower organization or as an organ to the KALIBAPI (Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas);
3. To act as an executive organ for mutual assistance and co-operation; and
4. To collect and distribute commodities.

The first aim was interpreted as a departure from the reign of terror to co-existence.[80]

The objective attracted a big percentage of the masses. One year of Japanese occupation was too long for those who did not have an ample supply of essential commodities. The commodities that were due from the neighborhood would help them very much.

The years of crisis were 1943 and 1944. By force of necessity the individuals sacrificed principles for their basic needs. Most hungry people kept saying, "you can not eat principles." The desire to own a pair of shoes, a yard of cloth, a pound of sugar, a ganta of rice or salt, a cake of toilet soap, or any household item available in the neighborhood *cantina* compelled the people to join the organization. In fact, many surreptitiously secured neighborhood membership cards just so they would be entitled to procure the daily rations. It was not surprising, therefore, that many outsiders trekked to the Japanese occupied area. Had the supplies been abundant throughout the critical years this system could have wielded tremendous influence.

Alfredo Villavert was the executive officer of the Neighborhood Association in Antique. Albino Z. Abiera acted as the spokesman. Since the main concern of the organization was to avert food shortages, Abiera was sent to Manila to undergo a three-month in-service training specifically on food-production.[81] The campaign to ameliorate the economic conditions of the people was quite a success. Every vacant lot or backyard was planted with cassava and other root crops. Home beautification was also made a part of the campaign as embodied in the Association's provisions which read:

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[79] *The Tribune*, Manila, August 19, 1943, p. 1.

[80] In accordance with the Japanese verbal instruction to puppet Mayor Melo of Sibalom, those who would return to the town, whether they serve guerrillas or not, would be set free.

> The task of the neighborhood association was the spirit of mutual aid and public service which we so sorely lacked in the past is the foundation of the neighborhood association and with the organization of Filipino homes into neighborhood groups, we may say that the granite cornerstone for the promotion of that spirit has been laid. The distribution of prime commodities has been turned over to the association in order that balanced and equitable allotment he attained. The function delegated to the neighborhood association cannot be said to be primary. Without self-sacrifice and willingness to serve others, the smooth distribution of goods can not be attained.[82]

The KALIBAPI helped actively in the food production drive by initiating a nation-wide fruit tree planting campaign. Its national art exposition, cultural contests, provincial fairs, and patriotic holidays were encouraged. The association did not lag behind in their campaign to preserve the health and sanitation of the province in general.

The Neighborhood Association was organized on the basis of ten families each. Ten Neighborhood Associations composed a District Association under a district chief who was responsible to the town mayor. Each barrio in the towns of Sibalom, Patnoñgan and San Jose had its own district head. Each individual in the neighborhood was responsible for any crime committed in his community. The Neighborhood Association, as an organ of the KALIBAPI was laudably ushered in San Jose and Sibalom but was frowned upon in the town of Patnoñgon. In remote barrios the people were interested only in getting the commodities and paid no attention to the sugar-coated enemy hyperbole. Many residents were not aware of the "real purpose of the neighborhood association was to apprehend guerrillas with the cooperation of the leaders or presidents of the vast network of associations."[83]

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[81] Interview with Albino Z. Abiera in San Jose, Antique, on January 2, 1967.

[82] *The Tribune*, Manila, April 20, 1943, p. 1.

Enemy Atrocities: As the bitter days slowly unfolded, brutalities, cold-blooded murders, and wanton killings were committed here and there by the invaders. Gone were the good old days of chivalry when the position of women in the society was revered and honored. Under the new era, the dignity of Filipino women was desecrated and grossly abused. Women were lynched for refusing to give in to the dastard intentions of the murderers. A man could not in conscience forget the barbarous atrocities committed by the Japanese. Those inhuman acts were nation-wide and there was seemingly no attempt to stop them. The late Claro M. Recto, in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the puppet government, denounced the abuses of the Japanese soldiers to General Takehi Wati, Director-General of the Japanese Military Administration.[84]

The Japanese were vindictively allergic to the death of their soldiers. Any member of their armed forces killed by the army or civilian was being paid dearly with ten or more Filipino heads. The late puppet President Jose P. Laurel observed that for a single Japanese soldier killed, the Japanese "wiped out men, women and children and even the inhabitants of the whole barrio."[85]

On September 18, 1942, on mere suspicion, Geronimo Morales, Jose Nietes (incumbent mayor of Laua-an) Salvador Escaldo, and Carlos Calubiran were slain and their bodies thrown into a well in Pis-anan, Sibalom. In other killings, Manuel Gallera was fatally shot following discovery of a 45-calibre pistol in his possession. Vicente Vedeja and Lapu-lapu Vedad, were stabbed many times with bayonets after being waylaid in Nagdayao, Sibalom. Adding insult to injury, the Japanese went to the extent of intruding into people's domicile, which act was a violation of the international law. How could they convince the people that their coming was to "restore the dignity of the degraded oriental people" and part with the exploiting imperialistic occidental when their actions spoke louder than words?

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[83] Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

[84] Mauro Garcia, *Documents on the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines* (Manila: The Philippine Historical Association, 1965), p. 109. Cf. Molina, *loc. cit.*, p. 353.

[85] "War Memoirs of Dr. Jose P. Laurel," (Manila: Jose P. Laurel Memorial Foundation Inc., 1962), p. 24.

The carnages committed by the Japanese soldiers were apparently considered by their commanders as military glory. The perpetrator of crimes in Panay, identified as Major General Takeshi Kono, was responsible for many deaths. He was bloodthirsty and as such was dubbed "Butcher of Panay."[86] On July 18, 1943, in barrio Millamena, Sibalom, three persons were hog-tied inside a house and were burned alive. They were identified only as Emilio, Henry, and Victor. Emilio was caught in an improvised guard-house. In cooperation with the army he was on routine duty when caught. In those days the home-guards were under instruction to stay in their posts to observe the trading or purchasing activities of the civilians.

Teodulo Gabor, a shop teacher in the Antique High School before the war, was caught and bayoneted mercilessly several times when he was caught in his hide-out. He was fortunate to live to relate his harrowing experiences. Tomas Rectra, another public school teacher was bayoneted to death in Guia, Pandan. Father Henry von Amstele, parish priest of Laua-an was killed when he refused to heed the enemy's request to use his church as headquarters.[87]

From 1943 up to the end of 1944, the enemy was at the height of their indiscriminate killings. They became cruel and vindictive for their failure to crush the guerrillas. Then on December 21, 1943, the army raided the Japanese garrison right in the heart of Sibalom. The following day being market day, many people, some of whom were from the outskirts of the *poblacion,* came to sell or buy their household needs. The Japanese noted that a certain Juan Basañes was seen coming from the direction where the army raiders deployed the night before. He was nabbed as a suspicious character. After being rigidly searched the Japanese discovered in his custody a letter containing Christmas greetings intended for a certain Luz Garfin and signed by Gabriel Checa.[88] The letter served as *prima facie* evidence which justified the culprit's identity with the underground forces. He was detained. On the same hour and day Domingo Huera was also caught with the discovery in his possession of several empty blank catridges from an Enfield rifle which he picked from the place where the raiders deployed. He had in mind to use the blank catridges for his fishing net. He, too, was detained on suspicion that he was an army agent. Minutes later a man peddling a sack of salt was apprehended. Since nobody vouched for him he was also detained. The Japanese called Mayor Melo to identify the detainees. Failing to convince the Japanese of their innocence, the detainees were brought to the public plaza and were made to squat in a triangular position with their backs facing against each other. They were given bayonet thrusts before the eyes of a horrified public.

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[86] Nicanor Maronilla Seva, "The Law of War and Philippine War Crimes Trials," Unpublished Bachelor's Thesis, Manila, Adamson University, 1950, p. 79.

[87] Interview with Esteban Lomugda, Sergeant Infantry Reserve, in Laua-an, Antique, on December 25, 1965.

[88] Interview with Melquiades Melo in Sibalom on December 29, 1965. Mr. Melo was the mayor of Sibalom when the incident happened.

Ernesto Barrientos, an intelligence officer under Lieutenant Valente, was collared in San Jose. He was pressed for the whereabouts of Mayor Juan Abellon and his unsatisfactory explanation caused him to be hanged to death upside-down on July 26, 1943.[89] A lucky fellow was Victor Pagaduan. He was caught, too, by a patrol in Barabanua, Sibalom in September 1943. After he was tortured he was tied to a post to be burned, but his "angel" saved him when suddenly a burst of gun-fire was heard across the river. Confused, the Japanese deployed and advanced in the direction of the fire. He was temporarily forgotten. Thereupon, he untied himself and scampered for freedom.[90]

Sebastian Gono of Bugasong was tending his carabao when caught by the Japanese patrol. Brought to their garrison in Magarang, he was manhandled and tied to an *enyam* tree. Finding no clue as to his participation in the guerrilla movement he was released after the *teniente encargado* vouched for him. He was ransomed by his mother who gave six chickens and two dozen eggs.[91]

On February 22, 1943, the Japanese penetrated the northern towns of Antique. Upon reaching the town of Bugasong they divided their forces in two; one group took the shoreline and the other followed the national road. The group that passed the shore scanned the marshy nipa groves in Hinalinan. Jose Almonte, Mateo Matillano, Bernardino Santurdio, Vicente Gertos and his son and ten others were killed. Their blood-soaked corpses were left floating in the swamp.[92] Six months earlier, in the *poblacion* of Bugasong, Alfredo Militante was caught with a wound. Suspected as a member of a foraging band of outlaws, he was brought to San Jose for interrogation. Since nobody dared to identify him, he was butchered with a samurai sword, then pushed in a hole he himself had dug earlier.

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[89] Interview with Benjamin Valente, First Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, in Iloilo City on January 1, 1966. The same information was related by ex-Mayor Juan Abellon of Patnoñgon on December 20, 1965.

[90] Interview with Victor Pagaduan in Sibalom, Antique, on December 22, 1965.

[91] Interview with Dominga Vda. de Gono in Iagbalañgao, Bugasong, Antique, on January 1, 1966.

On September 5, 1943, a repetition of what they had done in Barrio Milamena was perpetrated on Alfredo Odi. He was tied to a post in his house and burned for his inability to give the desired information as to the accurate station of the army.

The highest toll in lives suffered by both the civilians and army men registered in June 1944, September 1944, and April 1945. The army suffered its most serious blow in Barbaza on June 9, 1944. The sad episode wrecked an entire section of the army. The Japanese patrol disembarked from their boat in Beri, San Antonio, Barbaza at around 1:00 p.m. on June 8, 1944. The operation caught the army off-guard. The assault that ensued took the lives of Captain Gil Mejares and eight of his soldiers, namely: Lieutenant Cornelio Salarda, Sergeants Victorino Pendon, Simeon Segundo Nelmo, Privates Leopoldo Rodriguez, Cresenciano Feratero, and Ramon Imperial, of the Regimental Staff, Sixty Fifth Infantry Regiment.[93] Two intelligence officers (S-2), Fabiola Eustaqui and Panfilo Trinilla were also caught and killed.

The death of Captain Mejares was considered the most remarkable feat ever achieved by the Japanese in their two and a half years of subjugation of the province. Captain Mejares and his companions were herded like cattle and later killed.

In a separate massacre on January 18, 1944, in Barrio Salvasion, Sibalom, thirty-four innocent civilians were victimized.

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[92] Based from the diary of Lucio Bacaoco, a retired public school teacher.

[93] Letter of Fidel Juanitas, Technical Sergeant Infantry Reserve, to the writer dated August 25, 1965. Mr. Juanitas was with the group who were killed, but he escaped.

Others killed were Petronila Petiaoco, a classroom teacher, Wenceslao Udango, Leonila Abancio, a certain Gaudioso Veñegas and his wife. Only a few survived to narrate their ordeal on that horrible day. Perfecto Udango stated that he was among those herded and could have been killed had it not for Juancho Abancio, a member of the Constabulary force who was with the patrol. Abancio interceded for him by telling the Japanese that Perfecto was his father.

On January 6, 1944, in the outskirts of Sibalom thirteen persons were killed by the Japanese. Vicente Opao, his wife and a seventeen-year old daughter Francisca were among the victims.[94] On the same day Blas Opao, his wife and a one-year old child were beheaded. Together with the foregoing corpses floating near the Pangpang bridge at Sibalom river were that of Tomas Gatela, his wife, Mateo Gatela, his wife Susana, their two children and Perfecto Gillera.

Of all the towns in Antique, Pandan ranked second as to death toll suffered at the hands of the Japanese. Information furnished by Jesus Villamon, District Supervisor Pandan with the collaboration of ex-Captains Dalmacio Dy Buco and Adriano Samulde[95] revealed that forty-nine civilians were shot, bayoneted, or burned in Pandan.

In Barbaza the following were reported murdered:[96] Gonzalo Pecaoco, Silvestre Pecaoco, Rafael Nabong, Leonardo Gindap, Joaquin Andres and Rafael Juanitas. In Barrio Tabongtabong of the same town, Florentino Badong, Manuel Martin and Domingo Pascual were innocently killed. In Belison, Patnoñgon, the following met the same fate:[97] Enrique Escañer, Gaudencio Ballarta, Tranquilino Lamprea, Apolonio Casiano, Rufo Banusing, Ireneo Pingoy, Julian Opao, Lamberto Galedo and Juan Lancara. The latter was caught with some medicine in his pocket and was suspected as a medical officer in the guerrilla.

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[94] Interview with Doroteo Opao, son of Vicente Opao of Sibalom, Antique, on December 26, 1965.

[95] Letter of Jesus Villamon to the writer, dated August 25, 1965.

[96] Historical and Cultural Data on the Municipality of Barbaza compiled in consonance with General Memorandum No. 34, series of 1952 dated April 28, 1952, of the Bureau of Public Schools.

[97] Historical and Cultural Data of the Municipality of Patnoñgan, *op. cit.*

Punitive Operation: At the start of the occupation, the Japanese soldiers manifested signs of friendliness. Just after they landed they solicited the civilians' good will to help them in their reconstruction program. In response to the call many were employed in the mines, foundry, and road-and-bridge construction. However, the Nippon-Filipino honeymoon did not last long. The intensification of guerrilla activities against the enemy changed their attitude from friendly to hostile. They were now bent on retaliatory expeditions with greater intensity to break the backbone of the resistance movement.

In the middle of November 1942, the Japanese army in synchronization with their navy opened a deadly blow against the guerrillas. By then they called the guerrillas with different terms like — "bandits of the hills," "misguided elements," "robbers," "renegades," "unruly bands," "stragglers," "disturbers of peace," and "deserters." To combat these various elements, training of released USAFFE prisoners went underway.

From September 1942, to the early part of November 1942, the guerrillas moved freely raiding enemy garrisons. But their happy days were numbered. After the Japanese received their reinforcements, punitive drives against the army commenced. They patrolled in sufficient strength leaving no room for the exit of the guerrillas to freedom.

It was the common practice of the enemy to take along members of the Coastguard Defense Corps (CDC) during penetrations. Accordingly, these pro-Japanese forces were more active and cruel in dealing with their fellow countrymen. These CDC's aptly referred to as the "standing army," was an all-Filipino organization. They were trained and indoctrinated along the Japanese Imperial Army style. For that matter they could hardly be distinguished from the Japanese during patrol time. They also wore Japanese uniforms. Known to have pro-Japanese leanings, practically any atrocity committed was blamed on them. Since they have the full command of the local dialect it was easy for them to pick out a guerrilla from a civilian.

In June 1943, Plutarco Salvani, Miguel Salvani, Uldarico Jarandillo, Pedro Escañer and Rafael Silva were victims of the CDC manipulations.[98]

Based on the report of the Office Civil Affairs, the total death toll suffered by the civilian population from July 1942 to December 1943, as a result of their punitive drive was thirty-nine. Then from January 1944 to November of the same year, it rose to 438. These figures referred to cases which were officially reported. Many deaths were not reported because eyewitnesses were either confused where to report the cases or they were busy with their work.

In February 1943, when the Japanese penetrated north, they came across Clemente Juadiong, a guerrilla. Juadiong thought that the enemy was part of his platoon sent earlier on mission to the shore. Unmindfully, he ran towards them only to be cut down with a volley of fire. In the same year when the Japanese penetrated to the mountains of Patnoñgon, they caught seven persons. Justo Magbanua, Crescencio Gonzaga, Pe Sin Yong and four unidentified persons were killed.[99]

On March 21, 1944, two platoons of Japanese soldiers were sent on punitive drive against the elements of Lieutenant Victorino Einosas in Lambayagan, Sibalom. It was a market day in that barrio and the Japanese wanted to surprise the soldiers as well as civilians. In the afternoon of March 20, information was received that the enemy was heading for Lambayagan. Lieutenant Einosas assigned Private First Class Clemente R. Sermeno, Privates Juan Villoso, Ignacio Sarce, and Evangelista as forward guards. At around 1:00 a.m. of March 21, the enemy began firing at their position. Private Ignacio Sarce was hit on the right thigh and died a few hours later. Sermeno sustained the firing while his companions were retreating. It was on this daring act when he was hit by the enemy machinegun in the left arm. He was amputated to save his life.[100] The fight continued the whole day, with the army retreating and the enemy pursuing. When Lieutenant Einosas' men reached Bulalacao he was joined by the platoon of Lieutenant Sixto Magbanua of Company "E". Established on a favorable ground near Tapugay Creek, they waited for the enemy. At 2:00 p.m., firing resumed. It lasted up to 8:00 p.m. without let-up. Sergeants Ireneo Fadrillan, Francisco Alagos, and Amado Dañgan were the casualties in that encounter. The firm stand of the army saved the life of Sergeant Alejandro Esteban of the intelligence section who was captured earlier.[101]

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[98] Interview with Rafael Silva, former Provincial Board Member for Antique in Malate, Manila, on December 18, 1965. The Cabiling brothers were responsible for his apprehension.

[99] Interview with Rafael Magbanua, retired Public School Principal, in Iloilo City on August 1, 1966.

[100] Interview with Clemente R. Sermeno, a veteran pensioner, in Sibalom, Antique, on December 22, 1965.

On the early morning of April 2, 1944, the Japanese patrol raided the outpost of Company "C" under Lieutenant Pedro Norella in Toog Hill, Barangbang, San Remigio. Sergeant Jose P. Bello was the lone casualty. The men of Lieutenant Vicente Amabran who were on shift that day were taken by surprise.

When the Japanese penetrated to the north on June 23, 1944, they surprised the personnel of the Intelligence Service (S-2) in the house of Alfredo Galela. Failing to capture the fleeing soldiers, they proceeded to barrio Tagudtud, Bugasong, and came across three women — Petra Capistrano, Narcisa Jauod, and Ignacia Tenorio. In their trip to Talisay, they ganged up on Tomas Sanchez who was tending a carabao. Suspected as a disguised guerrilla he was bayoneted to death. Entering Cubay, Bugasong, they nabbed Asuncion Galela. Adjudged guilty of hiding supplies for the use of the guerrillas she was burned along with a one-year old nephew, the child of Hugo Galela.[102]

Bombings of places which could not easily be reached were part of the Japanese tactics of annihilation. On July 30, 1944, the town of Bugasong was bombed. It was Sunday and a market day in the town. The pilot was probably attracted by the crowd. The son of Antonio Bantolo was injured during the bombing.[103]

Investigating Agency: Although the civil government headed by Tobias Fornier was supposed to be responsible for the civil affairs of the province, he was simply there as a figure head, for the real power rested on the Imperial Japanese Army. In matters affecting the disposition of suspects regardless of whether they were guerrillas or civilians, the Kempeitai or Military Police had the final say. The Kempeitai had the most powerful arm of any military branch in the Japanese Army. This agency was assisted by the Philippine Constabulary, if the necessity warranted. Only in few instances when the evidence presented was doubtful that the opinion of the civil authorities was sought. The most that Governor Fornier and Mayor Villavert could do when a civilian or a guerrilla was turned over to the Kempeitai was to beg for mercy.

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[101] Jose Managuit, *loc. cit.*

[102] From the diary of Lucio Bacaoco, a public school retiree.

[103] *Ibid.*

The Japanese style of determining the guilt or innocence of a person was through the use of violence which was exercised by the much dreaded Kempeitai.[104] The first thing they did to a suspect was to give him the third degree. If they could not get the desired information they would "water-cure" him, or expose him to the heat of the sun, or else hang him upside down. With those unbearable investigative methods, it was said, many were forced to admit participation in the underground movement, even if they were innocent. After a suspect was found guilty he was made to dig his own grave in a space behind the present Antique Vocational High School. Knowledgeable sources estimated no less than three hundred heads rolled in that little "cemetery."[105]

In mild cases the local Philippine Constabulary men were allowed to handle the investigation of civilians caught in patrols.

A Japanese Imperial Forces proclamation disseminated in 1942 listed the following crimes punishable by death or other severe penalties after due investigation had been conducted.[106]

1. Any person who rebels against the Japanese Forces;
2. Any person who intentionally and falsely guides the Japanese Forces, warships or transports;
3. Any person who commits act of espionage, collects or betrays vital military secrets to the enemy, or gives such information to the public;
4. Any person who states false information or spreads wild rumors of military importance;

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[104] Aurelio Salazar, *loc. cit.*

[105] Interview with Francisco Elizalde, Jr. in Singalong, Manila, on August 13, 1965.

[106] *The Tribune*, Manila, January 14, 1942, p. 1.

5. Any person who steals arms, ammunition, provisions, clothing or any other objects of military importance which are under the care of military authorities;
6. Any person who inflicts damage or destroys roads, waterways, bridges, or railroad signs;
7. Any person who refuses to obey orders of military authorities; and
8. Any person who pollutes drinking water by poisoning or in any other way.

THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

The guerrilla movement in Panay, specifically in Antique, was inspired by the "I shall return" announcement of General Douglas MacArthur.

In a conference exclusively convened by General F. Christie to sound out the opinion of his staff, seventy per cent registered a negative vote. In the wake of this development Lieutenant Colonel Macario Peralta, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff (G-3), pleaded to his commanding officer that he preferred to lead a resistance movement for which he needed financial assistance to start with.[107] To that effect, General Christie handed him several thousand pesos. With the money as an initial operating expenses, the guerrilla outfit was organized in June 1942, following a meeting of some officers in Lambunao, Iloilo. Colonel Peralta was recognized the leader since he was the most ranking officer who started the organization.

To expand the area of his command and jurisdiction, Colonel Peralta through Major Rafael Almacin dispatched Lieutenant Gabriel Tuazon to Antique to get in touch with responsibile leaders. From thence, the Antique guerrilla organization was born. The rise of the Antique guerrilla with its generic traits, organizational and financial problems and how it overcame these same, had become a significant part of the province's history.

Beginning of the Underground Movement: The guerrilla movement began to operate in full swing when it received recognition from the headquarters of General MacArthur in Australia. At first, a few Filipino soldiers and roustabouts saw the advantage of grouping into small gangs and preying on the public. It took them quite a long time to arrive at a mature perspective. These roving small bands fused together to make a regiment that drove the enemy out.

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[107] Interview with Macario Peralta, Jr., General Reserve, Guerrilla Chief of Panay, Malate, Manila, March 27, 1967.

On the date set as deadline by the Japanese army for the USAFFE to surrender in Antique only a handful few responded, the rest had decidedly ignored their superior officer's order. Major Silverio Nietes and few of his men holed up in Barrio Pangalcagan, Bugasong. After securing arms for his men he ordered the civilians living within the perimeter of the army caches to safeguard what were kept in the bodegas for future use.

Sergeant Vicente Manzanilla, Nietes' old buddy, was designated Executive Officer. Later he was joined by Sergeant Russel Tordesillas and Corporal Vicente Salvani. The former acted as a Detachment Commander and the latter as Finance and Supply Officer.[108] In thirty days their number swelled to fifty-four including two intelligence men (G-2).

On July 6, 1942, the Japanese patrolled in Guisijan, Laua-an. Throuph tactful inquiries they received a tip that the wife of Vicente Manzanilla, a constabulary man, was residing there. They decided to arrest her. Arrest of members of the immediate families of the guerrillas was a part of the Japanese scheme to force hiding soldiers to bow to their rule.

At about the same moment when Mrs. Manzanilla was evading the pursuing enemy, Sergeant Tordesillas was caught offguard by the Japanese.[109] He was utilized as guide to locate the hiding place of Major Nietes and Sergeant Manzanilla. But by sheer luck he was able to slip clandestinely from the hands of his captors. Immediately he boarded a sailboat for San Jose.

When Sergeant Manzanilla learned that his wife was being hunted by the Japanese he decided to give up to the enemy in order to end once and for all the odyssey of his wife and the members of the family. Upon reaching Guisijan and having been informed that his wife took the boat for Patnoñgon he immediately followed her. His four days sojourn in Patnoñgon was characterized with fear and apprehension. After studying the situation carefully, he wrote Colonel Ricardo Perez, his former Commanding Officer in Antique who was with the Japanese to negotiate for his surrender.[110]

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[108] Interview with Vicente Salvani, Sergeant Infantry Reserve, in San Pedro, San Jose, on December 20, 1965.

[109] Interview with Russel Tordesillas, Captain Infantry Reserve, in Sibalom, Antique, on December 28, 1965.

In the designated place the party rendezvoused. Colonel Perez was with Major Angel Salazar, Jr., and Francisco Nuñeza, Manzanilla's brother-in-law. They discussed the terms of surrender. After he was informed by his brother-in-law that one hundred of his relatives and another one hundred of his wife's side would be killed in exchange of his head, he hesitatingly went with Colonel Perez to Bugasong where the Japanese were waiting. Upon the suggestion of Cohero, the Japanese interpreter, Manzanilla was given a mission to accompany Alberto Villavert, Emegdio Nietes (brother of Major Nietes), and Protacio Ybut to the mountain redoubt of Major Nietes.

Upon reaching Pañgalcagan, Manzanilla and Villavert stayed behind while Nietes and Ybut proceeded to Igcaturong mountain.[111] Availing of his intellectual ability and brilliance and his dexterity in argumentation, Major Nietes in tearful language bowed to a pleading younger brother.[112] With his surrender on July 12, 1942, the band under him disbanded.

His surrender did not deter, however, the urge of the remaining soldiers in other sections of the province to resist the enemy. Inversely, the impact of forced surrender inflamed the people's patriotism. Armed groups formed in towns far from the Japanese garrisons, pledging to themselves to continue the fight against the enemy until victory was won. In Barrio Humabol, Sibalom, Captain Valentin V. Grasparil, a young military man burning with a high spirit waited for an opportune time to strike.

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[110] Interview with Vicente Manzanilla, First Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, in Pasay City, on May 22, 1966.

[111] *Ibid.*

[112] Emegdio Nietes took interest to convince his brother to surrender because of the threat that he and the whole members of his family would suffer the consequences.

He was over vigilant over the movements of the enemy. This officer became the head of the province later on.

Captain Grasparil shortly before the surrender was the liaison officer of the Sixty-first Division (G-2) assigned in Antique, His military career began in April 1931 when he joined the 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts in Fort Wm. McKinley, Rizal. When hostilities broke out he was sent to Anilao, Iloilo, and assigned to the Advance Message Center, Sixty-first Division. With a reputation for bravery, and commanding personality, and a cowboy stamina, he pledged to stake his life, if necessary, until the enemy was subjugated. To him, facing court martial was better than to be a captive of the enemy. Topping it all, his wife delayed his plan. She argued that not being an Antiqueño herself, she forsaw hard life ahead if she was left alone.[113] It was through the pleading of his loving wife that moved Grasparil's innermost feeling.

Following the simple rites in Ilaures, Bugasong, soldiers trekked to Captain Grasparil's house to consult him on vital questions of the day. He did not at first give attention to such overtures as he was observing closely how the Japanese would govern the province through the puppet officials. Two weeks later he learned that Major Nietes was conducting a passive resistance in Pañgalcagan. This encouraging information invigorated his weakening stamina. He was weighing the matter seriously when a messenger arrived and told him to report to Iloilo for a conference with Colonel Macario Peralta, Jr. Peralta verbally ordered Grasparil to organize the guerrilla movement in Antique, to contact all professionals who wish to join the organization, suppress lawlessness, collect firearms and ammunition, and coordinate his activities with the civil authorities.[114] Returning to Antique, he called Roque Namo, his former intelligence enlisted man, and Salvador Mondido, his former driver. He informed them of his plan to regroup. His idea spread like wildfire all over the province. In a moment's notice, the Corderos, Daguinotan, Baldad, Protacio, and Einosas responded to the "call to arms."

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[113] Primitiva Grasparil was from Mulanay, Quezon.

[114] Interview with Jovito Elisan, Sergeant Infantry Reserve, in Manila on November 25, 1966. Mr. Elisan was present in the conference when Peralta told Grasparil verbally.

Several days before Grasparil formally organized his forces, a band of around twenty-four men in Barbaza was already in operation and had pledged to combat lawlessness and protect themselves from possible harassment by the puppet officials.[115] The overall organizer was Sergeant Gideon Yonque. Yonque was a former member of the Philippine Constabulary who chose the course of resistance by organizing a band in his hometown, instead of subserviently following the order of surrender. Yonque and his older brother Ismael and Alfonso Marquez, Roberto Jumauay, Vicente Silva, Ismael Ybera, and Soriño, converged in Capuywan, Barbaza, to map out their course of action.

Still further north in barrio Canurup, Culasi, Lieutenant Felipe Alpas had blue-printed the organizational set-up of another outfit. Lieutenant Alpas was called to active duty on December 12, 1942. He reported in Dingle, Iloilo, and was inducted into the USAFFE on December 30, 1941. When his outfit surrendered, he went home to Culasi. On August 3, 1942, Alpas, Silverio Cadiao, Juan de Lara, and Amador Estelloso agreed to pool their resources for a noble purpose. This was necessary to combat unruly bands who were molesting the evacuees. They made Culasi as their base of operation.[116]

In the municipality of Patnoñgon, two bosom friends, Orlando Flores and Vicente Salvani, contacted other army men of the town in order to form a cohesive group which would act as one united front to safeguard the helpless residents from unscrupulous individuals. Flores wooed his comrades-in-arms, who were with him on their way to Patnoñgon when they heard the order to surrender, to join him in their crusade.[117] The two soldiers theoretically drew the sphere of their respective areas. Ipayo River and Sibalom River were placed under Orlando Flores, while from north of Ipayo to Cañgaranan River was under Vicente Salvani. In August 1942, acting on the order of Captain Grasparil, the men of Salvani were turned over to Simeon Furio.

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[115] Interview with Gideon Yongue, Second Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, in Barbaza, Antique, on December 25, 1965.

[116] Interview with Felipe Alpas, Captain Infantry Reserve, in Culasi, Antique, on December 25, 1965.

[117] Interview with Lieutenant Orlando Flores in Iloilo City on August 15, 1966. Mr. Salvani related the same when interviewed in San Pedro, San Jose, on December 20, 1965.

This unit later became Company "L", while that of Flores was merged with Sergeant Anecitas Daguinotan's band which became Company "E".

Further north of the province Captain Dalmacio Dy Bucc, together with Captain Adriano Samulde, persuaded the unsurrendered soldiers to standby for any eventuality. While in Dao, southernmost town of the province, Melquiades Raba, a former member of the Philippine Constabulary, hatched an idea to organize a resistance outfit. In Guisijan, Laua-an, Lieutenant Benjamin Empestan having learned of the underground organization founded by Grasparil, initially contacted hiding servicemen to constitute his own unit. Like other organizations mentioned earlier, Empestan's group was also motivated by the unselfish design to protect its members from being molested much less threatened by bandits. These bandits sported heavy arms recovered from the surrendered army and the civilians as well. To subdue them, a stronger force was needed.

Individual Exploits: When the different guerrilla bands had gathered enough followers and collected sufficient arms they successfully stamped out banditry in their respective areas. Next they vied with each other in demonstrating their valor by raiding Japanese garrisons and sniping at enemy soldiers on patrol duty. At this stage the Japanese, with the help of the puppet officials, and through treacherous manuevers, succeeded in a large measure to coerce and intimidate easy-going ex-USAFFE men to surrender. When the Japanese patrol went to Mablad, Barbaza, to haul the contents of the caches there, they were ambushed by the men of Sergeant Yonque. The unwarranted hostility of Yonque prompted the Japanese to mobilize their resources and might against him. This incident signalled the beginning of shooting war in Antique.

Another daring assault was conducted by Ramon Absalon, a civilian volunteer. Acting on the orders of his superior officer, Lieutenant Empestan, he raided the Japanese garrison in Laua-an. Fearing that they would be cut off from their base of supply when the army intensified its activities, the enemy abandoned their garrison on September 16, 1942, and returned to San Jose. It was an initial triumph for the guerrilla army and a tribute to the heroic feat of Lieutenant Empestan and his men.[118]

In Sibalom, Captain Grasparil, inspired by the confidence and responsibility delegated to him by Colonel Peralta as commander of the Antique force, called a conference in Barrio Humabol to lay down the major plans of his newly ushered organization. Then along with thirty men he ordered Lieutenant Nunilon Protacio to raid the Japanese outpost in Barangbang, San Remigio; Sergeant Anecitas Daguinotan with forty-five men to stand by at Atabay, San Jose, and ambush the reinforcement that might be sent to San Remigio; and Corporal Alipio Cordero to lead his forty men to Tipuluan river and blockade the Japanese reinforcement coming from Villar, Sibalom.[119] Although the plan fizzled out because of the failure of Protacio to carry out the order, it marked the beginning of the so-called "command responsibility" advocated by Grasparil over the whole guerrilla movement in Antique.

The deployment of Daguinotan's men at the outskirts of San Jose did not escape the vigilant eyes of the Japanese. They were immediately pursued by the enemy to Egaña, Sibalom. Daguinotan's band fled to the hills where the enemy lost track of them. Two days later the Japanese Command reinforced its outpost in Barangbang, San Remigio. On the way to Tipuluan River, the Japanese spotted Corporal Alipio Cordero and engaged him in a hand to hand fight but he eluded capture by applying his knowledge of the local "judo." Failing to bag Cordero, they instead nabbed Pedro Gatela Milan whose fate was unheard of since then.[120]

The following day two truck-loads of Japanese reinforcements were sent to San Remigio. As they were crossing Tipuluan River they got stalled because of the ditches dug purposely by the men of Cordero the night before. When the Japanese alighted to clear the way for their vehicles owing to the deep canal, they were felled by the volley of fire from the men of Cordero who dug in within the vicinity. The assault made the enemy furious of their unseen enemies.

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[118] Interview with Benjamin Empestan, First Lieutenant, Finance Service Reserve, in San Jose, Antique, on December 28, 1965.

[119] Interview with Valentin V. Grasparil, Lieutenant Colonel Infantry Reserve, in Sibalom, Antique, on December 21, 1965. The same information was related by Cordero, Daguinotan, and Protacio.

[120] Interview with Alipio Cordero, Captain Infantry Reserve, in Sibalom, Antique, on December 22, 1965.

The group of Sergeant Victorino Einosas who assembled in Luyang, Sibalom, was not so lucky. The men he posted in Nagdayao, Sibalom, were surprised by the enemy patrol on September 12, 1942. Lapu-lapu Vedad and Manuel Gallera were captured alive. Esteban Omadio was able to escape with a wound on the right leg.[121] Einosas' unit was later on merged with that of Dionisio Cabrela and became Company "F".

Not to be outdone, the men of Daguinotan tried their luck at the Japanese in Sido, Sibalom, but when the enemy retaliated, they scampered in disorderly withdrawal. The recruits and fresh volunteers returned to their unit two days later.

The most successful ambuscade which left a lasting imprint in the guerrilla records was the one conducted by the detachment commanded by Sergeant Russel Tordesillas. Tordesillas was given thirty-eight men to ambush the Japanese soldiers enroute to San Remigio. On September 23, 1942, he deployed his men on the hill just thirty meters from the main road. At 7:00 a.m. a truck load of Japanese soldiers passed by the target area and was greeted with a volley of fire from automatic rifleman Dionisio Belonio. The place of the ambushers was so located on a vantage point that all the Japanese soldiers in the truck were annihilated. The ambushers were aided by Sergeant Daguinotan's men.[122] Their booty after the encounter consisted of five revolvers, twenty rifles, and two transits. Captured alive were Manuel Rafols, driver and a mining engineer identified only as Dizon. Dizon was later released and allowed to return home to Luzon. So far that was the heaviest loss ever sustained by the enemy which was duly accounted in their two and a half years of subjugation of the province.

Other bands stationed in the different parts of the province contented themselves with easing out banditry. Robberies were minimized in Bugasong and Valderrama because of the presence of an organized force under Sergeants Emmanuel M. Solis and Jaime Pacete.

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[121] Interview with Esteban Omadio, Sergeant Infantry Reserve, in Sibalom, Antique, on December 24, 1965..

[122] Interview with Anecitas Daguinotan, Captain Infantry Reserve, in San Jose, Antique, on December 23, 1965.

Sergeant Dionisio Cabrela and Corporal Melquiades Raba tried their luck in an encounter in Hamtic but were compelled to flee due to enemy superiority in strength and arms.

The efforts of the civilians to bolster the fighting spirit of the *guerrilleros* was contributory factor for the early success of the resistance movement.

Initial Raids: Inasmuch as the objective of the early underground movement was to inflict a fatal blow against the enemy, if not totally to drive them out of the province, adequate preparation was imperative. For several days they were preoccupied in collecting arms, procuring foodstuffs and supplies, and contacting soldiers who failed to report. At the start many were hesitant to join the cause of the movement. But compelled by a sense of patriotic obligation they finally placed themselves at the disposal of a responsible official.

It was estimated at the time that enemy strength did not exceed one hundred fifty and what was necessary was courage, patriotism, and tact to win the support of the puppet officials. The last factor called for the coordinated activities of every sector commander. To attain the objective, Captain Grasparil began sending contact men throughout the province to get puppet officials and Japanese sympathizers to act in their favor. In dealing with some puppet officials, who, by their words and actions, were more Japanese than Filipinos, harsh words like "liquidate" and "kill" were used. This was deemed appropriate to neutralize their pro-Japanese leanings.[123]

In a letter addressed to Lieutenant Felipe Alpas in September 1942, Grasparil stated: "If you have already reorganized them (the soldiers), march them to Sibalom. Along the way, raid the town of Barbaza, kill the mayor and disarm the policemen. In the town of Laua-an, kill the mayor and policemen and all the Japanese soldiers."[124] In his memorandum to Juan Abellon dated

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[123] Grasparil, *loc. cit.* When interviewed by the writer. Jose Managuit, *ex-guerrillero*, said that it was necessary during those days to frighten civilians to make the organization succeeded.

[124] Letter of Captain Grasparil to Captain Samulde and Lieutenant Felipe Alpas, dated September 15, 1942.

September 18, 1942, he said, "Never give any mercy to the 5th columnists. Grab them at the first opportunity...instruct your men to snipe them."[125]

The initial raids were directed against the puppet officials. After having occupied the towns in the northern part of the province and detained the puppet officials, the different units were reorganized preparatory to the attack on enemy garrisons.

September to December 1942, were busy months for the resistance movement in maneuvering the troops. Troops were assigned within the effective range from enemy garrisons ready for any showdown. Lieutenant Alpas in his capacity as acting adjutant of the force, disposed of the troops in the following places or sectors: Captain Dalmacio Dy Buco (leader), Benjamin Empestan, and Claro Alongsagay were assigned in San Pedro-Senaja sector; Captain Adriano Samulde (leader), and Sergeant Gabriel Checa, Hamtic sector; Captain Valentin Grasparil (leader), Sergeant Russel Tordesillas, Lieutenant Felipe Alpas, Sergeants Victorino Einosas, Emmanuel M. Solis and Ignacio de Guia, northern Sibalom sector; Sergeant Anecitas Daguinotan (leader), Vicente Villasor, Eliseo Baldad, Sergeant Silverio Cadiao, Lieutenants Juan de Lara and Modesto Nagrampa, northeast Sibalom sector; Sergeant Alipio Cordero (leader), Ramon Absalon, Dionisio Cabrela, southeast Sibalom sector. A partial report revealed that the strength of the Antique force which participated in the "front lines" during this period was estimated at 790 with 478 assorted weapons (460 caliber RI-30, 18 AR caliber C-30, and shot guns and pistols)[126]

Each sector commander had a mission to perform — to harass the enemy. Sergeant Tordesillas who was assigned to Sibalom was ordered to lie in wait in Odiong for the possible reinforcement coming from San Jose while Villar was under attack. He deployed his men at around 5:00 a.m. in November 1942. Two hours later three trucks appeared headed for Villar. When the first enemy truck was about forty yards away from their position they opened fire causing the immobilization of the other trucks. The exchange of fire lasted until 9:00 p.m. It was estimated that all the thirty-six occupants of the first truck was killed or wounded. An unmanned machine gun remained mounted. In the stillness of the night the Japanese from the other trucks overheard Tordesillas conversing with his men as to who would dare volunteer to get the machine gun. Private Simeon Ramiro who responded quickly was fatally hit by bullets fired from a Japanese "pik-pok" rifle. He died instantly on that tragic day, November 17, 1942.[127]

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[125] Memorandum of Captain Grasparil to Mayor Juan Abellon of Patnoñgon, dated September 18, 1942.

[126] "Partial Strength Report" submitted by Lieutenant Alpas to the Commanding Officer, Antique Force, dated October 17, 1942.

In spite of their privation and hunger during the duration of the exchange of fire, the men fought up to the dark hours of the night. At about 9:00 p.m. when they heard shots from the rear, they retreated to Tagbacan. It was later learned upon verification that the Japanese returned to San Jose but came back via San Pedro through to Cubay Ilabas and attacked their rear. Lieutenant Emmanuel M. Solis' men who were previously deployed in the area were unable to stop the enemy.

Later, more resistance leaders participated in armed fight. On October 9, 1942, Amador Estelloso sent a team to the Semirara Coal Mines under Isidro N. Xavier. Along with other reservists in that Island municipality, he was able to accomplish a rewarding mission. At an early morning of Friday, the band staged a surprise attack at the enemy-held barracks. The sentries were caught unaware. They were unable to fire back. Final accounting of the raider's booty yielded one motor launch (German), twenty-seven mine workers captured and, one Japanese guard killed and two schooners, the *Efrain* and *Sostenes.*[128]

The fifteen-man team responsible for the "mission well done" were: Isidro Xavier, Ambrosio Janairo, Francisco Guillermo, Epifanio Alolod, Solomon Alojado, Pedro Norella, Angel Milares, Diosdado Elemente, Francisco Roldan, Alonzo Sino, Alonso Magan, Agapito Manañgol, Onofre Madarcos, Rosauro Felipe, and Saba Jailani. The latter was the lone fatality having been wounded.

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[127] Interview with Francisco Elbanueva, Sibalom, Antique, December 27, 1965.

[128] Per report of Sergeant Amador Estelloso to the Sector Commander of Culasi, dated October 28, 1942.

While the successes in their Semirara venture were claimed by the army, the men of Captain Dy Buco stationed in San Pedro-Senaja sector, in the opposite scene, suffered setbacks. At the early part of October 1942, Dy Buco's men occupied San Pedro with guards posted at Telegrafo Hill. But their position was wrested by the enemy when reinforcements arrived. At 12:30 a.m. of November 1, 1942, the Japanese captured Telegrafo with the aid of their machine gun. The capture of the outpost was blamed on the laxity of a civilian volunteer, Victor Española.[129] With Telegrafo Hill under control the enemy swooped down on San Pedro where the bulk of Dy Buco's men were stationed. At 3:00 p.m. the Japanese commenced machine-gun fire on the army's position. Two hours later the army returned the fire and held the enemy for almost two hours. At 7:00 p.m., however, the army retreated to Senaja after running short of ammunition. Two army men were wounded. It was fortunate the enemy did not pursue the retreating army men for had they resorted to they could have successfully routed the highly demoralized soldiers. It was a quirk of fate that saved the outfit from having been totally wiped out.

San Pedro was the second army outpost to fall into enemy hands. The first was Mantarawis. At the middle part of September 1942, Sergeants Alipio Cordero and Anecitas Daguinotan established their respective outposts at the place overlooking Japanese controlled Bongboñgan Copper Mines. From Mantarawis, Bongboñgan, and Villar were within the target range. From Mantarawis, the mine workers were fired upon from time to time. Irked by the constant harassment of the guerrillas, the Japanese sent up a platoon and with the support of a plane succeeded in driving the occupants. Since then, the Japanese established a fortified outpost.

The strategic location of the hill became the bone of contention between the guerrillas and the Japanese. It was constantly raided by the army. On one occasion, Sergeant Cordero, ably assisted by Pablo Cordero, recaptured one enemy outpost, but only to yield it after irresistible enemy pressure for twenty-four hours.[130] The difficulty of securing food and the shortage of ammunition forced the army to withdraw at the expense of one life. Marciano Vego was killed during that raid.

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[129] Letter of Juan Abellon to Lieutenant Felipe Alpas, dated November 3, 1942.

In another encounter it was the men of Lieutenant Emmanuel M. Solis who gave the Japanese such fireworks.[131] Lieutenant Solis was a perspicacious militarist and knew what he was doing. His military career began in 1939 after training in Camp Parang, Cotabato. In recognition of his meritorious achievements in the field he rose rapidly from a mere sergeant to captain when the war ended. He first saw real action in Cubay-bari, Sibalom, in October 1942. The Japanese were ferrying the relief guards across Sibalom river to Villar when all of a sudden rifleman Damaso Macalipay let loose a withering fire with his automatic rifle. All the passengers reportedly did not reach their destination. On November 19, 1942 at around 5:00 a.m. the Japanese soldiers retaliated wounding Private Juan Berber. Another private, Antonio Regundon, was reported missing. Unable to hold their position in Cubay-bari the army men moved their headquarters to Barrio Salvacion. When pursued by the enemy, private first class Constancio Ayson was hit by sharpnel in the right shoulder. Two days later he died in the hospital. That was on December 18, 1942. Unable to hold the enemy, hit-and-run tactics was adopted by Solis' men.

Several days earlier, from September to October 1942, the guerrillas lorded it over in San Pedro, Sibalom, San Remigio, and Patnoñgon. Army patrols penetrated as far as the vicinity of San Jose. With the guerrillas occupying Telegrafo Hill they were confident that the Japanese would never have a chance to go further to Magcalon. In fact the men of Sergeant Silverio Cadiao, patrolled as far as Bantayan, five hundred yards away from the Japanese headquarters. At that time the enemy strength was negligible. Had the guerrillas been armed with trench mortars, machine guns, and hand grenades, they could have probably driven the Japanese out of the province earlier. The long suffering of the people could have been averted.

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[130] Cordero, *loc. cit.*

[131] Interview with Emmanuel M. Solis, Captain Infantry Reserve, in Quezon City on August 24, 1965.

In the southern sector, Samulde's men were in high spirits. They were boasting they could knock down any enemy that would dare cross their line. They often harassed the Japanese outpost in Bagumbayan, a distance of one kilometer from the town of San Jose. As a precautionary measure the enemy established their garrison in Guinsang-an further south and an outpost in Bulalacao Hill. This hill had its counterpart in Mantarawis. The control of the strategic hill see-sawed several times. The attempt of the army to wrest it from the enemy on December 8, 1943, resulted in the wounding of Private Ireneo de la Cruz and Diosdado E. Tayo.[132] A year before, the Japanese raided the same hill while being occupied by the army. The enemy raid cost the lives of Sergeant Gregorio Caranza and Private Silverio Tubanza[133] On the enemy side, six were reported wounded.

Integration of Units: The promotion of Captain Grasparil to Major on November 5, 1942,[134] marked the beginning of immediate implementation of reforms of the old set-up to conform with the operational standard prescribed by the military commander of Panay. Raids, ambuscades, and patrols were no longer a personal affair of any officer, but a concerted effort of a unified organization whose orders came from the higher command to insure effectiveness of efforts. Smaller units were merged with big ones. The Antique force, falling under the organizational pattern of the Sixty-first Division (later Sixth Military District, could only move when authorized or ordered by the latter. Provincial policies were geared along the Higher Headquarters wishes.

Antique Force: Retrospectively, before October 1942, the units in the province were called sectors and the leaders, sector commanders. Each unit was independent and responsible to nobody. Oftentimes there were overlapping of jurisdiction thereby causing friction generated out of intrigues and jealousy. At the start, Major Grasparil found a hard time bringing together the different bands into a compact body with himself at the helm. He overtaxed himself handling all phases of the administrative and tactical work ranging from Personnel Officer (S-1), Intelligence Officer (S-2), Plans and Operation Officer (S-3), to Supply Officer (S-4).[135] His problems were partially solved when some officers reported to him for assignment. Lieutenant Florentino Armonio was designated Executive Officer and Lieutenant Roque Namo, Intelligence Officer.

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[132] Interview with Diosdado E. Tayo, a participant in the above-mentioned incident, in Sibalom, Antique, on December 24, 1965. Among the members of the team who raided the outpost were: Sgt. Meliton Barcelona, Florentino Palacios, and Pedro Mendoza.

[133] Interview with Estanislao Saludarios, Iloilo City, August 1, 1966.

[134] "Non-Current Records Branch," Office of the Adjutant General, Fort Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

By November 1942, the Antique force was divided into two sectors — the north and south. The northern sector was under Captain Dalmacio Dy Buco while the southern sector was under Captain Adriano Samulde. Juan Abellon, Mayor of Patnoñgon, was the coordinator. Accordingly, Major Grasparil was retained Commanding Officer of the reconstituted force. The officers of the reshuffled outfit were composed of Lieutenant Felipe Alpas,[136] Executive Officer; Lieutenant Roque Namo, Intelligence Officer; Lieutenant Ernesto Tan, Personnel Officer; Captain Cleto Elequin, Supply Oficer; Captain Ceferino Carreon, Plans and Operation Officer; and Lieutenant Jose Azurin, Judge Advocate.

As the force expanded, the northern sector became known as the Third Battalion, and the southern sector, the Second Battalion, with the original commanders retained. When the two battalions were reorganized, the different sector commanders became company commanders; unit commanders, junior officers; and the rest non-commissioned officers. The set-up of the two battalions during the later part of 1942 were as follows:

SECOND BATTALION

Commanding Officer — Captain Adriano Samulde[137]
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Gabriel Checa
Personnel Officer — Lieutenant Alberto Javier, Jr.
Plans and Operation Officer — Lieutenant Gregorio Alava

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[135] Grasparil, *loc. cit.*

[136] He was later on replaced by Major Celestino Monroy.

[137] Samulde was a public school teacher when called to the colors. His first assignment was as cadre commander of the 8th Cadre, Dingle, Iloilo, in January 1939. In January 1940, he was transferred and made cadre commander of the First Antique Cadre, San Jose, Antique. On September 26, 1942, he was ordered by Captain Grasparil to organize the Second Battalion.

Intelligence Officer — Lieutenant Dariyes Nacionales
Supply Officer — Lieutenant Jose Managuit

Company "E"

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Anecitas Daguinotan
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Orlando Flores

Company "F"

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Dionisio Cabrela[138]
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Melquiades Raba

Company "G"

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Russel Tordesillas
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Gregorio Tordesillas[139]

Company "H"

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Emmanuel M. Solis
Executive Officer — iLeutenant Leonardo Revilla

THIRD BATTALION

Commanding Officer — Captain Dalmacio Dy Buco
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Felipe Alpas
Personnel Officer — Lieutenant Ramon Juanitas
Plans and Operation Officer — Lieutenant Juan de Lara[140]
Intelligence Officer — Lieutenant Benjamin Valente
Supply Officer — Lieutenant Luis Palma

Company "I"

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Jose Cordero
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Pedro Rufon

Company "K"

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Silverio Cadiao
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Felipe Esteroes[141]

Company "L"

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Pedro Norella
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Rufo Maquiran

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[138] On November 13, 1942, he was replaced by Lieutenant Luis Magbanua.

[139] In October 1942, he was replaced by Lieutenant Luis Magbanua.

[140] He was replaced by Lieutenant Feliciano Villarete on December 15, 1942.

[141] Two months after he was replaced by Lieutenant Angel Lumogdang.

Company "M"
Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Modesto Nagrampa
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Gideon Yonque

Combat Company
Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Alipio Cordero
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Quintin Nelo[142]

There was another unit organized in northern Antique. It was called Coast Patrol Guard (CPG). Later it was expanded and came to be called Sixty-first Infantry Regiment. The first name connotes that its main function was to guard the coast.

This unit was organized by Captain Cirilo B. Garcia pursuant to an instruction of Colonel Peralta. The mission of the unit was to meet the submarine that would surface in the shores of Antique. The shoreline from Laua-an, Antique. up to Calivo, Capiz, was restricted from civilians and all movements of maritime ships within the area was radioed to MacArthur. The unit was also enlarged to cope with the unloading of supplies and ammunitions from submarines. The unit did not participate in raiding enemy garrisons, save in the general offensive in 1945. This unit was headed by Captain Cirilo B. Garcia who was later promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.

Bad-as Inquiry: The Japanese Occupation Forces easily found sympathizers in the persons of opportunist Filipinos. They were labeled "collaborators," "fifth columnists," "anti-Filipinos," and "pro-Japanese." This group of people aided the Japanese patrols in pinpointing guerrillas whom the Japanese called stragglers, deserters, and bandits. The puppet municipal mayors and their policemen were also active agents in identifying soldiers of the underground movement. Policemen Leopoldo Manaquit and Angel Marques of Barbaza became Japanese informers.

As soon as the guerrilla had fully assumed stable stature the so-called "operation liquidation" was conducted. Their contention was that espionage and collaboration must be discouraged through swift and judicious trial and the guilty punished. An Inquiry Board was created in Bad-as. This Board picked indi-

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[142] Replaced by Lieutenant Jose R. Caballero when Nelo was designated Commanding Officer of Company "D".

Ambeth Ocampo

viduals who had aided the Japanese in their drive against the guerrillas. The first victims to fall under the Inquiry Board were Leon Pedrosa, his brother Salvador and the priests of Hamtic and Dao. Antonio Conlu was the next victim. He was followed by Father Silvestre Stroiber of Hamtic, a German by birth and blood. The enemies of the puppet officials gathered every bit of incriminating evidence envisioned to destroy them. In the case of Father Stroiber, it was rumored that he operated a radio transmitter which was used by him in contacting his fellow Germans in Manila. The priest in Dao suffered the same fate. He, too, was suspected of supplying the enemy with vital information.[143] Other knowledgeable sources, however, revealed that Father Carlos Fing was liquidated by the men of Lieutenant Alfredo Macavinta when the priest refused to solemnize a marriage because of some immoral and illegal implications.

The puppet officials who were called to Bad-as were not able to take refuge under the protective mantle of the Japanese garrisons. When the guerrilla organization ramified to the north and the Japanese from Laua-an driven out, all puppet mayors, policemen, and councilors fell in the hands of either the guerrillas or civil government with the exception of Melquiades Melo of Sibalom, Pedro Gindap, Mayor of Barbaza and Alfredo Magluyan, Chief of Police of Laua-an.

Among the puppet mayors and officials apprehended and brought to Bad-as for questioning were Francisco Candari and Gerardo Agravante of Pandan; Esperanza Javier and Chief of Police Alberto Javier of Culasi; Felino Blase, parish priest Louis Spath, and treasurer Perfecto Varona of Bugasong; Sotero Valdellon of Dao; Baltazar Baladjay of Laua-an; Gervacio Abrico and Chief of Police Jose Ponan of Valderrama; Heriberto Bandoja and treasurer Nicolas Flores of Tibiao; ex-Congressman Calixto O. Zaldivar, volunteer Ramon Absalon, Guillermo Militante, and many others. It was learned that those who were not vouched for by friends of guerrilla officers were waylaid and their fate remained a mystery. Those who were positively found innocent were freed. Because of the rumors that countless heads had rolled in Bad-as, the mere mention of the name terrified the suspects. The name symbolized death and nobody wanted to hear it much less brought to the place.

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[143] Interview with Juan Abellon, Second Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, San Jose, Antique, December 20, 1965.

Different methods were used to extract confessions from suspects. But the most vicious was by manhandling. The interrogators resorted to pistol-whipping and rifle-butting the alleged suspect everytime an unsatisfactory response was given. What was terrifying was the presence of the so-called "berdogo" everytime a probe was conducted, awaiting order to liquidate anyone meted death sentence.

The notorious "berdogo," Salvador Mondido, was able to win the trust of his Commanding Officer. It was said that he could pass judgment on any person being suspected as fifth-columnist even without the sanction of his immediate superior. He was pinpointed to be the mastermind in the killing of the priest in Hamtic. Unit commanders had their own "berdogos." Pantaleon Decena represented Company "E" and Francisco Elbanuena, Company "G". Decena was blamed for the death of Antonio Conlu, a fifth-columnist suspect. Francisco Veñegas represented the regiment.

Those who were authorized to cross examine the suspects were Major Valentin V. Grasparil, Lieutenants Ernesto Tan, Jose Azurin, Roque Namo and Sergeant Salvador Mondido. While those who defended some of the accused were Captain Cleto Elequin, Lieutenant Emmanuel M. Solis, Attorney Ramos Maza, Mayor Angel Villafuerte, and Lieutenant Felipe Alpas.

With reference to the charges instigated against Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Javier and Calixto O. Zaldivar, it was Captain Felipe Alpas who cleared them for such implications. Mayor Gervacio Abrico and Jose Ponan were freed upon the intercession of Captain Cleto Elequin.[144] Detained suspects from Bugasong, Felino Blase, Perfecto Varona, and Father Louis Spath, were released at the instance of Lieutenant Emmanuel M. Solis.

It was later established that not all of those killed were collaborators. They were killed because of personal grudges. Passion prevailed over reason. Animosities, intrigues, and petty quarrels before the war culminated in brutal killings. Emilio Hofileña and Pedro Basiloña of Sibalom were manhandled because of selfish motives. Antonio Pediangco and Alejandro Bangcaya of Bugasong were killed because of intrigue. Some soldiers with limited schooling became so trigger-happy on the wrong assumption that their organization was supreme and above the law. They abused the power and prestige of the rifle in dealing with the civilian population. Their nomadic life and freedom from responsibility made them self-important and less sensitive to the rights and feelings of others.

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[144] Interview with Cleto Elequin, Captain Infantry Reserve, San Jose, Antique, December 29, 1965.

Some collaborators who were freed were given multiple missions. Mr. and Mrs. Alberto Javier of Culasi were given a quota to raise several sacks of rice for the use of the army, aside from their contribution of ₱452.00 in cold cash. Salvador Izunsa of Dao volunteered to raise money for the use of the army. On January 20, 1943, he turned over to the army ₱2,475.25.[145] On the other hand, Gervacio Abrico and Jose Ponan were ordered to collect arms and ammunition and other military items, like helmets, haversacks, bayonets, canteens, medicine, etc. Other donors in the name of the underground movement were:[146] Felino Blase, ₱2,200.00; Francisco Candari, ₱600.00; Heriberto Bandoja, ₱250.00; Gerardo Agravante, ₱300.00; Pablo Montenegro of Lauaan, ₱266.85; and Perfecto Varona, ₱500.00.

The reason why Calixto O. Zaldivar was brought to Bad-as was attributed to his public speeches in Pandan urging the people to cooperate with the constituted local officials to beat starvation. He was misunderstood.[147] His political enemies managed to concoct rumors to destroy his personal image. In a confrontation with Grasparil, Zaldivar demurred participation with the Japanese puppet government in Manila.

Finance and Supply Problems: At the beginning of the guerrilla movement, the question of subsistence and operating expenses of the soldiers was not much felt. Everybody seemed unmindful of his personal safety and necessities of his family.

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[145] From abstract of First Lieutenant Benjamin Empestan, Finance Service Reserve, copy of which was furnished the writer.

[146] *Ibid.*

[147] Interview with Calixto O. Zaldivar in Makati, Rizal, on January 21, 1967.

What was uppermost in their minds was to drive the enemy out of the province so that freedom would again prevail. But as days passed, the guerrillas realized that the longer they stay in the field the more they felt the need for money to take care of their family necessities back home.

Lieutenant Benjamin Empestan, Finance Officer, solicited funds for the operating expenses of the army. The contribution in cash and in kind were the financial foundation and support of the organization. His collection of ₱22,458.00 prior to the printing of emergency notes elicited public satisfaction. Major Grasparil was the first one to turn over ₱4,800.00 to Lieutenant Empestan out of the individual contributions he solicited. Small as the amount was, it somehow helped the needy soldiers' sad plight. The people continuously supplied them with food.

Because the civilians' economic supply was at its lowest ebb in the later days of 1943, the people became less generous. The rule of force was resorted to in the procurement of commodities. The guerrillas used their guns as badges to get what they wanted. The situation worsened with the exhaustion of supply of ammunition. No more arms were available either. These problems were serious blows to the entire organization. Remedial measures had to be done if the army was to survive. Circulars, memoranda, and letters were issued to the field to exhaust all possible means to surmount the crisis. Other means were explored to meet at least the minimum needs.

The Ordnance Section: Early in October 1942, Lieutenant Felipe Alpas, acting in his capacity as Executive Officer of the organization, issued a circular to all detachment commanders to preserve empty cartridges for obvious reasons.[148] It was then felt that no immediate aid was forthcoming. To obviate the unforeseeable adversity, an ordinance section was organized under the charge of Francisco Nuñeza. He was assisted by Lieutenant Jose Ayco, then an Ordinance Sergeant of the Philippine Scouts, Fort Stotsenburg, Pampanga, who escaped from the concentration camp at Capas, Tarlac and joined the guerrillas. The designation of Nuñeza was meritoriously hailed because he had been in the foundry business in Guisijan, Laua-an, long before the outbreak of hostilities.[140] All the blank cartridges which were saved were sent to him for refilling. He used scrap iron and old bells for the manufacture of bullets, and sulfur, salt-peter, potassium chloride for the manufacture of black powder. He also manufactured spare parts like ejectors, extractors, firing pins, springs and screws. Inspite of the efforts of Nuñeza, locally manufactured ammunitions were not enough to cater to the needs of an ever increasing army. The army, therefore, tried to get aid from the outside.

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[148] Memorandum dated October 17, 1942, to all detachment Commanders, issued by Lieutenant Felipe Alpas.

Aid from the Outside: While the infantry men were busy in the field harassing the enemy, another branch of service was burning the last candle finding means to contact the headquarters of General MacArthur. The Signal Section which was organized early in August 1942, tried all avenues to contact by radio San Francisco or General MacArthur in Australia. Since they did not know the radio frequency or call sign of MacArthur's Headquarters, the message was tuned in to the International Radio guard frequency for ships in distress at sea, repeating the "Free Panay Calling, Free Panay Calling."[150] At last their tireless effort was responded by KPS, a radio station in San Francisco. The answer gave vigor to a weakening organization whose mission could not have succeeded in perilous circumstances of the time without external help.

Colonel Peralta, the overall commander of the guerrilla movement in Panay, immediately asked for the recognition of his outfit. He advanced the suggestion in his message to General MacArthur that planes may drop the needed supplies in interior places five miles away from the municipality or a submarine may be dispatched twenty miles away from each coastal capital. After this first message a regular exchange of radio communications ensued. General MacArthur ordered Peralta to organize a "decoy" unit whose mission was to establish an area free from enemy infiltration.

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[140] Interview with Francisco Nuñeza, Lieutenant Ordnance Reserve, in Laua-an, Antique, on December 25, 1965.

[150] *Reminiscences*, by General Douglas MacArthur (New York: Fewcett World Library, 1965), p. 222.

When all was ready, final instruction was given to the receiving party. On April 30, 1943, submarine *Gudgeon* surfaced at Libertad, Pandan, and unloaded arms.[151] Accordingly, it also unloaded three tons of assorted supplies including radio sets, batteries, 22 cases of calibre 45 and 50 rounds of ammunition, grenades, Springfield rifles, one machine gun, and medicine. Landed also was Lieutenant Toribio M. Crespo, Sergeants Jose Ramos, and Orlando Alfabeto and two Muslims and three enlisted men. The most spectular were the packages of cigarettes. This shipment made the soldiers exceedingly happy. The arrival of new arms bolstered the morale of the fighting men and civilians alike. It also aroused the interest of other young men to volunteer for military service.

The bulk of the supplies, however, was allotted to the security unit of the "Hubag." The various units in the meantime were issued a piece or two for display purposes only.

The next rendezvous with the submarine was on July 31, 1943, on the same site. The *US Grayling* unloaded two tons of arms and ammunition.

Incidentally, almost at the same time the enemy began combing the possible lairs of the army. Then came the order of "lie low." With the army's hands tied, the enemy had a holidy cruising the highways and mountains looking for their prey.

The fourth delivery on February 5, 1944, came after six months of waiting. Unloaded were mostly carbines and Garand rifles. The considerable number of arms and ammunition afforded other units to receive their share. This shipment brought forty-five tons of arms and equipment.[152]

The display of the new arms was common sight everywhere. Soldiers were now bold in their determined bid to fight the Japanese patrol. It was from these later encounter that the enemy learned of the new submarine arms shipment.

The fifth shipment was carried by the *Angler* on March 20, 1944. Its main mission, however, was to evacuate stranded American soldiers and civilians. The sixth shipment came on June 20-21, 1944. The *USS Narwhal,* commanded by Commander F. D. Latta, surfaced in Lipata, Culasi. It carried the biggest shipment consisting of one hundred tons of war equipment.[153] The Japanese probably detected through their intelligence unit the shipment as they sent foot patrols to the north one week prior to actual landing in spite of diversionary unit sent against them.

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[151] Soledad Lacson Locsin (trans.), *A Basque Among the Guerrillas of Negros* (Bacolod City: Publication and Arrangement, Occidental Negros, 1962), pp. 104-110.

[152] *Ibid.*

On June 11, 1944, while the Japanese patrols were closing in towards the unloading site they were ambushed by the men of Captain Silverio Cadiao in Tigis, Tibiao. Heavy enemy casualties were inflicted. Felix Segara, one of Cadiao's trusted men, was the lone army casualty. In spite of immense losses, the Japanese continued to push through their penetration to the north.

On the 21st day of June 1944, the Japanese motor boats appeared in the scene bringing supplies to the foot patrols. The U.S. submarine immediately opened fire until the boats sunk.[154] At around 9:00 a.m. of the same day, an enemy plane spotted its target and started to strafe the bancas loaded with supplies from the submarine. In their haste to save their lives, the boatmen dumped the much needed arms and ammunition into the sea.

The last arms delivery by submarine to completely make the guerrilla self-sufficient and capable of waging an offensive was on September 30, 1944. The shipment consisted of 81-MM guns. During this time the American Liberation Forces operating from the Southwest Pacific was within striking distance of the Philippines. It was calculated that by the time the Americans could effect their landing on Philippine soil, the guerrillas would be capable of blocking all possible avenues for retreat by the enemy. It was proved in other theaters of operation that the Japanese usually penetrated the interior to avoid destruction.

Another manifestation of an outside aid was the authority issued by General MacArhtur for the underground movement to issue certificates to show that the United States owes its salaries.

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[153] Jose D. Doromal, *The War in Panay* (Manila: The Diamond Historical Publications, 1952), p. 87.

[154] Interview with Benito Manzanilla, Captain Infantry Reserve, in Iloilo City on August 3, 1966. In another interview, Jovito Elisan, Sergeant Infantry Reserve, stated that they were not mere motor boats but transport intended to saturate Panay with soldiers to prevent the rendezvous of submarines.

At the beginning, from 1942 to 1943, the salaries of enlisted men ranged from ₱8.00 to ₱25.00 and commissioned officers from ₱30.00 to ₱100.00. Later the salaries of enlisted men and officers were raised to ₱38.00 and ₱130.00, respectively. With stable finances the commandeering of civilian property was ordered stopped.

Civilian Support: "Remember that the civilians are the ones supporting us and we should be very kind to them. We should help them in time of their need."[155] This was the reminder of Captain Valentin V. Grasparil in his memorandum issued to all detachment commanders on October 8, 1942, after being informed of the plunderings of the civilians. As a follow-up to his directive, he issued another memorandum on October 10, 1942, after receiving another report that the soldiers, especially the volunteers, terrorized, looted, or commandeered the personal effects and property of civilians. Incensed, he hurled his "bolts of thunder and peals of lightning" from his headquarters, saying "I have received reports that soldiers and volunteers have been commandeering things from civilians for their own personal use. If these offenses are reported again to me, I will liquidate those soldiers or volunteers."[156] A soldier carrying a gun at that time was a king of his domain. He construed his status as a franchise to loot civilian property.

Civilians could not be taken for granted. The guerrilla was primarily conceived to protect them. No guerrilla will succeed in any region without the support and sympathy of the people. If the people were on their side they could easily conceal the soldiers whenever the enemy pursued them.

The most important job of the civilians during the last war was to produce food for the army. For that invaluable contribution they should not be fleeced but protected instead. In 1944, Colonel Peralta enjoined all officers to help the civil government in the food production campaign. This was in anticipation of a unforeseeable shortage. "It is very easy to evade the Japanese, but you cannot evade starvation," Peralta told his soldiers.[157] Besides the major economic role played by the civilians they also performed intelligence work, errands, and manual labor.

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[155] Memorandum of Captain Valentin V. Grasparil to the Detachment Commanders, dated October 8, 1942.

[156] Letter of Captain Valentino V. Grasparil to the Detachment Commanders, dated October 10, 1942.

Intelligence work was one of the most risky services performed by civilians. Every bit of information concerning Japanese reinforcements, troop movements and campaign operations gathered by the civilians were passed to the army command post and conveyed to friendly units. They also collected data of merchant ships going in and out of the province. Civilians on the enemy payroll were made to spy on the activities of the enemy. They risked their lives detecting Japanese military secrets in order to carry out their mission. The report of the Chief of Police of Sibalom to the Deputy Governor of the First Administrative District on November 18, 1943, based on the reports of civilian agents is a good example.[158] These contact men did the job without any compensation. They did it out of love of country. A certain Elpedio de la Cruz of Bugasong for instance, allowed himself to be an orderly of the Japanese garrisoned in Magarang, Patnoñgon, just to smuggle bits of information which were of value to the army. The information he gathered was transmitted to Dionisio Agting and in turn given to the army operatives in the other side of the river.[159]

Many of these messenger-agents were women. Crescencia Tana, Socorro Magbanua, and Priscilla Pañganiban of Carit-an, Patnoñgon, played an important role in espionage job. They supplied the Third Battalion with invaluable information. They used coded names to hide their identities. Written information were kept in top secret otherwise it would endanger their lives. These civilian agents also collected and relayed messages from the enemy to the army lines. Inks, stationeries, canned rations, and cereals bought from Japanese *cantinas* were surreptitiously channeled to the army areas. Antonio Melicano gathered vital information on the activities of the Japanese stationed in Vego Hill, Sibalom.

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[157] Doromal, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[158] Reported collaborators were: Miguel Garcesa, Salvador Elisan, Victor Pagaduan, Leonito Alecre, Francisco Occeña, Antonio Alecre, Claro Laure, Modesto Federico, Fermin Amosolo, Pedro Ordino, Sixto Orbino, Rosario Abancio, Luciano Abnesa, and Meliton Romero.

[159] Interview with Dionisio Agting on October 17, 1965, in Manila.

Other informers were Apolinario Tating, Herberto Manzanilla, and Benjamin Estañol of San Pedro and Patnoñgon, respectively. Both residents of enemy occupied zone, they were less susceptible to suspicion by the enemy. They covered the areas of San Pedro, Patnoñgon and Villar. Estañol and Manzanilla who relayed information to the 61st Infantry Regiment were later inducted into that outfit[160] in grateful recognition of their performance.

Carmen Ballarta, Fe Manzanilla, Trinidad Checa, Alfredo Villavert and Angel Salazar risked their lives collecting information for the use of the Second Battalion.[161]

An equally meritorious service extended by the civilian force was their supply of man power. Wherever the army was, civilian services were always sought. The barrio lieutenant was the man looked up to for assistance. Several army requests or orders were imposed upon him. Guerrillas who happened to pass by the barrio were served meals. If army men happened to bivouak in a barrio, the civilians were called upon to dig foxholes. Still others were requested to help in pounding rice, helping in the kitchen, transporting arms and ammunition and army supplies from one station to another.

To achieve early victory more men were necessary. Hence, more civilian volunteers were called into the military service.

The Expansion Program: Up to the early months of 1943, only the Second and Third Battalions were firmly organized. Although the requirements of a standard unit was not fully met, yet for guerrilla purposes, it was considered satisfactory. A unit with barely four officers and fifty enlisted men was then called a company. This company was born out of the first and second sectors of Antique Force in August 1942. This force was farther enlarged and reorganized to assume the status of a regiment in October 1942. On March 10, 1944, it expanded and became the Sixty-fifth Infantry Combat Team. By due process of reorganization and expansion, the regular requirements of a standard regiment were nearly met at the close of the hostilities.

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[160] Interview with Benjamin Estañol in Pasay City on May 22, 1965.

[161] Interview with Alberto Javier, Jr., 2nd Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, Quezon City, February 22, 1966.

Recruitment and Training: It is a fact that an organization that lacks trained men reasonably versed in at least the rudiments of military science and tactics is bound to fail. To cope with the deficiency a training school was established. Many officers of the guerrilla were only non-commissioned officers at the outbreak of the hostilities and had much more to learn about the responsibilities of officership.

In-service training or troop school was an indispensable asset. The first troop school was held for two weeks in Olaño, San Joaquin, Iloilo. It started on May 4, 1943, and ended on May 16, 1943. Among the commissioned officers who took the training were Alipio Cordero, Jose Managuit, Ramon Abellon, Russel Tordesillas Juan de Lara, Leonardo Revilla, Simeon Furio and Alberto Javier, Jr. The members of the administrative and instructional staff of the school were drawn from regular and reserved officers at the outbreak of the war who were already in the guerrilla service. Among them were Major Valentin V. Grasparil, Captains Ceferino Carreon, Celestino S. Monroy, Cleto Elequin and Lieutenant Ernesto Tan.

The second troop school were held in Importante, Tibiao, immediately after the commencement exercises in Olaño. It started on May 17, 1943. More commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers attended this in-service training. Among the cadets were Emmanuel M. Solis, Silverio Cadiao, Anecitas Daguinotan, Gabriel Checa, Ramon Juanitas, Luis Magbanua and Calixto O. Zaldivar. The instructors were Captain Ceferino Carreon, Captain Celestino Monroy, Captain Juan Buenaflor, Major Valentin V. Grasparil Lieutenants Josue Lacson Cadiao and Benjamin Empestan. Many graduates from this training school were assigned to different units which were then in the process of organization.

The last biggest group of trainees were schooled at Tigbaboy, Tibiao, Antique. The training lasted for seventeen days, from September 1-17, 1944. There were forty-seven enrollees. Unlike the previous troop school, this one was composed mostly of non-commissioned officers. The subjects taken were close order and extended order drill, military courtesy and discipline offensive combat, cross march, security and patrolling, musketry, military administration and correspondence, map reading, public relations, secrecy discipline, orientation of new arms, and Articles of War. The latter was important because it consisted of a set of laws which pertains to the supervision and administration of justice governing military men. The complete list of those who took the training as follows:[162]

Cadet Company Commander — Cadet Simeon Furio
Cadet Executive Commander — Cadet Jaime Pacet
Cadet First Sergeant — Cadet Joaquin Alojepan
Cadet Supply Officer — Cadet Victoriano R. Tan

FIRST PLATOON

Cadet Platoon Leader — Cadet Leonardo Revilla
Cadet Platoon Sergeant — Cadet Ernesto Dalawas
Cadet Platoon Guide — Cadet Avelino Hiceta

FIRST SQUAD

Cadet Squad Leader — Cadet Egmedio Beriong
Cadet Asst. Squad Leader — Cadet Miguel Caday
Number 2 — Cadet Rosauro Apayart
Number 3 — Cadet Alberto Javier
Number 4 — Cadet Jose Yap
Number 5 — Cadet Manuel Yap Seng
Number 6 — Cadet Isidro Xavier
Number 7 — Cadet Jose Cruz
Number 8 — Cadet Feliciano Sotelo
Number 9 — Cadet Sergio Trinilla

SECOND SQUAD

Cadet Squad Leader — Cadet Vicente Acsay
Cadet Asst. Squad Leader — Cadet Benedicto Alonday
Number 2 — Cadet Enrique Barredo
Number 3 — Cadet Cirilo Pagunsan
Number 4 — Cadet Juan Cesar
Number 5 — Cadet Modesto Molinos
Number 6 — Cadet Hilario Rivera
Number 7 — Cadet Jose Ayco
Number 8 — Cadet Felix Sapalaran

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[162] Based from the personal files of Simeon Furio, a participant.

SECOND PLATOON

Cadet Platoon Leader — Cadet Rufo Macairan
Cadet Platoon Sergeant — Cadet Benjamin Valente
Cadet Platoon Guide — Cadet Angel Lomugdang

FIRST SQUAD

Cadet Squad Leader — Cadet Dariyes Nacionales
Cadet Asst. Squad Leader — Cadet Teodoro Silfavan
Number 2 — Cadet Ernesto Balenas
Number 3 — Cadet Ricardo Jalipa
Number 4 — Cadet Justo Concepcion
Number 5 — Cadet Miguel Suplico
Number 6 — Cadet Narciso Salde
Number 7 — Cadet Daniel Mejares
Number 8 — Cadet Eriberto Palermo

SECOND SQUAD

Cadet Squad Leader — Cadet Dioscorro Santarina
Cadet Asst. Squad Leader — Cadet Antonio Soberano
Number 2 — Cadet Gabriel Aguirre
Number 3 — Cadet Eusebio Huelar
Number 4 — Cadet Filomeno Sebastian
Number 5 — Cadet Mateo Napulan
Number 6 — Cadet Jorge Cruz
Number 7 — Cadet Luceno Avito
Number 8 — Cadet Vicente Centina

Special Order Number 147 dated September 20, 1944, was issued to the honor graduates certifying to the effect the completion of the prescribed course conducted by the Officer's Training School, to wit:

Hq. 65th Infantry Combat Team
6th Military District (PA)
USAFFE

SO No. 147 20 September 1944

x x x x x x x

4. Following-named cadets, 65th Officer's Training School (First Class), having attended and awarded the excellencies indicated, are hereby published:

1. Most Distinguished Cadet — 3rd Lt. Vicente Acsay, Inf.
2. Distinguished Cadet — Sgt. Gabriel Aguirre, Inf.
3. Distinguished Leadership — 2nd Lt. Simeon Furio, Inf.
4. Distinguished Conduct — 1st Lt. Benjamin Valente, AGS
5. Distinguished Unit Leader — Sgt. Avelino Hiceta, FS

(Sgd.) J. LACSON CADIAO

The instructors were selected from among the military personnel with considerable years of experience behind them. Major Gamaliel Manikan was a Philippine Constabulary Academy (PCA) graduate; Captain Eliseo D. Rio, a PMA topnotcher in the class of 1941; Major Celestino Monroy was an instructor in cadres long before the outbreak of the war; Major Ceferino Carreon was another PMA graduate; and Major Dalmacio Dy Buco was a reserve officer.

The training of commissioned and non-commissioned officers was done simultaneously with the new recruits. The crying need of the time was the completion of the whole regiment. At first the source of manpower was a stumbling block because of the district circular which restricted members of the guerrilla to reservists and those inducted into the USAFFE before the surrender only. The sad situation was later eased when Major Celestino Monroy, Regimental Executive Officer, issued a Memorandum dated April 4, 1943, which provided for the expansion of the first battalion and induction into military service of civilian volunteers after priority had been extended the full-fledged reservists and civilians regularly inducted into the USAFFE.[163]

The completion of the First Battalion was entrusted to Captain Felipe Alpas. The battalion which was organized in southern Iloilo was only a skeletal force. It was attached to the 62nd Infantry Regiment under the charge of Captain Pablo J. Brillantes.

Two doctors, Juan Tordesillas and Raymundo Azurin were assigned with the battalion to determine the physical fitness of applicants. The recruits underwent rigid training. The training had to be rigorous because previous experience showed that undisciplined soldiers were disposed to commit irregularities. It was expected that most of the volunteers would come from the illiterate stratum. Therefore, rigid training would help improve the quality of the fighting men. Emphasis on the training was close and extended order drills aimed: to make easy for the in-charge of the unit to move or dispose his troop, inculcate in the minds of the soldiers to follow orders and enhance moral character and develop esprit de corps, and give opportunity to junior officers to command troops.

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[163] Memorandum of Major Celestino Monroy to Captain Felipe Alpas, dated April 4, 1943.

The first memory work committed by the trainees were the following General Orders:

1. To take charge of this post and all government property in view.
2. To walk my post in a military manner, keeping always on alert and observing everything that takes place within sight or hearing.
3. To report all violations of orders I am instructed to enforce.
4. To repeat all calls from posts more distant from the guardhouse than my own.
5. To quit my post only when properly relieved.
6. To receive, obey, and pass on to the sentinel who relieves me all orders from the commanding officer officer of the day, and officer and non-commissioned officers of the guard only.
7. To talk to no one except in line with duty.
8. To give the alarm in case of fire or disorder.
9. To call the corporal of the guard in any case not covered by instruction.
10. To salute all officers and all colors and standards not cased.
11. To be especially watchful at night and during the time for challenging to challenge all persons on or near my post and to allow no one to pass without proper authority.

The familiarization of the modern arms stole the show from the other subjects during the training. Carbines, Thompsons, Bazookas and 81-MM guns drew curiosity from volunteers. Inasmuch as the newly acquired arms were unknown to them before, their thorough knowledge of the gun's nomenclature and usage was given impetus with the use of service manuals and brochures as reference.

After the training and the apportionment of the graduates, the First Battalion was on the march. Its complete composition was as follows:[164]

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[164] When Colonel Braulio Villasis became the Regimental Commander of the 65th Infantry Regiment, he reshuffled the officers from the regiment down to the company.

FIRST BATTALION

Commanding Officer — Captain Felipe Alpas
Executive Officer — Captain Calixto O. Zaldivar
Personnel Officer — Lieutenant Juan de Lara
Plans and Operation — Lieutenant Cornelio Ravena
Officer — Lieutenant Benjamin Valente[165]
Intelligence Officer — Lieutenant Jovito Naranjo
Supply Officer

Company "A"

Commanding Officer — Lieut. Napoleon Tenefrancia
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Benedicto Alonday

Company "B"

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Hilario Ablero
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Angel Lomugdang

Company "C"

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Pedro Norella
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Ernesto Anam

Company "D"

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Quintin Nelo
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Santos Namit

Simultaneously, other units and detachments were completed to get ready for the big job ahead. They were the following:

Medical Services

Commanding Officer — Captain Juan Encanto
Executive Officer — Lieutenant Pablo San Juan

Military Police (MP)

Commanding Officer — Lieutenant Josue L. Cadiao[166]
Executive Officer — Ignacio de la Flor

Ordnance Service

In Charge — Lieutenant Francisco Nuñeza
Assistant — Lieutenant Jose Ayco

Transportation Unit

In Charge — Lieutenant Alfredo Macavinta
Assistant — Lieutenant Dioscorro Santarina

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[165] He succeded Lieutenant Vicente Acsay who was transferred to 3rd Battalion.

[166] When he was appointed Regimental Personnel Officer, de la Flor became the Commanding Officer and Lieutenant Benjamin Valente was his Executive Officer.

On July 2, 1943, there was a reshuffle of assignments. Valentin V. Grasparil who was promoted Lieutenant Colonel was transferred to Capiz. Lieutenant Colonel Braulio Villasis, Commanding Officer of the Sixty-sixth Infantry Regiment took his place.

Colonel Villasis was born in Pontevedra, Capiz, in 1901. He joined the Philippine Constabulary in June 1926. He was with the Philippine Constabulary company in Palawan when the order of surrender was announced. Instead of following the order of surrender, he went home to Capiz. On August 15, 1942, he was ordered by Peralta to head the Sixty-fourth Infantry Regiment.[167] His replacement by Colonel Grasparil was on account of the alarming low morale of the people of Capiz. The civilians became indifferent toward the cause of the guerrilla movement. Instead of helping the guerrillas in their food production drive, they instead helped the enemy.[168]

Barely a month after Villasis assumed the command of the Sixty-fifth Infantry Regiment, he effected the reshuffle of officers. He designated persons of his confidence to hold responsible positions. The reorganized staff members of the Sixty-fifth Infantry Regiment under the command of Colonel Villasis were as follows:

SIXTY-FIFTH INFANTRY REGIMENT

Commanding Officer — Lieut. Colonel Braulio Villasis
Executive Officer — Major Marcial Capinpin
Personnel Officer — Captain Gil Mejares
Plans and Operation Officer — Lieutenant Cornelio Ravena
Intelligence Officer — Captain Ireneo Jamora
Supply Officer — Captain Joaquin Orbegoso
Signal Officer — Lieutenant Pedro Rapista

At first Colonel Villasis established his headquarters in the mountains of Culasi, Tibiao and Barbaza. In 1944 he moved to Bugasong when conditions became favorable to the army.

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[167] "Non-Current Records Branch," Office of the Adjutant General, Fort Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

[168] *Ibid.*

In the later part of 1944, however, he incurred a bad image for himself. He ordered different Food Administrators including the staff of the Regimental Quarter Master to intensify the procurement of supplies needed in their offensive drive. Rice, mongo, sugar, salt and dried fish were purchased and deposited in army caches. It was later disclosed that sugar and mongo procured in the name of the army were personally commercialized by Villasis.[169]

Offensive Preparation: In October 1944, when the Liberation Forces of General MacArthur was just a few miles away from the Philippines, a message was flashed to Colonel Peralta, District Commander of Panay, of the arrival of the submarine in August 1944. As expected it was laden with high powered guns including 81-MM mortars and bazookas. This was an affirmation of the General Headquarters commitment to send aid in preparation for their landing in the Islands to liberate the people from the clutches of tyranny.

Even before the arrival of the much needed aid, combat teams were already organized in March 1944, in anticipation of the offensive. An effectively coordinated intelligence and tactical operations were intensified "to carry out policies of the higher headquarters." Physical check-up of the positions of men and their ammunition were required by the battalion commanders. Leave requests were suspended and those already on leave were recalled. A directive to get ready for any eventuality was circulated in the entire Island.

The disposition of troops began in August 1944. On September 11, 1944, a letter was issued that all rice in excess of the family's consumption be purchased and stocked in designated army caches.[170] The *tiniente encargados* were also requested to help procure pigs, chickens, eggs, and cows for army use.

Early in August 1944, the training of the Combat Company went underway in Culasi. In October 1944, after the soldiers were issued additional arms they were ordered to march to the south. In Barbaza, the Combat force was augmented with the release of ex-USAFFE men. The members of the Medical Corps were briefed on their mission. Hammocks were requisitioned to serve as stretchers. There were drill exercises with the use of hammocks carried by soldiers in bamboo poles.

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[169] Solis, *loc. cit.* The same information was related by Lieutenant Alberto Javier, ex-guerrilla officer, Lucio Bacaoco, a retired public school teacher, and Federico Columbres, district supervisor, Bureau of Public Schools, when interviewed on different dates.

[170] Letter of Cirio to Edgar dated September 11, 1944.

Meanwhile, the outfit of Captain Anecitas Daguinotan which was playing "hide and side" in the mountains of San Joaquin, Iloilo, during the "lie low" period were ordered to return to Antique. Colonel Peralta, who for fourteen months was directing the intelligence operation in the mountains of Laua-an, likewise left his secret headquarters for the low land to map out the final drive for the liberation of the Island. He organized the Task Force with the enemy's garrison in Patnoñgon as its first objective.

The Task Force: Believing that only a special force with selected component could bring about early victory, Colonel Peralta organized a composite group under the command of Major Luis M. Franco. He was assisted by Major Francisco Tan Gana, Executive Officer; Captain Emmanuel M. Solis, Adjutant; Lieutenant Rex A. Drilon, Assistant Adjutant; Captain Norberto C. Baylen, Intelligence Officer; Lieutenant Cornelio P. Ravena, Plans and Operation Officer; and Captain Antonino Aligaen. Supply Officer. The immediate mission of the Task Force was to clear the province of its numerous garrisons, specifically in Patnoñgon. For that reason Colonel Peralta called a conference of officers of the Third and First Battalions in Bugasong for purposes of sounding out their plans. The plan submitted by Captain Alipio Cordero was adopted.[171] When the blue-print was about to be executed, Captain Feliciano Villarete, sent an advance notice to his girl friend in Patnoñgon to get out of the town. The evacuation of the girl's family and relatives was detected by the Japanese, hence, they decided to hide inside the convent.

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[171] Personally related by Alipio Cordero, Captain Infantry Reserve, when interviewed in Sibalom on December 24, 1965. His plan was to contact puppet mayor Anselmo Alvañes to hold a dance in his house inviting all the Japanese of the garrison. Then Cordero himself and another soldier donning woman's attire would be there too. A selected group of soldiers would be deployed between the garrison and the house while the dance was in progress. When the Japanese were already in the party, Cordero would fire three bullets. That fire would draw back the Japanese to their garrison. On their way, they would be fired upon by the deployed soldiers.

When the Japanese suspected the massive movement of the guerrillas they abandoned their outpost in Magarang on August 10, 1944. With the abandonment the civilians sensed something wrong. As the liberation fever was becoming strong they slipped one by one from the enemy zone. The most apprehensive groups were Filipino constabulary men, Coastal Defense Corps members, the collaborators, and puppet officials. They began to seek connections with the guerrillas. "Better late than sorry" was the philosophy of puppet Governor Tobias Fornier and company as they crossed the army lines in October 1944 for their safety.

With Magarang garrison already abandoned by the Japanese, the army proceeded with their projected assault of the Patnoñgon Convent in which some twenty-two Japanese soldiers were entrenched. The attack began in the early part of October. The first raid was unsuccessful because the army had already secured themselves inside the convent with sufficient stock of supplies and ammunition which would last for days. Colonel Peralta called another conference in Larioja to inform the different company commanders how to overcome the thick cement wall barrier. "Bamboo poles should be used by the attacking force in order that they could hurl their hand grenades,"[172] he remarked. The suggestion was opposed by Major Ceferino Carreon as it would entail heavy casualties. Since it was not feasible to implement the plan more troops were called to intensify the attack aimed at starving the enemy. There were three companies pooling their resources against the small band. Company "K" under Captain Alipio Cordero occupied the right flank, Company "A" under Lieutenant Napoleon Tenefrancia in the front flank, Company "I" under Captain Jose Cordero occupied the left flank. Two mortar sections of the Combat Company under Lieutenants Crisanto Cunanan and Claudio Trumpeta supported the foot troops. For several days the church was bombarded with 81-MM mortars; however, the enemy stronghold withstood the attack. In this assault, the army sustained losses. Because of this utter failure, Colonel Peralta sarcastically remarked that "the failure to capture the garrison was not due to lack of 'ammos' but because of lack of 'balls.'[173] After that Peralta left posthaste with the members of his staff for Iloilo via Ibajay, Calivo and Capiz.

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[172] Interview with Orlando Flores, First Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, Iloilo City, August 5, 1966.

Meanwhile the attack was renewed.

A certain soldier named Cesar Vego of Company "K" demonstrated a spectacular feat by climbing the walls of the convent in an effort to hurl hand grenades to the enemy. He was forced to come down because of heavy enemy fire. Some guerrillas crawled towards the convent determined to throw hand grenades but likewise were frustrated. The enemy was well barricaded while the army was exposed in the open field. The daring try of the elements of Company "A" cost the lives of Privates Vicente Bardollas, Melecio Sarmiento and Angel Sumado. Eliodoro Flores of Company "I" was also hit on the same day. It was lamentable that some of them were not yet inducted in the army because they were new volunteers. To avenge their loss, the army intensified its attack. More shells were fired by the Mortar Company.

As the positive result was far from being realized it was decided to by-pass the garrison and the forces proceeded to a bigger objective leaving only Company "K" to snipe the Japanese who were trying to forage for food outside the church. It was calculated that in a month's time the enemy would run out of supply and would be forced to surrender if no reinforcement arrived.

One rainy night, on November 15, 1944, the Japanese surprisingly landed in Padang, Patnoñgon, to fetch their stranded companions. With only two platoons guarding the possible exit or reinforcement of the enemy under Lieutenants Briccio Dava and Wandrillo Abellon (Lieutenants Teodoro Centeno and Teodorico Silfavan were previously withdrawn to reinforce San Jose), they were repulsed by the heavily armed and suicidal force. Private Benigno Antonio, Flaviano Fadol and Silvestre Marfil paid dearly for the price of liberty in the early morn of that day while their comrades-in-arms were beginning to see the dawn of freedom.[174]

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[173] Interview with Jaime Pacete, Second Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, San Jose, Antique, December 29, 1965.

In the southern front, the men of Captain Anecitas Daguinotan who had just come down from San Joaquin recaptured Bulalakao Hill easily without any casualty on their side. While the main force was in Asluman, Dao, the other contingent was sent to occupy Hamtic. By the end of October 1944, they moved their headquarters in the vicinity of Malandog, barely three kilometers from the Japanese outpost in San Jose.

In November 1944, heavy weapons arrived to support the force of Companies "G" and "F". Continuous mortar fire and carefully planned advance of the main line of defense forced the enemy to reestablish a new perimetrical line closer to the *poblacion*. Conscious of their precarious position, the Japanese secured the support of their Air Force. Their lone dive-bomber caused much trouble to the army soldiers. The aerial bombing and strafing temporarily hindered the army operation but did not in any manner deter the original plan to cordon them. On the contrary, the soldiers got accustomed to the daily visit of the plane. There are, however, casualties as a result of exploding

On October 20, 1944, US Liberation Forces landed in Leyte. On the same day, American bombers pounded on the Japanese installations in San Jose with high calibre bombs. Two weeks after, on November 8-23,[175] a follow-up bombing and strafing blasted the enemy installations. It was at this juncture that the American planes caught up with the lone Japanese dive-bomber in the vicinity of San Jose and was finally shot down. On December 27, 1944,[176] twenty-four B-19 flying fortresses again bombed the airfield totally destroying hangers and depots sending dark billowing smoke to the sky. This indicated that huge Japanese stocks of gasoline and oil were directly hit. Bit and deep pock-marks caused by carpet bombing rendered the airstrip useless.

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[174] Interview with Briccio Dava, Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on January 25, 1966.

[175] From the diary of Augurio Paguntalan.

[176] *Ibid.*

Motor boats moored in the sea coast were not spared by the raiders. The destruction of the motor launches was a preplanned scheme to prevent the Japanese from fleeing through the sea the moment they were pressured in the land.

Last Line of Defense: In spite of the odds against them, the Japanese soldiers held on firmly on their position. The only language known to them at the time was "to fight to the last man." The coordinated and simultaneous attack from all fronts left no alternative for the enemy but to capitulate. Intelligence report disclosed that it was just a matter of time for they were fast running short of food and ammunition supplies. What was imperative then was to tighten the cordons of their well-entrenched garrison until the day they would voluntarily surrender when hunger would overtake them. Courage, discipline, and their suicidal stand could not be a substitute for an empty stomach.

Bongboñgan, Villar, Sibalom and Patnoñgon were still in the enemy hands and the abandonment of these towns was undetermined. As the shortage of food became acute, however, early withdrawal of the Japanese was expected in any moment. As decided, the garrison in Bongboñgan was to join with that of Villar, and the remaining two with that of Sibalom and finally all would converge in San Jose. Heavy army fire forced the enemy in Sibalom[177] to flee to San Jose. Days later, the Japanese soldiers from Villar arrived. The last to leave their post were those from Patnoñgon.

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[177] Sibalom Garrison. The attack of Sibalom garrison was planned by Captain Russel Tordesillas and Lieutenant Vicente Acsay. They used the doubled webbed ladder to surmount the Japanese barbed wire fence garrisons. Six special squads were organized headed by Captain Tordesillas, Lieutenants Vicente Acsay, Guillermo Armada, Pablo Alpas, Vicente Amabran and Cosio. They were armed with the best available weapons on hand like Thompsons, carbines, automatic rifles, garands and grenades. The mortar section under Lieutenant Claudio Trumpeta provided the shelling. The enemy garrison was subjected with continuous fire for thirty minutes to soften enemy resistance. After firing five smoke screen shells, the special squad RUSSHED to the garrison and began fiirng. The enemy did not answer. One soldier advanced and accidentally pulled a live wire. A simultaneous explosion frightened the whole unit. Two were reported injured. The search for the enemy ensued. Further search disclosed that the enemy escaped to San Jose through a tunnel which nobody knew of its existence before. Related by Vicente Acsay, First Lieutenant Infantry Reserve, on April 10, 1967, in Concepcion Street, Malate, Manila.

The Japanese Consolidates Force: Sensing that they could no longer withstand the army pressure, the enemy abandoned all their garrisons and took refuge in San Jose. After the enemy had left Sibalom, Lieutenant Manuel Oliverio effected the burning of the town to prevent them from returning. Aware of the imminent danger awaiting the Japanese in Villar, they raced against time. Passing by Sibalom, they saw the soldiers burning the town. On November 4, 1944, Federico Nabong and Nicasio Nalaunan were bayoneted to death in a brief encounter.

On November 15, 1944, the Japanese in Patnoñgon were routed out from their lines. Concentrated in the Capital, the Japanese made their last stand.

The Desperate Try: The Japanese knew that their shortcomings were many. But their courage did not falter, instead several attempts were made to break the army cordon. To counteract the offensive of the army, a three-pronged attack was launched. One group of soldiers passed the open field at the east of San Jose and reoccupied Telegrafo Hill, the second took a motor boat and landed in the shore of Banay-banay, San Pedro, and the third proceeded to Culasi. The latter landing caused the pulling out of Company "C" from the frontline to be rushed to the north. Reaching Culasi after a two-day travel, they found the foxy Japanese had already returned to San Jose. The landing of the Japanese at the rear line caused panic and confusion in the army.

Early in the morning of November 17, 1944, the Japanese reoccupied Telegrafo Hill and began firing at army strongholds with their mortars, "pik-poks," and machine guns. The army was caught by surprise. They could not believe that the enemy could do such a desperate task. A test of courage was imminent. It appeared now that the army, composed of three companies, was overruled by the enemy who was in firm control of the front and rear lines. Task Force Commander Major Luis Franco, the members of his staff, a section of the mortar company and medical service were among those trapped.

In the morning of November 17, 1944, at about 5:00, shortly before breakfast time, a barrage of deafening fire was heard coming from the direction of Telegrafo Hill and Banay-banay, San Pedro. Heavy volumes of fire that ensued caused wild panic. With the presence of mind, Major Franco counseled his men to keep calm. But the intensity of fire moving towards them was no joke to the non-combatant soldiers. Although no words were said, the shivering bodies manifested proof of their fear.

An order to those committed in the line was to hold on. Company "L" was pulled out from the front line in order to establish a rear defense line to stop the enemy advance.[178] The contingent of Company "C" which was earlier placed on reserve joined Company "L", plus the two platoons from Company "K". The order was for both lines, front and rear, to hold their respective positions at all cost. Simultaneously all non-combatant soldiers were ordered to withdraw to Sibalom at dusk while the combatants were to follow suit later.

At six o'clock sharp that day, the enemy began to advance. Their gun fire triumphantly roared in the air. At around 7:00 when they were within the range of the army soldiers who were safely holed in dugouts, they were stopped by a counter fire. The continuous exchange of fires that ensued seemed to measure each other's strength. Both were conscious of their stand. Both dared not to advance as they were concerned with their security.

The surrounded soldiers missed their two square meals that day. The army kitchen was located in Belison and it was impossible to bring in the soldiers' food because the enemy occupied the rear of the battle area. Some soldiers merely subsisted on coconuts.

Back in San Pedro, some panicky soldiers who heard the enemy fire from the direction of Telegrafo Hill moved out towards Belison to evade possible encirclement. Following the road up north, they were intercepted by a volley of fire from the enemy. They were unaware that the enemy had landed at the rear in a motor launch. The casualties on that tragic day, November 17, 1944, were Lieutenant Manuel Mecenas, Junior

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[178] Interview with Vicente Condez, a participant, at his residence in Project 7, Quezon City on April 6, 1966.

Officer of Company "C", Private Miguel Absalon, Bernabe Esmeraldo, and several were wounded.[179] The other group who narrowly escaped death were Captains Antonino Alegain, Juan Encanto and Lieutenant Gorgonio Varua. The enemy failed bitterly in their attempt to humble the army. The enemy, after assessing the strength and arms superiority of the army forces embarked on their motor boats and proceeded back to San Jose under cover of darkness, leaving massacred civilians who hastily reoccupied their houses in Banay-banay.

The Siege: It was from the foregoing experience that the army profited in their determination to attain victory. After that sneak attack behind the lines, there was a general awakening for a more rigid and systematic preparation and fortification of army defenses.

In January 1945, the District Task Force under the command of Major Luis Franco was dissolved. Colonel Braulio Villasis took over. The First Battalion was withdrawn from the line and sent to the Iloilo battlefield. Inasmuch as the enemy was concentrated on the *poblacion* of San Jose, Antique, the regiment was under orders to contain them in their position. As planned, Antique would be cleared of the enemy after Iloilo was liberated, with the help of the forces from the Eight Army, U.S. Liberation Forces, if need be.

Assuming its former position, the Second Battalion under Major Adriano Samulde was under strict orders to guard the southern approach to the town. Likewise, the Third Battalion under Major Ceferino Carreon, acted as security to the northern approach. The Battalion Commanders were strictly held responsible for the defense of their respective sectors. They were not supposed to provoke attacked but should retaliate fiercely if attacked. Captain Jose Cordero who commanded Company "I" was assigned to guard the line from Badiang extending to the defunct Philippine Army Cadre further to the beach; Captain Alipio Cordero of Company "K" covered the areas from Badiang to Atabay. These companies alternated with Companies "L" and "M" in the two said areas.

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[179] Interview with Jose Tupino, Captain Infantry Reserve, Paco, Manila, August 19, 1966.

Early in the morning of January 15, 1945, while Captain Cordero and his men were engrossed in digging foxholes in their newly assigned sector, some of his men built fires to roast mudfish for their breakfast. The billowing smoke gave the Japanese a clue in ascertaining their actual position. Penetrating the place in a blitz, the Japanese came across Private Proceso Cerevo whom they bayoneted to death. The other Japanese rushed to Marcelo Merindad and grappled with him. Foreseeing possible tragedy, Nicanor Benedicto tried to run, but Captain Cordero who happened to be with the group, shouted, "fight!" With the help of Celestino Pasaquin and Captain Cordero himself, they were able to subdue the six Japanese soldiers presumably belonging to a suicidal squad. They divested the Japanese of one samurai sword[180] as a booty.

In the southern approach of the town, Companies "F" and "G" alternated with Companies "E" and "H" on reserve. The Tubudan Hill, the source of the town's water supply, was well guarded by the Japanese. Lieutenant Miguel Caday attacked the outpost but was wounded on the right chest from a hand grenade hurled by the enemy. His companion Tirado was killed. The attempt to wrest control of the garrison was given up. The army had in mind that the Japanese would be deprived of their water supply once the outpost was in their hands. November 4, 1944, was very memorable to Lieutenant Caday because several months later he was awarded a Silver Medal for having been wounded during the Tubudan encounter.[181]

On February 11, 1945, General MacArthur radiogrammed Colonel Peralta[182] the feasibility of pinpointing the target areas where the enemy was still entrenched. When the exact locations of the army outposts were flashed to MacArthur, U.S. planes were dispatched to bomb the areas. One day the enemy retaliated with machine gun fire. One low flying US (P-36) plane on a strafing mission was shot down.

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[180] Alipio Cordero, *loc. cit.*

[181] From the 201 file of Lieutenant Caday, Non-Current Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, Fort Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

[182] Radiogram of General MacArthur to Colonel Peralta, dated February 11, 1945.

The Escape: Early in December 1944, the Japanese concentrated their forces on the capital with formidable defense consisting of thick pill boxes and trenches. For the time being while the First Battalion was in Iloilo, the remaining forces restrained their activities. They contented themselves cordoning the capital. Company "I" under Captain Jose Cordero, "K" under Alipio Cordero, "M" under Lieutenant Modesto Nagrampa, guarded the north and northeast approaches. Company "H" under Gabriel Checa and Company "G" under Lieutenant Pedro Norilla were assigned to the east and Company "F" under Captain Luis Magbanua, to the south. Companies "E" and "L" were on the reserve. The order was to wear out the enemy until they were totally annihilated.

In the Iloilo front, the landing of the Task Group 78.3,[183] 40th Division, 8th US Army on March 18, 1945, in Barrio Banbanan, Tigbauan, ended the two years, nine months, and two days of the Japanese oppressive rule. The remaining Japanese fled to the interior only to surrender later on. The First Battalion 65th Infantry was recommitted to the Antique front.

On March 25, 1945, the higher headquarters issued Special Order Number 4 designating Lieutenant Colonel Valentin Grasparil district Task Force Commander for Antique with the mission of clearing the province of the Japanese.[184] Temporarily assigned to work with him were: Major Juan Buenaflor; Captains Alejo F. Alvarez, Delfin Gella, Juan Encanto; Lieutenants Pedro Rapista, Jose Managuit, Felimon Dueñas and Jose A. Belo. Captain Eliseo Rio was designated to command the First Battalion vice Major Gamaliel L. Manikan who was on detail with the District Headquarters. The elements of the Second Battalion under Major Adriano Samulde were deployed from Hamtic to Supa comprising the southern and eastern parts of the capital; the First Battalion under Captain Rio, from Supa to San Pedro, the eastern part of the town, and Company "K" of the Third Battalion, the northern part of San Jose extending up to the beach.

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[183] Morison, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

[184] Special Orders No. 4, dated March 25, 1945, Headquarters Sixth Military District.

While the preparation was underway, the representative of the U.S. 8th Army gave the guerrillas eight 81-MM mortars and 1,200 rounds of ammunition.[185] The plan as previously drawn was to pound the enemy positions without letup to force them to surrender. Barely had the plan been carried out when District Representative, Major Alfonso P. Palencia, arrived with a verbal instructions from Colonel Peralta that the Japanese be prodded instead to get out and in the process be smashed to save the lives of the innocent civilians in the capital. The plan as revised should leave a gap unguarded along the irrigation line as an enemy exit and the moment they were in the open field they would be machine-gunned by battle-tested men waiting in marked exit positions.

Feeling that portion of the cordon was left unguarded, the beleaguered Japanese took the bait and slipped out of the town on the night of April 1, 1945, at around 8:30 p.m. Unfortunately, the men guarding the place did not notice the presence of the enemy as it was very dark that night. The army knew only that the enemy had escaped when one hungry Japanese soldier asked for food from a civilian in Cubay-bari.[186]

A running battle followed. Men in the firing line were withdrawn to go after the fleeing enemy. The enemy followed the irrigation canal up to the dam site, then turned northeast to the mountains of San Remigio. When they passed Cubay, they fire indiscriminately hitting innocent civilians. Private Saturnino Calibjo of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Third Battalion was the first casualty in that enemy retreat. In Sulong, the contingent of Company "G" waited for the enemy in the other side of the river. But they were not able to hold or inflict damage to the retreating enemy. On the army side, Private Apolonio Villar became the next fallen fighter.

More and more troops were thrown to the field. Contingents of Companies "H", "M", "L", "F", "G", and two Mortar Sections of Combat Company joined the chase. On the third day of the running battle, two men were killed near the town of San Remigio. They were Corporal Ernesto Baylon of Company "L" and Simplicio Tomaub of Company "M". On the fourth day, Private Roque Saldejeno was hit in the stomach near Mount Poras by a Japanese sniper who hid behind a big rock. The victim belonged to Company "F". On the same day, April 5, 1945, Staff Sergeant Ramon Bangcaya and Private Esteban Berojon were fatally mowed down while leading a platoon designed to track down reportedly wounded Japanese soldiers in Bato- Cueva. Both belonged to the Third Platoon, Company "H" under Lieutenant Cesar Jardeliza.[187] Fellow platoon member Francisco Calibjo who wanted to avenge the death of their fallen comrades-in-arms was also wounded in the left arm.

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[185] Colonel Grasparil, *loc. cit.*

[186] Interview with Luther Autajay, San Jose, Antique, December 22, 1965.

Of the companies that participated in chasing the retreating Japanese, the unit under Captain Alipio Cordero was a little bit lucky. He captured alive Japanese soldiers. On the early dawn of April 2, 1945, he patrolled the town proper of San Jose and discovered that the Japanese soldiers had deserted the place. He came across instead several puppet officials and civilians inside the Roman Catholic Church taking shelter in the event heavy artillery fires would seal the fate of the town. After turning them over to the proper authorities in Sibalom, Captain Cordero joined in hunting the running enemy. In Igmaricag, San Juan, Sibalom, he spotted a Japanese soldier sitting under the bamboo grove sporting a wound in the left leg abandoned by his companions. With cocked gun, his companion Private Melquiades Pingoy, shouted, "surrender! surrender!" The Japanese countered "surrender." The captive was brought to town by the homeguards in a hammock.[188] He was the second living prize-souvenir captured by the army. The first one was captured in Cubay-bari by Company "C".

The confirmation of the news that the Japanese had left San Jose lured the soldiers and civilians alike to have a first glimpse of the ruined town. A platoon from Company "H" which was then guarding the southern approach of the town was among the first to get inside the deserted capital. Upon reaching Doctor Antero Sison's house located right at the heart of the capital they spotted a textile piece laid against a post. An innocent soldier pulled out the textile but it exploded killing him instantaneously. It was later discovered that all attractive items, like textiles, especially displayed in conspicuous places, were purposely connected to a time bomb. The victim in that house was Pfc. Quintin Degracia from San Jose. They met accidents in spite of the warning of Captain A. Grasparil.

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[187] Interivew with Francisco Calibjo, Sergeant Infantry Reserve, San Jose, Antique, on December 29, 1965.

[188] Interview with Melquiades Pingoy, a participant, Sibalom, Antique, December 26, 1965.

In the afternoon of April 2, 1945, more fatalities from exploding bombs and booby traps inside the town were registered. From Company "H" alone there were ten accounted deaths on that particular day, namely: Corporal Semin Soldevilla, Pfc. Quintin Degracia, Private Ruperto Barcebal, Ricardo Dabandan, Teofilo Fantilagan, Jose Prescom, Modesto Gallano, Elisio Garcia, Marcelo Namit, and Dominador Perez. From Company "M", Private Eugenio Magbanua fell victim. Many others were unaccounted. The soldiers were later counseled from getting inside suspicious buildings until the place had been declared safe from time bombs or booby traps.

On the following day, April 3, 1945, an engnieering team of the U.S. Army arrived in the capital.

Mine Clearing Unit: A U.S. team composed of one squad arrived in Antique to supervise the disarming of buried and/or planted anti-personnel bombs. In the landing field they discovered a mine belt. In the high school, the headquarters of the Japanese army, scattered mines were found. Near the shop building attractive tools were displayed to attract attention. In the Hoc & Sons Bazar, in the house of Mrs. Jovita L. Rodriguez, booby traps were likewise discovered. In Patnoñgon Convent, the enemy headquarters in the wharf and in the house of Mr. Loza another set of hidden booby traps was discovered.

Suspected areas, especially evacuated places, route for possible army advance, abandoned buildings, foxholes, vehicles, attractive objects, like textiles, jewelries, bicycles and canned foods were carefully examined. The incident met by the soldiers when they pulled a bicycle and textiles in the house of Antero Sison was a good lesson. When the bicycle was disturbed, a series of explosion followed. It was discovered later on that objects were attached to the bombs. The bloody incident gave the unit the idea how enemy booby traps and mines were laid in the capital.

Disarming booby traps is always dangerous, as it often causes casualties, and could be avoided through proper precautions. Normally a person examines and disarms a booby trap while others remain at a distance. The incident met by Corporal Bonifacio Perales of Company "E" who availed of his services to the Americans was a case in point. He was hit by the bomb in the left arm when the Americans were examining the bomb at the junction leading to the airport. He was not properly oriented for his role. Another casualty caused by carelessness was inflicted on a colored American who accidentally tripped on a buried mine at the back of the shop building.

Booby traps rely for their success entirely on surprises, the charge and the operating mechanism were either concealed or made to resemble some common harmless object. The detection of booby traps required knowledge of enemy booby trap equipment, its normal employment, and how to disarm it. All personnel must be trained to extreme caution whenever boody trap may be encountered, and watch closely for unnatural objects or conditions.

The Americans divided the suspected area into zones for purposes of clearing the town of San Jose of anti-personnel traps. They proceeded systematically in each zone before going to the next zone. When a trap was found, they studied the method of disarming them before they were disturbed. No attempt would be made to disarm it until its method of firing was understood.

Most of the standard booby traps were fitted with one or more safety device, usually a pin. First the hole from which the pin had been withdrawn was located. Then a nail or wire was inserted in this hole.

The entire length of wires and lead wire was carefully examined to make certain there was no trap at the opposite end which might explode if the wires were cut. The examination also included a search for pressure operated devices. It was ascertained that the wire was not an electric lead wire. This prevented completing a firing circuit by cutting a double electric lead wire with pliers, or closing an electric relay by breaking a circuit.

THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT

On August 13, 1942, Governor Tomas Confesor of Iloilo issued a proclamation addressed to the people of Capiz and Antique announcing that he had "assumed all powers of government under the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the United States of America, over the provinces of Capiz and Antique.[189] The proclamation set forth four objectives:[190]

> First, to establish and provide the people of those two provinces local governments to function and operate under the Commonwealth of the Philippines and loyal to the United States of America;
>
> Second, to establish and provide in each municipality of those two provinces an effective political organization for purposes of assisting and cooperating with Col. M. Peralta and his co-workers to re-organize the free USAFFE forces in those two provinces with the end in view of welding them into an effective army to assist in the task of liberating the Island of Panay from the invaders and thereby restore the liberties and institutions of our people under a democratic regime;
>
> Third, to provide patriotic and constructive democratic leadership among the loyal and patriotic masses of the people of Capiz and Antique, who have been betrayed by their leaders, with the end in view to restore and raise their morale that they may continue their passive and moral resistance against the enemy upon the assurance and confidence that the day of their liberation from Japanese autocracy and barbarism is near; and
>
> Fourth, to exercise such government powers and authority to accomplish the establishment and organization of local governments in Capiz and Antique to realize the ends and objectives above enumerated.

Tomas Confesor was appointed governor of Iloilo by the then President Manuel L. Quezon before the President evacuated to the United States with his family and other Filipino leaders in compliance with the wish of President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, a wish which was coursed through General Douglas MacArthur.[191]

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[189] Proclamation issued by Governor Tomas Confesor of Iloilo dated August 13, 1942.

[190] *Ibid.*

The appointment of Tomas Confesor clearly showed that Quezon personally held him in high esteem in spite of the political differences they had between them in the past. It was common knowledge that Confesor had on several occasions defied the political orders of Quezon. In the last off-year elections before World War II broke out, Confesor won the governorship of Iloilo in spite of the presidential pressure brought to bear against him. Quezon bowing to Confesor's political prowess in Iloilo, induced to latter to vacate the Iloilo gubernatorial chair in favor of a position with a cabinet rank — the National Cooperatives Administration.[192]

When Brigadier General Albert Christie decided with a heavy heart to surrender the Sixty-first Division, USAFFE, on Panay Island to the Japanese, Confesor fled to the mountains and refused to accept the lucrative position offered by the Japanese. In the interregnum, Confesor reorganized the civil government in Iloilo. On July 9, 1942, he issued a proclamation formally establishing the civil government in the province.[193]

Peralta had already established an island-wide organization at the time Confesor assumed his civil powers over the two provinces on the island of Panay.[194] Although Peralta lacked the full authority to utilize his organization as a military arm that would actively resist the enemy, he nevertheless had elements of his organization scattered over the island ready to jump into action at his bidding.

Peralta was an obscure army officer serving as Chief of Staff, B-3 of the Sixty-first Division stationed on Panay Island under Brigadier General Albert Christie. Events have ways of pulling men out of obscurity and propelling them into prominence. In Peralta's case it was Christie's decision to surrender to the enemy that boosted Peralta's stock and assured him a niche in the resistance movement during those crucial times. Peralta had defiantly told Christie that he would not lay down his arms. He would rather risk court martial than follow orders. Peralta likewise told Christie of his intention to organize an irregular army that would fight the enemy in a hit-and-run manner. Peralta's action was very much admired by his fellow officers who decided later on to serve under him in the Free Panay Force.

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[191] Agoncillo, Teodoro A. *The Fateful Years,* Vol. I, R. P. Garcia Publishing Company (Quezon City, 1965), p. 275.

[192] Rodolfo A. Gumabong, "Panay's Forgotten Hero," *Philippines Free Press* (June 27, 1964), p. 25.

[193] Doromal, *op. cit.,* p. 9.

[194] Doromal, *ibid.,* p. 10.

Peralta's rise to prominence in those days was considered phenomenal by many who knew him very well. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, in his account of activities of the various leading guerrilla fighters in his book„ *The Fateful Years,* wrote the following of Peralta:

> When news of Peralta's activities reached Manila, former students of the University of the Philippines were mildly surprised, for he was not exactly a campus leader of Vinzons' type and, consequently, did not expect him to lead men in battles. Peralta was not a professional soldier in the sense that he studied military science and tactics in a regular military college. He was graduated Bachelor of Laws at the University of the Philippines in 1936, and his only military experience up to that time was as regimental commander of the University's ROTC corps. But he was brash and had a military swagger that his college contemporaries twitted him about. They had doubts in his capacity in military matters and although they admired him for his rodlike posture, they nevertheless called him the 'Chocolate Soldier,' no doubt because he was dusky. Once out of college, he obtained a commission in the fledgeling Philippine Army... as a reserve officer. Finding army life suited to his temperament, Peralta enrolled at the Reserve Officers' Service School in Baguio and finished his course at the top of his class. He was next appointed to the Regular Force and soon he successively became ROTC commandant, instructor at Infantry School in Camp Murphy, and Staff Officer of the 61st Division stationed in Panay. As plans and training officer of the 61st, he showed efficiency and competence. When he refused to surrender in spite of the possibility if a court martial for disobeying legitimate military orders, his popularity with the men of his Division rose. His classmates and contemporaries in Manila, receiving the news of his 'brashness', commended him and ate their words dutifully. Peralta had won his spurs and as far as his civilian contemporaries were concerned he was a hero.[195]

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[195] Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years,* Vol. II, R. P. Garcia Publishing Company (Quezon City, 1965), p. 713.

Peralta's military organization and Confesor's civil government grew out of the same event — during the Japanese army's take-over in Panay island. Both men had almost simultaneously reorganized their respective forces in Iloilo. While Peralta was re-grouping the scattered elements of the 61st Division in Iloilo, Confesor was also busy re-organizing the civil government.[196] Both organizations existed on mutual interests. In fact, as early as July 3, 1942, Peralta had sought the assistance of Confesor and the Iloilo political leader willingly cooperated.[197] Peralta had written Confesor a letter requesting the latter to ask the officials under him to solicit contributions for the purpose of maintaining the underground movement. Confesor acceded to the request by quoting a portion of the letter in a memorandum to the deputy governors and municipal officials under his jurisdiction and enjoining these officials to cooperate fully with Peralta's guerrillas "men ready to meet all kinds of difficulties and hardships for the cause of liberty and democracy."[198]

This communication between Peralta and Confesor established a definite relation between their organizations. The *entente* brought about the idea that Confesor should also cover the other two provinces of the island aside from Iloilo.

Confesor Includes Antique: On August 27, 1942, exactly 14 days after he assumed civil power over the provinces of Capiz and Antique, Governor Confesor issued Executive Order No. 2 whereby he divided Antique into three administrative districts each of which would be headed by a deputy governor.[199] The division of the province into districts was made to make at least four towns close-knit for easy administration. The first administrative district consisted of the towns of Dao, San Jose, Sibalom and Patnoñgon, which are located at the southern part of the province. San Remigio, Bugasong, Valderrama, Laua-an and Barbaza in central Antique comprised the second administrative district, and the third was composed of Tibiao, Culasi, Pandan and Caluya in the northern part of the province.

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[196] Doromal, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[187] Memorandum to all deputy governors and municipal mayors dated July 8, 1942, issued by Governor Tomas Confesor.

[198] *Ibid.*

[199] Executive Order No. 2 dated August 27, 1942, issued by Confesor as Governor of Panay.

Executive Order No. 2 authorized the deputy governors, under the supervision of a Supervising Deputy Governor "to exercise the duties and powers of the Governor of Panay in the district." The duties and powers as spelled out by the executive order were:[200]

a) — To establish Provincial and Municipal Governments and to see to it that said civil government is preserved and maintained;

b) — To supervise the official activities of all municipal officials;

c) — To see to it that peace and order is properly maintained;

d) — To direct and supervise the activities of the Provincial Guards;

e) — To undertake investigations in the conduct of local officials affecting the administration of local affairs, and report his findings and recommendations to the governor;

f) — To see to it that taxes are collected and public funds are properly safeguarded;

g) — To investigate all fifth columnists activities and espionage and take proper measures against them;

h) — To detain or order the arrest of persons suspected of fifth column activities and espionage;

i) — To undertake and direct guerrilla warfare against puppets and collaborators with the Japanese military authorities;

j) — To exercise all powers of the governor in accordance with law; and

k) — To report weekly to the governor all his activities, actions, and instructions to officials in his district, thru the Supervising Deputy Governor, who shall be appointed by the Governor of Panay to act as his representative in that province.

Aside from defining the duties of the Deputy Governor, the executive order included the appointment of the Supervising Deputy Governor and two Deputy Governors. Tomas Sartaguda, a native of San Joaquin, Iloilo, and close associate of Panay Governor Confesor, was named Supervising Deputy Governor, while Ramon Maza of Sibalom, Antique and Simeon Herbilla of San Remigio were designated Deputy Governors of the First and Second Administrative Districts, respectively. Maza was a prominent lawyer and former representative and delegate to the Constitutional Convention, while Herbilla was the municipal treasurer of San Remigio when the war broke out.

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[200] *Ibid.*

Strangely enough, the Executive Order left out the appointment of the Deputy Governor of the Third Administrative District which had under it several towns in the northern part of the province. The omission must have been deliberately made because at that time there was difficulty in communicating with people from the northern part of the province who could qualify for the position. Herbilla, who was Deputy Governor of the Second Administrative District, held the post of Deputy Governor of the Third Administrative District in an acting capacity.[201]

Between August 27, 1942 and November 29 of that year when the executive order was issued, Pio Dioso was appointed acting Deputy Governor of the Third Administrative District. There were, however, two contenders for the position occupied by Dioso. They were Alejandro T. Lim of Tibiao who was then residing in San Jose and former Assemblyman Calixto O. Zaldivar of Pandan. Lim, a former governor of the province, was at that time serving as Recorder of Deeds of the puppet government and at the same time playing the role of informer under Captain Valentin V. Grasparil.

At about that time, Tomas Sartaguda received a communication[202] from Captain Grasparil informing him that former Assemblyman Calixto O. Zaldivar, a captain in the reserve force, was moving south with a contingent of soldiers. Grasparil was certain that Zaldivar was not called to active duty in the army when the war broke out. But chances were that Zaldivar must have volunteered his services. In any case, Grasparil believed that Zaldivar would be more useful to the cause if he were made to join the civil government instead of leading soldiers in the army. Zaldivar undoubtedly enjoyed a certain degree of political prominence in the province and popularity during his political heyday.

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[201] Appointments and Executive Orders signed by Simeon Herbilla, dated September 12, 1942.

[202] Letter of Captain Valentin V. Grasparil to Supervising Deputy Governor Tomas Sartaguda, dated September 24, 1942.

Zaldivar could accomplish much service in the civil government and he could easily bring to the post of Deputy Governor of the Third Administrative District his wealth of experience and his political savy.

Hence, when Captain Grasparil reported to Supervising Deputy Governor Sartaguda that he could not go to San Jose to get in touch with former Governor Lim, he included in his letter the request that Lim be ruled out as Deputy Governor and Zaldivar be considered in his stead.[203] In this connection, he asked Sartaguda to write a letter asking Zaldivar for a conference with him and Ramon Maza, Deputy Governor of the First Administrative District. Sartaguda promptly granted Grasparil's request. In this turn of events, Zaldivar became the second man to be considered for the position of Deputy Governor of the Third Administrative District.

Supervising Deputy Governor Sartaguda requested Zaldivar to attend a conference with First Administrative District Deputy Governor Ramon Maza and Captain Grasparil. Zaldivar explained in a letter addressed to Captain Grasparil that he could not possibly proceed to the conference site in Sibalom because the trip would be arduous for a man like him who was suffering from rheumatism of both legs and who at the time was undergoing medical treatment after having been sick of flu.

It was obvious from Zaldivar's letter to Captain Grasparil that he was declining to serve the free civil government of Antique in any capacity although he offered to "contribute what little I can in (sic) cause," if his health improved. This development must have disappointed Captain Grasparil, because no sooner had he received Zaldivar's letter than he sent another letter of Supervising Deputy Governor Sartaguda expressing his "mistake" in recommending Zaldivar to be deputy governor of the Third Administrative District.[204] In his letter to Sartaguda, Captain Grasparil sounded very mad.

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[203] Letter of Captain Valentin V. Grasparil to Supervising Governor Tomas Sartaguda, dated September 29, 1942.

[204] Letter of Captain Valentin V. Grasparil to Supervising Deputy Governor Tomas Sartaguda, dated October 22, 1942.

After he was disenchanted by Zaldivar, Captain Grasparil recommended Pio Dioso of Bugasong for the position of deputy governor of the Third Administrative District. Dioso was a willing candidate to accept the position because when he was invited to attend a conference he readily accepted it. Eventually Dioso was appointed Deputy Governor on November 29, 1942, a little more than three months after Executive Order No. 2 issued by Governor Confesor took effect.

Judge Pio Dioso's appointment as deputy governor of the Third Administrative District completed the organization of the higher echelons of the free government of Antique. Dioso was later replaced by Jose E. Mendoza of Tibiao. Mendoza, a gentleman farmer and current mayor of Tibiao, became deputy governor of the Third Administrative District from 1943 up to the time the province was liberated.

It is interesting to note that long before the organization of the administrative districts and the subsequent appointments of the deputy governors, municipal governments under the free civil government were already being established immediately after the issuance of Executive Order No. 2 by Panay Governor Confesor. Perhaps by virtue of their proximity to the seat of power, the municipalities under the First Administrative District were the first one to be organized. Municipalities in the Second Administrative District followed, while municipalities in the Third Administrative District were later organized by Simeon Herbilla, deputy governor of the Second Administrative District with the help of Pio Dioso.

The municipal governments organized by the free civil government of the province was similar to the one which existed before the war, except for the positions of Food Administrator and Assistant Food Administrator.

Officials of the municipal governments were the mayor, the vice-mayor, the councilors, the chief of police, the municipal treasurer, the justice of the peace, and the food administrator. The post of food administrator was created under unnumbered circular of the Office of the Supervising Deputy Governor, dated October 15, 1942.

Although the appointment of municipal officials solely rested with the deputy governors who were empowered to perform such functions under Executive Order No. 2, issued by Panay Governor Confesor, such appointments nevertheless were farmed out carrying the influence of persons working outside the frame of the civil government. Most of the time, recommendations for the appointments of municipal officials, especially the mayor, were made by sector commanders. These military men seemed to wield so much influence because their protegees were invariably appointed. The case of Martin Juanillo of Tibiao whose appointment was made on the recommendation of Sector Commander Ramon Absalon, a volunteer in the area, was a typical example.

The provincial government functioned smoothly four months after Antique was incorporated. The administrative districts as well as the municipal governments were also organized.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the free civil governofficials of Antique could render service without compensation. At the time it was not for them to contemplate government service in terms of legal tender. Under the civil government, however, due compensation was given for services rendered by both officials and employees. Salaries of deputy governors were fixed at ₱2400 per annum, while municipal officials received a maximum salary of ₱1200 per annum. Employees were given salary rates they received before the war.

These salaries were, of course, quite low taking into consideration the high cost of living. Prices were getting prohibitive, and people were indeed fortunate if they could stretch their budget to make both ends meet. The situation made the free civil government employees including the highly placed officials in the municipal governments, to agitate for salary increases by means of petitions sent to Governor Confesor. It was for this reason that Governor Confesor issued on December 26, 1943, an unnumbered Executive Order granting bonuses[205] to all municipal officials and employees. The bonus was equivalent to a a percentage of the actual salary, scheduled as followed:

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[205] Unnumbered executive order, Series of 1943, issued by Governor Confesor on December 26, 1943.

1.	Municipal mayors, municipal treasurers and chiefs of police of first class municipalities	35%
	All other municipal officials and employees of this class of municipalities	50%
2.	Municipal mayors, municipal treasurers and chiefs of police of second class municipalities	40%
	All other municipal officials and employees of this class of municipalities	50%
3.	Municipal mayors, municipal treasurers and chiefs of police of third class municipalities	45%
	All other municipal officials and employees of this class of municipalities	50%
4.	Municipal mayors, municipal treasurers and chiefs of police of fourth and fifth class municipalities	50%
	All other municipal officials and employees of these classes of municipalities	60%

Governor Confesor said that the petitions made by the officials and employees were just and reasonable in the light of the difficult tasks and the attendant risks undertaken by the municipal officials and employees. Besides, he said, giving them those bonuses would redound to "high morale and unflinching loyalty of said officials and employees.[206]

Payment of these bonuses was retroactive January 1, 1943, or exactly an equivalent of a half year's pay for some of those who were benefited. The windful was indeed quite timely. It came a day after Christmas and at a time when prices of prime commodities were already high. It goes without saying that the municipal officials and employees of the free civil government of Antique had a merry holiday then.

The public schools in the province were among the first public institutions which drew the attention of the free civil government. In one of his executive orders, Supervising Deputy Governor Tomas Sartaguda caused the reorganization of the public schools in the province in a "manner or system most practical in free areas of Antique."[207] The school system was to be administered and managed by a division superintendent of schools subject to the supervision of the office of the Supervising Deputy Governor.

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[206] *Ibid.*

[207] Executive Order No. 7, Series of 1942, Office of the Supervising Deputy Governor of Antique.

Sartaguda appointed Rafael Magbanua of Patnoñgon acting division superintendent of schools of the province. Magbanua was given full powers and authority to appoint "teachers, janitors and all other necessary personnel thereof, and to do all things necessary and proper to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant thereto.[208]

In spite of this executive order, public schools under the free civil government did not actually function although teachers reported for duty. In the municipality of San Remigio, 25 teachers reported for duty on various dates. However, these teachers did not perform teaching chores, nor did they attend to school matters. They worked either as food administrators or food production supervisors with salary ranging from ₱40 to ₱70 a month, depending on the nature of work they handled.

At that time food production was far more important than any other governmental activity. Extra food must be produced to feed the soldiers in the field fighting for freedom. As a consequence, almost all phases of activity in the free civil government were geared towards food production.

In order to give system to collection of food made by the the free civil government, Supervising Deputy Governor Sartaguda issued a circular to all deputy governors and municipal mayors ordering them to form Food Administrator Committees. The committees were given the following powers and duties.[209]

(a) To take charge of the collection of food supplies and other forms of contributions from the people in their respective jurisdiction, for the use of the FREE USAFFE men and of the Emergency Provincial Guards;

(b) To deposit the food supplies and contributions collected in certain places practically accessible to the Emergency Provincial Guards and to the FREE USAFFE men under the Military Commander of Antique, with the custody of any reliable person, who shall sign receipt for the same to deposit to either the Municipal Mayor or Municipal Treasurer;

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[208] *Ibid.*

[209] Circular to all Deputy Governors and Municipal Mayors of the Province of Antique issued by the Office of the Supervising Deputy Governor, dated October 15, 1942.

(c) To account from time to time to either the Municipal Treasurer or the Municipal Mayor, or their authorized representative, the supplies and cnntribution collected, received or given out for use;

(d) All barrio lieutenants shall, heretofore, be considered members of the Food Administrator Committee of their respective municipality, with power and duties supplementary to those above enumerated.

The food production campaign in the province was conducted in such a manner that failure to keep in step with it was considered criminal. In fact, "crimes relative to food production campaign (sic)[210] were drawn up under the definition of crimes that the Emergency Provincial Guards had to deal with. These crimes were[211]

1. Any animal caught destroying crops will be delivered to the Chief Food Administrator of the municipality and such animal is considered as having been commandeered for the use or consumption by the Army. The owner of the animal caught is liable for the restoration or the payment of the damage caused by his animal.
2. Any person found stealing or destroying the plants or crops raised in accordance with the food decree shall be punished as a person engaged in the fifth column activity.
3. Any person who is head of a family and does not cultivate half a hectare at least of land is considered fifth columnist and shall be arrested.
4. Any person who refuses or evades or in any manner fails to perform his obligations in connection with the food campaign is considered fifth columnist and shall be arrested.

Such were the conditions of the food production campaign in the province that it would have been fortuituous if it failed at all. Because of its success, Major Valentin V. Grasparil, commanding officer of the 65th Infantry Regiment in Antique, said on December 31, 1942:[212] "In view of the undying and unstinted support of the civilians towards a common cause, foodstuffs, aids and donations are flowing freely into our hands."

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[210] See duties of the Provincial Guard, *Panay Guerrilla Records,* Central Philippine University, Vol. 206, p. 65.

[211] *Ibid.*

Major Grasparil also said in the same report: "Fish, fresh meat, vegetable and sweets are served in abundance. Captain Juan Buenaflor, Chief, Quartermaster, had been out for 17 days in all places of the province, making conferences with deputy governors and food administrators for additional foodstuffs to fill up our reserve enough for at least six months. This quota will be filled by the first week of January."

The food production campaign was pursued without let-up until the province was liberated from the Japanese. Notwithstanding the comparative success the free civil government achieved, there were times, however, when friction developed between the civil authorities and the military officials. There was a time when the military demanded that the civil authorities had to supply the army with one million *cavanes* of palay. The civil authorities naturally demurred because it was not only impossible but also onerous. Reacting to this demand, Supervising Governor Sartaguda had this to say:[213]

> We are here trying to exhaust all the resources of Antique in order to make the army subsist. Let us also think that this is not only the concern of the civil authorities. We are here only for full cooperation. I don't think it is patriotic to starve the Civilians and make the army men live. We know that we are here fighting for the cause of the people of the nation, I think we are conscious of this responsibility. I am only frankly telling this to you so that you can very well appreciate of how your men interpret the order while in the field. I can't blame you for this because no one brought these things to our knowledge and no one will have the courage to tell you for we know that under the present circumstances the civilians labor under a certain idea of fear or threat were they to attempt to make a complaint.

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[212] Unit Report No. 4, 65th Infantry Regiment, 61st Division, dated December 31, 1942.

[213] Letter of Supervising Deputy Governor Tomas Sartaguda, dated January 13, 1944, addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Braulio Villasis, Commanding Officer of Command Post 5 somewhere in Antique.

If the food production campaign in the province had its villains, it also had its heroes. People who were engaged in the campaign did not mind whether they got maimed or killed, provided that they did their duty and contributed a bit. One of the martyrs in the campaign was a teacher, a fitting heroine, indeed. The heroine was Miss Petronila Petiaoco, a classroom teacher in Sibalom. According to the report[214] of school principal Julian Huera, Miss Petiaoco "was killed by the Japanese on January 18, 1944, while campaigning for food production and food collection in the barrio of Salvacion."[215]

The Civil-Army "Rift": Frienships sour and honeymoons end. It always happens, as it happened to the very best of friends and the most ideal couples. It happened to the unique set-up of the military under Colonel Macario Peralta, Jr. and the civil government under Governor Tomas Confesor.

At the beginning, Peralta's military organization and Confesor's civil government had the most harmonious relations. Both organizations aimed at attaining the same goals. But these relations. somehow, soured and the break-up became inevitable.

It all started quite innocently with one organization trying to put one over the other in the matter of which was supreme betweem them. At the outset, Peralta and Confesor avoided a brewing conflict. Confesor, the man who in the pre-war years was the stormy petrel of the Assembly and likewise was later to be dubbed the stormy petrel of the Philippine Senate, never tried to assert the President's power over the army.

Peralta, on the other hand, knew well the extent of his authority. It was clear in the radiogram he received from General MacArthur, to wit:[216]

> TO COLONEL PERALTA
>
> YOU ARE HEREBY APPOINTED LIEUTENANT COLONFL PHILIPPINE ARMY AS OF JANUARY THIRTEEN STOP YOUR JURISDICTION AND POWERS ARE THOSE OF MILITARY GUERRILLA CHIEF OPERATING IN TEMPORARY CONQUERRED LAND STOP AS REGARDS YOUR MILITARY FORCES YOUR AUTHORITY IS DE-

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[214] Letter of Julian Huera, Principal of the Sibalom Elementary School, addressed to the Division Superintendent of Schools of Manlacbo, Valderrama, Antique, dated January 28, 1944.

[215] *Ibid.*

[216] Jose D. Doromal, *loc. cit.*, p. 39.

FINED BY MILITARY LAWS AND REGULATIONS WITH WHICH YOU ARE ACQUAINTED STOP AS REGARDS THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITIES AND POPULATION YOU HAVE NO AUTHORITY EXCEPT THAT WHICH PERMITS YOU TO TAKE ACTION TO PRESERVE THE SAFETY OF YOUR FORCES STOP YOU HAVE DONE WELL UP TO THIS TIME AND I HAVE CONFIDENCE IN YOU KEEP ME INFORMED.

MACARTHUR

Peralta and Confesor understood each other's role as leaders of the resistance movement in the island of Panay. This was made evident through a circular issued by Confesor to all deputy governors and municipal mayors in the province of Iloilo. He had conferred with Mayor Rafael L. Almacen who represented Peralta on July 17, 1942, and "agreed to adopt the following basic principles of cooperation between the free Civil Government of the Province of Iloilo and the free USAFFE forces in Panay.[217]

FIRST: — Our common objectives is the maintenance of peace and order through the province that life and property of the civilian population, especially in the barrios and evacuation points, may properly be protected; to this and banditry should be suppressed by both the civil and military authorities;

SECOND: — There should be a delimitation of the sphere of action between the civil and military authorities;

THIRD: — In case of doubt on certain questions affecting local problems, local civil officials and the corresponding military officers therein should go into a conference to reach a working agreement;

FOURTH: — Misunderstanding and friction between local officials (civil) and corresponding military officials therein should be avoided as much as possible;

FIFTH: — The local officials should cooperate with the corresponding military officers in the reorganization of the free USAFFE forces;

SIXTH: — The corresponding military officers should cooperate as much as they could with the corresponding municipal officials;

SEVENTH: — Puppets are common enemies of both local civil officials and corresponding military officers;

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[217] Circular to all deputy governors and municipal officials, Province of Iloilo by Governor Tomas Confesor, dated July 20, 1942.

EIGHTH: — It is both the duty and responsibility of the civil authorities and the military to bring about a condition of non-cooperation beween the civilians and the Japanese army;

NINTH: — It is both the duty and responsibility of the civil authorities and the military to raise and maintain the morale of the people in their passive resistance against the enemy; and

TENTH: — The civil authorities and the military are complementary forces, under the present circumstances.

After the approval of the basic principles, Confesor and Almacen drew up rules and regulations which both the civil government and the military had to follow. They were:[218]

FIRST, the military to confine itself to purely military affairs, especially to the re-organization of the free USAFFE forces;

SECOND, to assist the civil authorities in suppressing banditry. To this effect, it should do patrol work with its organized units in each sector;

THIRD, the Army may arrest persons commandeering merchandise without specific authority to that effect from the Governor. The commandeering officer in his case should issue a corresponding official receipt for the commandeered articles or goods;

FOURTH, provincial and municipal officials are to stop confiscating army guns or weapons from members of duly organized units of the USAFFE;

FIFTH, the army should assist the Governor in supervising the Municipal Police for purposes of promoting efficiency in the service and maintaining discipline;

SIXTH, the Army should assist the Governor in supervising the administration of municipalities to promote efficiency and good government. Any irregularity or inefficiency that may be discovered therein by the military authority should be reported immediately to the office of the Governor and that of his corresponding deputy;

SEVENTH, any municipal police officer or provincial guard upon request of any military officer to perform on military duty should comply with said request. Any request to this effect should immediately be reported to the office of the Governor and that of his corresponding deputy.

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[218] *Ibid.*

The *entente* between Peralta and Confesor, however, was shortlived. Signs of an imminent rift between the two leaders began when Confesor became ill shortly after drawing up the manifesto of understanding with Major Almacen. Believing that Confesor could no longer ably discharge his duties as civil governor, the military broached a plan during a conference held at Passi, Iloilo, on November 15, 1942, to change the government from civil to military. According to one account, "one of the outstanding accomplishments of the convention was the proclamation issued by Lieutenant Colonel Relunia ordering the establishment of the military government in Panay... This plan was discussed and decided in the convention in preference to the Commission form of Government as suggested by the deputy governors (sic)..."[219]

The establishment of the military government in the island of Panay was followed with the declaration of martial law by Peralta. This step was decided upon when reports reached the military about the determined effort of the Japanese soldiers to recover the territories they had lost to Peralta's guerrillas.

This action of the military enraged Confesor who took to task the brains behind the virtual coup d' etat. He wrote Colonel Relunia a scathing letter without knowing that it was actually Peralta who was behind the move.

Peralta denied that there was a rift between him and Confesor. If ever there was a rift at all, according to him, it was only between subordinates. Peralta believe there was no bad blood between him and Confesor.

In an interview with this writer, Peralta said that the so-called "rift" was started by Confesor's Executive Secretary Mariano Benedicto.

When I learned that a miiltary government was set up during Confesor's sickness", he said, "I got mad at Relunia. We have had always a cordial relation with Confesor. Of course, there were those letters. At least it appears that the letters were exchanged between me and Confesor. Although signed by me, those letters were prepared by my subor-

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[219] *Panay Guerrilla Records,* compiled by Central Philippine University, Iloilo City, Vol. 14, p 116.

> dinates and because of pressing work at that time I was not able to discover lines which sound derigatory to Confesor's ears. But mind you Confesor and I have maintained good personal understanding. In fact, after the war, when Confesor was accused of murder in Iloilo, I was the first one to volunteer for his defense.[220]

Peralta wrote Confesor in an attempt to mollify the latter's feelings. A portion of the Peralta letter follows:[221]

> Permit me to assure you that I have no intention of 'swapping heroes (sic) in the middle of the stream. Frankly, the earlier change to martial law was at first made in order to frighten the fifth columnists. Later, when I found out that you were sick, I kept delaying taking it away because you never gave me any indication as to your "SECOND-IN-COMMAND" in case you become sick, and I was at a loss as to what civilian official could be completely trusted with the civil government while you were sick.

In spite of this acquiescent letter from Peralta, Confesor felt that he had been ignominiously undercut. He manifested this feeling in all his actions. Since then things came to a hot point which finally exploded when Peralta began appointing separate provincial executives for the provinces of Capiz and Antique. Repercussions of the Peralta-Confesor conflict were felt in Antique with the designation of former Assemblyman Calixto O. Zaldivar as acting governor of the province.

Zaldivar, the son of an illustrious father who had served as Justice of the Peace of Pandan until his death, lived a checkered career. He placed third in the bar examinations held in November 1928. After passing the bar, he joined the law offices of Laurel, del Rosario and Lualhati in 1929. He left these law offices to ran for representative in Antique in 1934. He won the elections and served in the Tenth Philippine Legislature. He was elected assemblyman in the First National Assembly in 1935 and was reelected to serve again in the Second National Assembly in 1938. He later became elective governor of Antique, reparations commissioner, acting executive secretary and finally associate justice of the Supreme Court.

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[220] Interview with Macario Peralta, Jr., Katigbak Building, Ermita, Manila, March 27, 1967.

[221] Letter of Macario Peralta, Jr. to Governor Confesor, dated February 25, 1943

Peralta's designation of Zaldivar as acting governor of the province was regarded by Confesor as seditious. In an appeal to the armed forces of Panay and Romblon, he said that it was contrary and in contravention to the explicit instructions of General MacArthur. Confesor quoted MacArthur's instructions, to wit:[222]

YOUR POWERS ARE THOSE OF A MILITARY GUERRILLA CHIEF OPERATING IN TEMPORARILY CONQUERED LAND STOP OVER CIVILIAN COMMUNITY ONE EXCEPT SUCH ACTIONS TO PRESERVE SAFETY OF YOUR FORCES STOP OVER ARMY UNITS AS PER MILITARY LAW STOP.

x x x x x x x x

PERALTA

REFFRENCE RECENT DISPATCHES WHICH HAVE BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION EXISTING CONFLICT BETWEEN YOUR COMMAND AND THE DULY CONSTITUTED CIVIL GOVERNMENT I FIND IT NECESSARY TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO POLICY PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED GOVERNING THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH MUST EXIST BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVIL AUTHORITIES. IT IS MY DESIRE THAT YOU TAKE IMMEDIATE AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO CLARIFY DIFFERENCES NOW EXISTING BETWEEN YOURSELF AND GOV. CONFESOR TO THE END THAT AN HARMONIOUS OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SEPARATE AND DISTINCT AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT MAY PROMPTLY BE REESTABLISHED I FURTHER EXPECT YOU TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AS IS WITHIN YOUR POWER TO SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND PROTECT THE OFFICIALS CHARGED WITH THE ADMINISTERING THE SAME UTILIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE ANY OF THE MILITARY STORES IN YOUR CUSTODY OR PERSONNEL UNDER YOUR COMMAND WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE AND NECESSARY.

But what was done cannot be undone. Confesor's appeal was ignored by the members of the armed forces in Antique. To assert his leadership and supremacy in the province, Confesor instigated clashes between the Emergency Provincial Guards and the army detachments.[223]

As regards Zaldivar's designation as acting Governor, Peralta had this to say:

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[222] Appeal of Governor Confesor to the Armed Forces of Panay and Romblon, dated November 1944.

[223] Jose D. Doromal *loc. cit.*, p. 131.

> When I appointed Calixto O. Zaldivar as Acting Governor, I was only exercising what in military parlance is known as 'element of simplicity.' There were three deputy governors in Antique then. I could not deal with them at the same time. I wanted to deal with only one person in order to hasten the military objective. The liberation forces of MacArthur had already landed and we were in the offensive. I wanted the execution of military rules and policies to be done in the fastest way. If one has to talk to several people about the implementation of these rules and policies it would result to an unnecessary delay and I was avoiding complicated matters.[224]

Zaldivar's designation as acting governor of Antique was not well received by the civilian authorities in the province. Ramon Maza, whom Peralta offered either positions of provincial board member, provincial fiscal or justice of peace of San Jose, told Peralta that "he found anomalous the establishment of the military government by coup d'etat, there being in existence a civil government which was functioning with regularity."[225]

Maza, who had been excellently serving as deputy governor of the first administrative district, is a lawyer. He showed political prowess at an early age when he drubbed incumbent Representative Angel Salazar, Sr. to win as representative of Antique in 1916. He was reelected. In 1934, he was elected senior delegate to the Constitutional Convention where he served as a member of the committee on declaration of principles, public instruction, finance and constitutional guaranty.

Maza further wrote in his letter:[226]

> If it is only for the purpose of severing the connection of the province of Antique from the government of Iloilo, there is no need of resorting to the abrupt and violent way, for it is the unanimous desire of the province of Antique to preserve its own individuality as a province, and by using constitutional right of petition the separation could have been attained by a peaceful and democratic way. I had this idea in mind, and it would have been my purpose to put into practice when the most opportune time arrived. The plan involves the idea that, if by right of

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[224] Peralta, *loc. cit.*

[225] Letter of Attorney Ramon Maza to Colonel Macario Peralta, Jr., dated December 21, 1944.

[226] *Ibid.*

petition the Governor of Panay and Romblon would not grant this plan, then it twould have been time to appeal to you for help. However, I got away (sic) with this idea when General MacArthur and President Osmeña reestablished the Commonwealth Government on Philippine soil.

I am sorry to inform you that the effect of your proclamation to the public opinion is contrary to your good intention. With the ousting from office of the civil officials and employees who had sacrificed and risked their lives during the most trying times of our history and by replacing them with those who had collaborated with the enemy, the people believe that loyalty is punished and treason honored, and the author of such proclamation, who was the object of their deep admiration is not considered by them as a dictator who placed and displaced a government at his own will.

This kind of reaction from a prominent segment of the populace had prompted Peralta to explain his actuations. He said he based his authority to appoint temporary officials in Antique on a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) dated October 9, 1944, issued by the General Headquarters of the South West Pacific Area. In a circular dated January 2, 1945, Peralta quoted a part of the Standard Operating Procedure as follows:[227]

2. CIVIL AFFAIRS AND RELIEF

a. Responsibility. — Army or area Commanders will be responsible for such administration and relief of the civil population in his area as is consistent with the military situation.

b. Scope. — The extent to which army and area commanders will administer civil affairs and relief will depend entirely upon the military situation.

x x x x x x

8. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT

(2) Policy. (a) Pursuant to this policy, the Commander in Chief will delegate, as promptly as possible, the administration of civil government to the Commonwealth Government pending full establishment of constitutional government.

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[227] Letter of Ramon Maza, Deputy Governor, First Administrative District to the Executive Secretary of the Governor of Panay and Romblon, dated February 20, 1945.

(b) Temporary Officials — Until it is possible to delegate the administration of civil government to the Commonwealth Government, temporary officials will be appointed."

This explanation however failed to disabuse the minds of the people of Antique. Maza, who later became the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit (PCAU) governor of the province, expressed in a letter[228] to the Executive Secretary to the Governor of Panay and Romblon that "the objectives of Peralta in reinstating puppets in the government is to cover up the extortion they have done to the puppets so that they, as token of gratitude, will not complain against them in case of investigation on the conduct of the Army on this island."

Peralta was not able to know Maza's letter until he was interviewed by the writer. When informed about it, Peralta said: I have not read that letter. But as I read it now, I think his letter is unfair and unjust. Maza's contention was contrary to fact. Of course, his words were tempered with the atmosphere of the time. There was a war then and those words could hardly be repeated during this time.[229]

There was then a general belief that most, if not all of Peralta's appointees, were either Japanese puppets or collaborators. Zaldivar, the acting governor, did not escape being branded a puppet. He suffered carrying the tag when he refused to serve under the Confesor government. Justice Zaldivar put the blame on his political enemies.[230] He further said that when he assisted the Civilian Emergency Administration as deputy in 1942 to 1943 in performing relief work, his political enemies began waging tongues. Their insidious work came to a point when the army in Antique almost had him liquidated for being a Japanese collaborator.

There is no denying that the rift between the civilian authorities and the military caused a lot of dissesion among the men who took it upon themselves to lead the people in that crisis. Doromal, writing about this, said:[231]

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[228] *Ibid.*

[229] Peralta, *loc. cit.*

[230] Interview with Supreme Court Associate Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar at his home in Makati, Rizal, on January 21, 1967.

[231] Jose D. Doromal, *luc. cit.*, p. 131.

> ...the spite and antagonism that accompanied it was actually confined to those who were direct participants in this unfortunate drama — the few men who sat on top of Confesor's official hierarchy and the top officials of the army who by their positions had the duty of dealing directly with such civil officials. Beyond these groups the conflict did not amount to much more than a highly agitated academic controversy.

The Emergency Provincial Guards: In an Executive Order No. 2 issued by Tomas Confesor as governor of Panay, the Supervising Deputy Governor of Antique was given the authority to appoint members of the province's provincial guards which consisted of one first lieutenant, three sergeants, four corporals and thirty privates. These provincial guards were distributed to the three administrative districts.[232]

The main duty of the provincial guards was to maintain peace and order within the districts to which they were assigned. Other duties assigned to them were to act as sanitary policemen, propaganda agents and rural policemen. As sanitary policemen it was their duty to enforce the sanitary regulations in the province as well as to report the outbreak of any disease in epidemic proportions. As propaganda agents they were sworn to inform the people of the progress of the war, describing graphically the theaters of war in order to enlighten the people on the relation of the situation obtaining locally in other places. As rural policemen they were duty bound to see to it that the orders of the food administrators were implemented. They have to arrest also the people who were destroying or attempting to destroy the crops.[233]

Although the provincial guards were mostly appointees of the supervising deputy governor, the governor of Panay reserved the right to increase the complement of this provincial police unit if it was found that their number was inadequate to cope with their main duty. He also enjoined the supervising deputy governor to give preference to USAFFE officers and enlisted men in the appointment of provincial guards. The governor made it clear that USAFFE and enlisted men would be entitled to "a certificate after the war from rendering service from the date they reported for duty, entitling them to collect their salaries.[234]

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[232] Executive Order No. 2, dated August 27, 1942, by Governor Tomas Confesor.

[233] *Panay Guerrilla Records*, Central Philippine University, Vol. 206, Iloilo City, p. 55.

The provincial guards were subjected to certain rules and regulations promulgated by the governor of Panay. Hereunder were pertinent portions of the regulations relating to the conduct and behavior of the provincial guards:[235]

1. To be courteous and polite in their dealings with the military men or the civilians.
2. To keep his eyes, ears, and mind open, but his mouth shut.
3. To keep secret his mission of which he is responsible and never to reveal it to anybody except to his superior who assigned the mission or gave the order.
4. To know which is in charge of maintaining peace and order in the town or province.
5. To gain knowledge of the work of the police department in the municipality.
6. To learn the most important laws, orders, proclamations, and ordinances of the municipality.
7. To know how the people can be of help in maintaining peace and order.
8. To render his services to the civilians in case of calamity.
9. To develop a sense of responsibility and to perform his duty at his best.
10. To maintain personal discipline.
11. To preserve the traits of honesty and truthfulness.
12. To be always on the alert in case of emergency.
13. To be able to know all the circulars issued by the civil authorities.

The provincial guards were given a set of crimes they had to deal with in the pursuit of their duties. These crimes were orderly enumerated and defined in the previous pages.

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[234] Executive Order No. 2, dated August 27, 1942, by Governor Tomas Confesor.

[235] *Panay Guerrilla Records,* Central Philippine University, Vol. 206, Iloilo City, p. 55.

Governor Tomas Confesor, as he had expressed in Executive Order No. 2, dated August 27, 1942, found the organization of the provincial guards quite inadequate. Hence, on January 1, 1943, he issued an unnumbered executive order regarding the standard table of organization of the provincial guards in Panay and Romblon. In this order, he assigned two provincial inspectors under his administrative jurisdiction in the provinces of Iloilo and Antique, respectively. The provincial inspectors had the rank of captain or first lieutenant. A staff was placed under the provincial inspectors. He also had under his command one combat detachment consisting of one 2nd lieutenant as commanding officer, one 3rd lieutenant as junior officer, one 3rd lieutenant as executive officer, one sergeant as company clerk, three corporals as squad leaders, three privates first class as assistant squad leaders, one private as orderly and sixteen privates as riflemen.

According to this unnumbered executive order, every administrative district in the island of Panay will have one company of provincial guards under the administrative control and supervision of the deputy governor. Control and supervision, however, would be shifted to the provincial inspector in case the provincial guards were to be assigned in military operations.

Organization of the provincial guard companies were as follows:[236]

> 5. In one company there shall be 100 men, excluding officers, with its staff to be organized as follows: one captain to act as the commanding officer, one first lieutenant to act as executive officer, one first sergeant to keep the roster of troops, one staff sergeant as clerk, one private as orderly, two privates as messengers, one private as cook, one supply sergeant and one mess sergeant.
>
> 6. In one company there are three platoons. Each platoon, consisting of 34 men, excluding officers, shall be organized as follows: one second or third lieutenant as junior officer, one platoon sergeant who shall act as second in command, one sergeant as platoon guide, three

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[236] *Panay Guerrilla Records,* Central Philippine University, Iloilo City, Vol. 15, p. 60.

corporals as squad leaders, three first class privates as assistant squad leaders, one private as messenger, 25 privates as riflemen.

7. All the officers and enlisted men in the company in the administrative district shall be appointed by the deputy governor or their corresponing commanding officer upon the approval of the Governor of Panay and Romblon.

8. The salaries of lieutenant-colonel shall not be less than P300.00 a month, major P250.00, captain P200.00, first lieutenant P100.00, master sergeant P60.00, corporal P30.00 and private P25.00. The officers and enlisted men shall be entitled to such privileges and allowances as were formerly enjoyed by such persons of equal rank while in the service of the Philippine Constabulary, subject to the approval of the higher authority.

Although issued at the start of the year 1943, enforcement of the unnumbered executive order authorizing the deputy governors to organize the emergency provincial guards was suspended. In fact, as late as October 13, 1943, Supervising Deputy Governor Tomas Sartaguda of Antique received a memorandum from Ricardo M. Salcedo of the office of the governor of Panay and Romblon, requesting him to defer the organization of the emergency provincial guards in the province. But once organized, however, the emergency provincial guards were used by the civil government as its military arm. On several occasions, the emergency provincial guards were used by the civil government to impose its will on the civilian populace.

There was a time in the early part of 1944 when the Japanese forces succeeded in penetrating deep into the free civil government territory. In this campaign, the Japanese went on a rampage and committed atrocities that instilled fear in the people. The grip of the fear on the people was such that they started cultivating an attitude on non-cooperation with the freedom fighters on the island. In order to win back the confidence of the people, the civil government sent out the emergency provincial guards to cover the whole island of Panay on missions to warn the people of the consequences of their non-cooperation. The civil government under Confesor as well as the military force under Peralta feared that if this attitude persisted it would spell the downfall of organized resistance movement on the island.

Organized as armed mobile units, the emergency provincial guards went from barrio to barrio to confer with local leaders, telling them to continue cooperating with the civil and army officials. These local leaders were ordered to remain loyal to the cause on pain of having to suffer the fate they suffered in the hands of the Japanese. The use of the emergency provincial guards in this work of the civil government proved quite effective.

As a force sent out to accomplish such a difficult mission, the emergency provincial guards were bound to commit certain abuses. What they did was evident in the complaints brought to the attention of the civil government. What was worse, however, was that some of these abuses were perpetrated on civilian agents on the army under Peralta. On one occasion, Peralta had to write Confesor a strong worded letter regarding the emergency provincial guards after the latter had inquired into the fate of several emergency provincial guards who were taken into the custody of the army. Peralta told Confesor in this letter that "peace officers of the provincial government and citizens of this island are subject to our courts of justice if they come within our jurisdiction as defined by the Articles of War, the Laws of Land Warfare and International Treaties and Conventions to which the United States is a party."

But it seemed that this exchange of communications between Peralta and Confesor on the emergency provincial guards was mere politesse. Actually army men and the emergency provincial guards were after each other's scalp. Combat missions sent out by Peralta seemed to have expressed instructions to go after emergency provincial guards. Reports reaching Confesor always told of army men looking for emergency provincial guards. One such mission was headed by a certain Major Perfecto Osman who combed certain towns in the province looking for emergency provincial guards and was committing abuses in the process. One report, handed in by Valerico Lim, enumerated the following abuses:[237]

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[237] Letter of Sergeant Valerico Lim to the District Commander, dated July 6, 1944, copy of which is in the possession of Captain Felipe Alpas (Res.).

a. More than 10,000 ears of corn were taken by them without any payment. Wherever (sic) the poor tenants claimed for the pay, they were threatened by these soldiers. The civilians residing in the following barrios of Culasi, Antique, can be inquired as to what they did:

1. Valderrama
2. San Gregorio
3. Bita

b. Pigs were taken by force from the owners and were not paid. Whenever the owners claimed for the payment, they were threatened with guns.

c. Plants were destroyed. Whenever they need banana leaves they cut the plant, though the cutting is very unnecessary in order to get the leaves. Papaya plants were cut whenever they needed its fruits.

d. In their short stay at Valderrama, Culasi, Antique, they used some plows of the civilians for fuel. Floors and windows of the houses were destroyed and used for fuel. They were making good at what the Japanese were doing that the civilians feared them as if they were their enemies.

e. They robbed the civilians of their clothing and hats.

f. Several soldiers were manhandled by them.

Another report rendered by Federico Columbres, acting Supervising teacher of Bugasong said in this wise:[238]

> Many civilians deserted the town and the nearby barrios. They were puzzled and bewildered. It was a veritable reign of terror. Even the soldiers who have been here for a long time (not the Mobile Unit) were not exempted from the abuses. Major Osmeña's soldiers were looking for the Emergency Provincial Guards and Military Police. They boasted that they would disarm or shoot any of them.

Although the Emergency Provincial Guards and Peralta's men quarreled over almost anything under the sun, it appeared that the touchiest subject over which they would kill each other without hesitation is the division of the palay produce both organization got from the civilian population. One eyewitness account told of one such incident:

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[238] Letter of Federico Columbres, dated June 22, 1944, to Governor of Panay and Romblon,

> In my headquarters in Guinbanga-an, I observed misunderstanding regarding the disposition of supplies for use in the field. Each organization wanted to have a lion's share of the rice. One incident I personally witnessed happened in Guinbanga-an when a member of the Emergency Provincial Guards and army quarreled over the allotment of rice. As a result Emergency Provincial Guard Vicente de Ramas was manhandled by army men.[239]

In another incident, in the house of Peroy, Sergeant Domingo Mejares was killed in the skirmishes between the army and the provincial guards.

The strained relations between the emergency provincial guards and the army men under Peralta came to a point when the arrests of the emergency provincial guards were made allegedly on orders of Peralta. Peralta, however denied later that he issued such order.

> There was no order. If arrests were made, they were done solely on the responsibility of the battalion commanders. You can just imagine how a battalion commander would feel if he finds armed men other than his minions roaming around. His suspicious would be aroused. Naturally he would arrest them. But I know for a fact that those men who were arrested, if they were Emergency Provincial Guards they were eventually released after they had been duly identified.[240]

With or without orders coming from Peralta, his men went on disarming the emergency provincial guards. Acting Governor Calixto O. Zaldivar pursued a similar action. These actions culminated in the armed clash between the emergency provincial guards and the army men.

In retrospect, the role of the emergency provincial guards in the scheme of things then prevailing on the island of Panay was vital and at the same time pragmatic. The organization was the police arm of the civil government that performed functions that went beyond police action. In fact it assumed military duties when it was sent out on combat missions. It was inevitable, therefore, that the organization would have the ire of the Peralta guerrillas falling down on it before it knew what was coming. In any case, however, the emergency provincial guards had done a job which, as a whole, could be considered quite commendable.

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[239] Statement of Jose Bayog when interviewed in Quezon City on June 5, 1966.

[240] Peralta, *loc. cit.*

The Bolo Battalion: The free civil government authorities in Antique, cognizant of the fact that they could not stand well alone on their own in those times of turmoil, decided to recruit from the rank and file of their constituents volunteer guards. In a circular[241] order addressed to all deputy governors, municipal mayors in the province, Tomas Sartaguda, supervising deputy governor, enjoined these officials to get the services of all able-bodied men who were not yet in the military service "for the purpose of giving an effective means of aiding the authorities of the Civil Government of the Province of Antique, and the military authorities thereof..."[242] Men between the age of 18 and 55 were ordered to become members of the Bolo Battalion. Persons who refused to serve in the Bolo Battalion were outrightly branded enemies of the "United States of America and of the civil government."[243]

Under this order, Bolo Battalions were organized in every sitio, barrio and town of the province. These battalions were divided into groups to have volunteer guards at designated points at all times of the day. These volunteers guards manned makeshift outposts and worked under rules and regulations drawn up by the proper authorities in their respective towns.

There is no gainsaying that the members of the Bolo Battalion had contributed much to the war effort. They served as lookouts for both the civil government and the military. It did not become unusual for them to do the chores of couriers carrying messages from one remote place to another. And it was not a rare case when they had to shed blood or give their lives to the cause of freedom in the province.

The Military Government: In a proclamation, dated November 8, 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Macario Peralta, Jr. declared former Assemblyman Calixto O. Zaldivar as acting governor of

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[241] Circular Order to all deputy governors and municipal, mayors, Province of Antique, dated December 25, 1942, issued by Supervising Deputy Governor Tomas Sartaguda

[242] *Ibid.*

[243] *Ibid.*

Antique. Immediately after the declaration, Zaldivar established his headquarters in Bugasong, appointed men of his confidence as officials and fired those he believed would not be able to contribute much or help him well in the administration of the military members of his staff. Among them were Augurio Paguntalan, Angel Licor, Dionisio Agting, Avito Pesayco, Panfilo Guanzon, Nicolas Imbang and Antero Arnaiz. These men were under the rovincial Auditor's office. Zaldivar's appointee as provincial auditor was Pastor Dava.

Zaldivar relieved some of the municipal officials appointed under the Confesor government. In San Jose, however, he reappointed the following:

Antonio de los Reyes — Mayor
Francisco Mosquera — Treasurer
Deogracias Abiera — Secretary
Carlos Melicoton — Chief of Police

How Zaldivar went about appointing officials in Antique after he took over as military governor could be gleaned from the portion of a letter written by Deputy Governor Ramon Maza to Supervising Deputy Governor Tomas Sartaguda:

> The following is the present set-up of the municipal governments in this District:
>
> SAN JOSE — No change except the Vice Mayor Mr. Pedro Javier who was replaced by the elected Vice Mayor, Mr. Catalino Balonon. This Balonon surrendered to the enemy at the beginning of the guerrilla and had acted as puppet vice mayor previous to the appointment of Mr. Alberto Villavert as puppet mayor of San Jose. When the free Civil Government was reorganized, said Balonon escaped and joined the guerrilla in San Pedro. By recommendation of the Army, I appointed him as assistant to my office in the field to attend to the procurement of food supplies for the army.
>
> DAO — The Mayor, Chief of Police, Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Secreary were all changed. The Mayor, the Treasurer and the Chief of Police appointed were all puppets; they were the municipal officials who surrendered to the enemy since the beginning. They had been arrested by order of Col. Grasparil, then captain, and were released only after having paid to the army some amount required for their release.

SIBALOM — Only the Municipal Treasurer, the Municipal Secretary and one Councilor were retained. The Municipal Treasurer was appointed due to the fact that his brother, Lt. Einosas, threatened to shoot the Mayor if his brother, the Treasurer, were driven out. The Municipal Secretary was retained temporarily inasmuch as Clara, Chief Clerk in my office, declined the appointment for this position, and the incumbent mayor has to retain, therefore, the former until he can find a person available for the said position. The Councilor, Vicente Lotilla, is the uncle of the new Mayor.

SAN REMIGIO — The Mayor, the Chief of Police, the Treasurer and two Councilors, Tabaque and Fordan, were replaced. The Municipal Secretary, my brother-in-law, who, despite his insistent requests to be relieved, was prevailed to remain upon the resolution of the municipal council.[244]

It could be gathered from the above-quoted letter of Ramon Maza to Supervising Deputy Governor Sartaguda that Zaldivar relieved all the municipal officials under the Confesor government whenever it was necessary. He was, however, quite choosy in making his appointments. He appointed officials who would serve his purposes well.

As a creature of Peralta, Zaldivar demonstrated his subservience to the army in the province. When some municipal officials complained to him about the abuses being perpetrated by the soldiers in their respective municipalities, he told these municipal officials he couldn't do anything about the situation if the the army so desired it. The municipal officials had complained that the army men were stealing their rice and commandeering their carabaos. One of them, the mayor of Pandan, reported that the army had prohibited the exportation of rice from one town to another. Zaldivar became non-committal on this matter, dismissing it as an affair of the army.[245]

There is little to show that Zaldivar was able to accomplish much during his term as military governor of Antique under the aegis of Peralta. Nevertheless, this aspect of this province's history during those turbulent days bespeaks of the manner by which things were ran under certain situations.

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[244] Letter to Ramon Maza to Supervising Deputy Governor Tomas Sartaguda, dated December 21, 1944.

[245] Letter of Deputy Governor Ramon Maza to the Honorable, the Executive Secretary of the Office of the Governor of Panay and Romblon, dated March 17, 1945.

Zaldivar's term as military governor of the province ended after a brief span of five months. When the Visayas were declared liberated by U.S. Armed Forces and the Philippine Commonwealth government, a new set-up in the governmental framework of the province was installed.

Ramon Maza and the PCAU Administration: The American liberation forces established a firm hold on the province of Antique by April 1945. Their entry brought about the organization of the provincial civil government under the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit (PCAU) of the United States Army.

Ramon Maza, the Deputy Governor of the First Administrative District of Antique under the Confesor government, was appointed Acting Governor under the provincial goverment set up by the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit. Pedro Vego and Guillermo Yson were appointed provincial board members. The provincial board's composition was bipartisan. Vego was a dyed-in-the-wool man of Calixto O. Zaldivar, the military governor whom Maza replaced, while Guillermo Yson was a Confesor follower who succeeded Simeon Herbilla as Deputy Governor of the Second Administrative District after the latter committed suicide.[246]

Under the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit, the officials in the provincial government before the war assumed their former positions. Among these officials was Rafael Magbanua, the Division Superintendent of Schools in the province. Magbanua also served as Division Superintendent of Schools in the Confesor government.

Most of the municipal officials in the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit organized government either were elected before the war or had served the Confesor government. Hereunder is a list of officials who assumed offices in Maza's administration:

LAUA-AN

Pablo Montenegro	Mayor
Filomeno Bandiola	Secretary

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[246] The cause of Herbilla's death is not yet established. Some persons interviewed said that it was a foul play.

Madia-as Impestan	Treasurer
Perpetuo Flores	Chief of Police

VALDERRAMA

Inocentes Loquias	Mayor
Leon Mandigal	Vice Mayor
Loreto Garcia	Secretary
Clemente Esposo	Treasurer
Basilio Pagayonan	Chief of Police

BARBAZA

Antonio Inocentes	Mayor
Rafael Nietes	Vice Mayor
Alfredo Tayo	Treasurer
Ramon Bautista	Chief of Police

SAN REMIGIO

Leoncio Cabrillos	Mayor
Crescenciano Marfil	Vice Mayor
Francisco Mecenas	Secretary
Silvestre Udami	Treasurer

PATNONGON

Ruperto Abellon	Mayor
Andres Elio	Vice Mayor
Jose B. Aguillon	Secretary
Simeon P. Abiera	Treasurer
Leonardo Fernando	Chief of Police

BUGASONG

Jose Barcelo	Mayor
Micael M. Fruto	Vice Mayor
Mamerto Estriver	Secretary
Pastor Dava	Treasurer
Protacio Ybut	Chief of Police

TIBIAO

Martin Juanillo	Mayor
Quintin Lim	Vice Mayor
Antero G. Tayo	Secretary
Angel Necer	Treasurer
Engracio Escarilla	Chief of Police

DAO

Sotero Valdellon .... Mayor
Tomas Febrero .... Treasurer
Angel Villdres .... Chief of Police

The provincial government organized by the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit with Ramon Maza as governor accomplished enough to prepare the province in resuming its activities in postwar conditions. Several improvements were made and Maza pointed out that it was during his term that a high school was established in Culasi.

Postwar Problems: Antique was devastated by the war. It suffered irreparable losses. It also suffered physical, moral and spiritual collapse.

Between 1942 and 1945 many people died as a result of their war effort, either because of mistaken identity or just plain cussness of other people.

Property damage was extensive. Public buildings, schools, roads and bridges were either in ruins or falling apart. An assessment of the damage done to provincial public works was worth millions of pesos.

During the postwar period, one of the worst problems was the maintenance of peace and order. The war had changed the moral values of people making peace and order in the province deteriorate. The Antiqueños were still carrying the hang-over of war and were behaving as if there were still a war going on. Thousands of loose fire arms were carried by the populace, and most of them got into the hands of people who needed them as they needed a hole in the head. The incidence of crime rose, and criminality seemed the order as people finding new values began to take stock of what they could grab.

But things would take to a tapering point. As the province assumed its role in nation-building, the Antiqueños began to revert to their old selves. All of them have to put their shoulders on the gear to help rehabilitate and reconstruct the province.

CONCLUSIONS

The start of the hostilities found the province making hectic preparations against the enemy. Military units were formed and their ranks swelled with civilian volunteers fired with patriotic fervor. These preparations did not serve the purpose because hardly had the enemy made a beachhead when the civilian volunteers sought the safety of their homes and the regular army men trekked towards the interior towns. Except for ambuscades of the enemy there really occurred no frontal clash between the army elements in the province and the invading Japanese forces, thus paving the way for the complete occupation of the province without a hitch. Shortly, the army forces surrendered on superior orders and a new era began.

After the surrender of the army, the Japanese forces launched a campaign to bring down the populace from the mountain hideouts to make them cooperate in building the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia. At first, the response was lukewarm, but the Antiqueños realized that it was vainglorious to resist the enemy, making them subscribe to the wisdom of the old adage that if you can't fight 'em, join 'em.

The first Antiqueños who went to the enemy were the military men. They were followed by the duly elected officials of the province led by Governor Tobias Fornier. The civilian officials were immediately installed as puppet officials of the Japanese military administration. There is no gainsaying that the motives behind the surrender of these top officials were more personal than patriotic; however, they promulgated measures for the rehabilitation of the province. Labor battalions were formed to reconstruct damaged public works while the campaign was stepped up to lure down the civilians and army men hiding in the mountain fastnesses. The campaign was successful because of the appeal of the puppet provincial officials about prosperity. Besides, most of the people preferred living in the enemy zone where they could enjoy an easy life than their *comprovincianos* staying in the hinterlands.

Two schools of opinion prevailed in the official hierarchy of the puppet provincial government. One school of opinion subscribed to the belief that Japan's victory in Asia and the Far

East was already complete and permanent. The group which belonged to this school of thought gave the Japanese occupation forces unilateral support. On the other hand the second school of opinion had the belief that the Japanese occupation was temporary and that the Americans would in the end win the war, hence, the Japanese should not be given full support. In spite of these diverse thoughts, however, the fact remained that both groups in their own way supported the Japanese.

Some Antiqueños who had accepted the Japanese rule went to certain extremes. A few turned spies while others openly advocated the Japanese policies. These Antiqueños had to suffer the consequences of their individual acts.

A majority of the prominent Antiqueños served the Japanese Government during the occupation in many capacities. They were responsible for the formation of such organizations as the Neighborhood Association and the "Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas" (KALIBAPI) in the province.

If the Japanese occupation caused the proliferation of villains during the war, so did it create heroes. It is common knowledge that the Japanese committed atrocities during the war. These atrocities could have reached superlative destruction had not for such prominent Antiqueños like Governor Tobias Fornier who ably defended his people, especially the womenfolk on one special occasion.

After the capitulation of the USAFFE forces in Panay, several guerrilla groups operated in Antique. Most of these groups were legitimate organizations but a number was composed of downright brigands and bandits. They have gone on sorties of harnessing the Japanese forces in the province but their motives would later appear to be suspicious. Eventually, however, the dross would fall out and leave the true guerrillas in command. Even before the guerrilla movement in the province firmed up, individual guerrilla bands were already making their mark in the province. Exploits of these guerrilla units were many.

The promotion of Captain Valentin V. Grasparil to the rank of major unified and expanded the guerrilla movement in Antique. The organization or unification of the guerrillas in Antique brought about the formation of what was to be known as Sixty-fifth Infantry Regiment which started from roving bands and was increased to four battalions as the war progressed. The Antique force was commanded by Grasparil with Adriano Samulde, Dalmacio Dy Buco and Felipe Alpas as battalion commanders. Grasparil was later to be replaced by Braulio Villasis, Dy Buco by Ceferino Carreon and Alpas by Gamaliel Manikan. Aside from the Antique force, another unit was organized. It was called the Coast Patrol Guard (CPG) which was later expanded and made the Sixty-first Infantry Regiment. This unit was placed under the command of Captain Cirilo B. Garcia.

The guerrilla movement was infiltrated by spies and it became necessary in the organization to create an inquiry board to try suspects and passed sentence on them. This board was stationed in Bad-as. Several people were meted death sentences and executed, while others were saved from certain death on the intercession of men connected with the movement. Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar became a suspect. Those who were freed by the army were pressed into soliciting supplies for the guerrillas.

The Antique Force received aid from the outside sources by means of submarine. Several shipments of arms and ammo were given to the guerrillas. General MacArthur likewise authorized to print money for the salaries of the officers and men of the organization.

The guerrilla movement also received assistance from the civilian population who never failed to give their help in the form of food, clothing, and information, not to mention lives which were sacrificed for the guerrilla cause.

When the Antique Force was in existence it engaged the Japanese military in several battles and skirmishes. It ambushed Japanese patrols and garrisons and was in turn hounded to its lairs. As a fighting force it upheld itself before the eyes of those who pinned their hopes on it.

The free civil government existed side by side with the guerrilla movement in the province. The fact of the matter was that the civil government had to be depended upon by the resistance movement forces for food supplies.

It was the primary duty of the civil government to produce for the fighting forces in the province. To this end it conducted food production campaigns.

The free civil government in the province was organized on the initiative of Governor Tomas Confesor as chief executive in Panay. The province of Antique was divided into three administrative districts under deputy governors responsible to the governor of Panay.

Because it was the creation of Governor Confesor, the free civil government in the province inherited characteristics which were Confesor's making.

The free civil government operated efficiently until the time Peralta and Confesor, the leading resistance leaders of Panay Island, developed a rift in their relations. This rift led to the creation of the military government in the province with a Peralta appointee heading it. This dispensation which was later replaced by the provincial government was organized under the auspices of the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit (PCAU) of the U.S. Army. Finally, the provincial government was restored under the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The war laid the province prostrate. Roads, bridges, public buildings and other public works were heavily damaged. The repair and reconstruction of these public works was the first measure which the provincial government undertook after the war.

The periods covered by this study have shown that the Antiqueños responded to trying circumstances. They have proven that they could be patriots in their own fashion and their love of country was expressed in a manner they could do best. Valentin V. Grasparil was an obscure army officer before the war performing liaison chores. There was reason to believe that his name would not even create a ripple if heard in a gathering of prominent Antiqueños before the war. And yet when he was tapped to organize the guerrilla movement in the province, he proved himself to be a better military men beyond the Antiqueños' expectations.

Tobias Fornier was elected governor of the province before the war. A very popular man, he had so much at stake, so much to lose and practically nothing to gain when he decided to surrender to the Japanese. The Japanese imperial army gave him in return the highest post in the province as a puppet official.

He could have been easily condemned by the people. He braved searing criticism, even death at the hands of his provincemates in order to provide his province measure of peace during those times. The welfare of the province and its inhabitants was his foremost concern. He made the sacrifice and emerged a hero in the eyes of his people.

Calixto O. Zaldivar was a former assemblyman when the war broke out. Like other prominent Antiqueños, he could have easily made himself a fence-sitter during the war. However, he chose to contribute to the guerrilla movement in the province. He was later tapped as military governor of the province by Macario Peralta, Jr. After the war, he was elected governor. Very much later he was appointed executive secretary and finally associate justice of the Supreme Court.

Ramon Maza, a law practitioner and former government official, could have chosen to stay behind the scenes during the war. But he did not. Instead, he actively participated in the civil government under Governor Confesor. When the war ended, he served as the provincial governor under the PCAU (Philippine Civil Affairs Unit). Immediately prior to his retirement he was appointed technical assistant on civil governments.

Simeon Herbilla, a municipal treasurer before the war, suddenly found himself occupying one of the top positions in the free civil government under Panay Governor Tomas Confesor. Herbilla helped much in the organization of municipal governments. He contributed immensely to the freedom movement in the province to the extent of sacrificing his own life.

Other Antiqueños responded just as well to the situation that tested man's mettle. Men like Melquiades Melo and Agaton Grasparil of Sibalom, Adriano Samulde and Dalmacio Dy Buco of Pandan, Emmanuel M. Solis and Guillermo Yson of Bugasong, Felipe Alpas and Antonio Alon of Culasi, were among them. Melo consorted with the Japanese military and openly exhorted the people to collaborate with the invaders. This easily landed Melo in the list of person marked for liquidation. But this was the farthest Melo got, however. He proved beyond the shadow of doubt that he was acting up consorting with the Japanese to get into their good graces so that he could extend his assistance to his provincemates. And he did by saving many Antiqueños from the Japanese sword. Grasparil who succeeded Melo as mayor of Sibalom stayed in his post up to the landing of the U.S. liberation forces in Leyte. He proved his worth by furnishing the army vital information concerning Japanese defense perimeter in Sibalom. Alpas was one among the first to lead the fighting units to ambush enemy garrisons during the early days of guerrilla organization. Solis was instrumental in consolidating the Bugasong force. He also suppressed banditry in Bugasong and Valderrama before joining the "firing line."

It is evident from the history of the period covered by this study that the Antiqueño could very well do much for himself and his province once given the chance and the proper incentive.

Recapitulating, the period between 1942 and 1945 is an aspect in the history of Antique that has brought about developments which can easily be considered as eye-openers. It is a period that saw the emergence of men who helped shape the destiny of the province. It is an era in the province's history from which Antiqueños can draw lessons as well as inspirations to push their province farther into the forefront.

This historical study covered four important phases in the history of Antique during the Japanese Occupation:

1. The decision of the duly elected officials of the province to cooperate temporarily with the Japanese Military Administration;

2. The organization of the Free Civil Government under the aegis of Panay Governor Tomas Confesor;

3. The formation of the Resistance Movement in the province at the initiative of Colonel Macario Peralta, Jr.; and

4. The installation of a military government under the auspices of the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit of the U.S. Army.

Little, if any, has been written about this trying incidents in the history of Antique. Although reference to the period has been made in some books and studies, yet nothing vivid was written about the period.

It is common knowledge in the province of Antique that the movement during turbulent years was a force that had to be reckoned with by the enemy. In fact it was the end-all and be-all of a great number of Antiqueños. The movement was active and militant. Comparatively speaking, it operated in a much better way than any other guerrilla movements during the Japanese regime.

The guerrilla movement in spite of its vaunted strength, failed to dislodge immediately the Japanese invaders from the province. The Japanese Army Force in Antique which was less than three hundred in number was too small in comparison with the two thousand strength of the guerrilla force in the province. This is a revelation in itself. Of course, we cannot discard the fact that the guerrillas in Antique were not well equipped in arms and ammunition. It was only later on when new arms were brought by the America submarines which landed in Antique.

This writer cannot claim that he was able to gather the complete facts about the guerrilla movement in Antique. However, he can say with modesty that he did his best to gather enough materials for this dissertation. He had gone over written primary sources, interviewed participants in the movement and studied the history and geography of the province. He talked with people who occupied high positions during that period. Among them were former Secretary of National Defense Macario Peralta, Jr., the moving spirit behind the movement; Supreme Court Associate Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar; Ramon Maza; and a host of other guerrilla leaders during the time.

Nothing much has been written about the history of the resistance movement in Antique during the Japanese Occupation. It is this finding which prompted the author to push through a project of this kind. This historical dissertation provided the author the opportunity to recollect for students his own experience and observation as an active participant in the guerrilla movement in Antique. The author firmly believes that for a people to become cultured, their past must be preserved. A persons who does not know the past cannot make the future great. The past becomes the basis for the future.

The Story of the Philippine Guerrillas during the Second World War*

BUENAVENTURA J. BELLO, schoolmaster at old Vigan on the far northwest coast of Luzon, sat down behind the desk that almost dwarfed his slight body, and prepared for a busy day. Just two days before (December 8, Philippine Time) the Japanese had blasted Pearl Harbor, in Hawaii, and Clark Field, in the Philippines, and the schools were to be closed down because the Philippines were assuredly to be an invasion target of the Nipponese.

Downstairs there was a sudden disturbance. Someone was tramping pompously up the stairs. Others were following. Six Japanese soldiers suddenly marched in through the office door. War had come to Buenaventura J. Bello and the other 16,000,000 citizens of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

He sat frozen to his seat. Yes, these were the enemy. He noted that one wore a samurai saber. He had read about those relics of an ancient warrior code. The one with the samurai sword was telling him something in Japanese. Then he made a gesture which Bello understood. The Jap pointed to the two flags on the wall, almost directly behind Bello's back, and jerked his clenched fists down toward the floor.

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* This article is taken from a work, entitled *Triumph in the Philippines*, of which it forms volume III. The work was prepared after the end of World War II by the Combat History Division, G-1 Section, Headquarters, United States Army Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) by order of Lieutenant General W. D. Styer, Commanding General. The Combat History Division was then under Colonel Walter E. Buchly, Cavalry, Chief of Division. The complete work, which is found in four volumes, has remained unpublished to date, as far as the editors could ascertain, with the exception of volume II, "Corregidor of Eternal Memory," which was printed in condensed form with 30,000 copies for members of the Armed Forces visiting the fortress.

So! The Jap wanted him to tear down the American and Filipino flags. He sat bolted upright in his chair. He would tell this creature off in good American English.

"If you want the flags taken down you will do it yourself," he said. "But not me."

He sat back and folded his hands over his chest in defiance. Now the Japs knew where he stood.

The Jap officer pulled out his revolver. Quick but orderly thoughts were marching through Bello's mind:

"There are moments in the lives of man when they are impelled to certify — to seal — with their actions what they believe and what they teach. Such a moment has now arrived in my life. I shall so certify.

"I have taught my school children to defend the flag of their nation and of their mother country. That I will do."

He raised his fists in a defiant gesture, and shook them under the very nose of the glaring invader.

"These hands," he shouted, "are made to defend those flags and not to pull them down."

The Japs reaction was instantaneous. He pulled the trigger and the slug tore into Bello's body. The defender slumped forward in his chair unconscious. He hadn't even felt the slug hit him. The pistol flash and unconsciousness came simultaneously.

The Jap leaped over to the flags and pulled them down. He made one stab at them with his saber. Two of the others jabbed at the flags with bayonets, ground their heels into them and stamped out of the room. Another non-cooperator had been eliminated from the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

But the Japanese couldn't realize they had just committed an act which was to make men over the world fight longer and fight harder, and to inspire the women and children who stood behind those men.

A GREAT NATIONAL MOVEMENT IS BORN

So it was that on that day, December 10, 1941, the day of the first Jap landings in the Philippines, that a great national movement was born — the resistance movement. The story of the

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quiet little schoolteacher of Vigan, symbol of the spirit of his people, swept over the world, as a call to arms for free men everywhere against oppression, tyranny, terror and force.

The Japs had disclosed the pattern of their plans of "cooperation" with the people of the Philippines in this one scene. But that same day down the road a short distance below Vigan, they gave another example. A bus, loaded beyond capacity with women and children fleeing from Manila back to their homes in the Ilocano country, was creaking along the highway.

The children were crying and many of the women were in tears. They were desperately tired because they had been enroute for two days. They had been forced to leave the train when the railroad tracks had been bombed. The old bus was the only thing they could find in which to ride. They didn't know that the Sugano Detachment of the 14th Imperial Japanese Army had landed at Vigan that morning and was sweeping down that very road.

Suddenly two machine guns opened up from both sides of the road. Cries and screams above the deadly cracking of the automatic weapons. Some of those in the truck didn't have time to cry out at all. They sat silently their heads leaning to one side. They couldn't fall to the floor when they were killed, the bus was too crowded. The truck careened to a stop and the first massacre of the invasion — almost exclusively of women and children — had ended. The handful still alive crawled from the scene of carnage.

THE ENEMY TAKES OVER

The Japanese lusted for Manila, beautiful capital city of the Pearl of the Orient, and their desire had been inmeasurably whetted by the fact they were being delayed by the grim and gallant USAFFE.

As both his northern and southern forces neared Manila, Japanese Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma could sense what would happen if both elements collided in the city head-on, placing the once gay capital in the bloodstained hands of two reinforced combat divisions. Other Japanese commanders had made that sort of mistake before, and had seen their armies disintegate before

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their eyes into an orgy of rape, plunder and pillage, with little hope of reorganization to continue the battle. He remembered what had happened at Nanking in 1937.

General Homma, a one-time Japanese military attached to the Court of St. James' knew his men and he knew also that if they were unleashed in Manila, he would have no army with which to fight on Bataan, where the USAFFE had withdrawn. He was taking no chances on losing his fanatical army.

It was January 1, 1941, when the Japanese advance elements stood at the threshold of Manila. General Homma summoned his staff and told them that both the Tsuchihashi Group, sweeping from the north, and the Morioka Group, slashing up from the south, would be halted where they stood at the gates of the city and that only a token force would be sent in to occupy the capital. The troops were in "heated spirits," and might get out of control, he added. Staff members, themselves anxious to get into the city and away from the rigors of combat, pleaded with him to let the "magnificent junction" take place.

General Homma remained adamant and sent his orders to Lieutenant General Tsuchihashi and Lieutenant General Morioka, prefaced with the remainder that their military objective was now Bataan. He told them that they must concentrate their entire efforts on overwhelming the peninsula, and that they each would sent only two battalions into Manila for the junction, to act as a police force. Both commanders were in a frenzy of chagrin at being deprived of the "reward" and loudly protested that their commander had "stopped them at the height of their success."

Finally, it became necessary for General Homma to send for General Tsuchihashi and personally tell him that it was a direct order which would be obeyed. General Homma further directed that one regiment, the 28th Infantry of General Morioka's 16th Division, would afterwards take over the occupation of Manila and all other troops would be used in the drive on Bataan.

Manila, in the grip of the Japanese pincers, cleared the streets, closed the houses and waited, with hollow feeling of hopelessness for the "triumphal entry" on January 2, 1942. Lamon Bay in the secondary amphibious effort, arrived within the city limits first. They marched into town in full battle formation: a long column with a point, an advance guard, and connecting files ahead of the main body. They were too sure of themselves at first, and they had their rifles at the ready position with fixed bayonets. About 500 troops, moving along Taft Avenue, had penetrated the area of the capital buildings, when medium tanks made their appearance in the column, roaring into the city. Negotiations had previously been made for the "peaceful" entry into the city, but the Japs took no chances on running into any organized opposition.

With the first troops came the Kempei-Tai, the dread secret police. They immediately took over the Jai-Alai Club, setting up the headquarters there. Then they plastered the city with billboard proclamations setting forth the rules and regulations under which they expected the Filipinos to live.

They sent out public speakers, issued newspaper broadcasts and made radio broadcasts carrying the message that "we came here not as enemies but as liberators." Then they started rounding up all the nationals of the several Allied nations, particularly the Americans and British, and interned them in ancient Santo Tomas University. First university in the Philippines and one of the great seats of learning in the Far East, Santo Tomas was turned into a concentration camp for civilian internees.

Soon the Kempei-Tai, began to realize that despite every effort of their propaganda machine to convince the Filipinos of Japanese friendship, resistance was evident everywhere. Jap sentries began to disappear mysteriously. Things the Japs had ordered done, simply were not being done. Then the Japanese issued a proclamation which warned that for every Jap killed ten Filipinos would be killed. The next day they found their huge warning posters had been altered to say that for every Filipinos killed one hundred Japs would be killed.

The Manila police, under the control of the Kempei-Tai, were virtually helpless. The city police had been disarmed the day before the arrival of the Japs under terms of the pre-entry negotiations made by Mayor Jorge B. Vargas, President Quezon's former secretary who had been left in Manila to arrange for the best possible terms with the enemy. Before the Japanese arrived in the city Vargas had transmitted the instructions to Chief of Police Antonio C. Torres.

Knowing that the police had been disarmed, rowing Japanese patrols were sent out with orders to kill everyone in possession of firearms of any kind. While the propaganda blared friendship, Lt. Col. Ohta, merciless chief of the Kempei-Tai, delighted in having groups of Filipinos tied up at the Jai-Alai Club where he could personally beat and torture them for minor infractions of impromtu rules and regulations.

Ohta told Chief of Police Torres, "you run the police department in Manila but we will be incharge." Then he proceeded to place a Jap staff sergeant in command of Chief Torres, who was himself a Colonel, and appointed a Captain Horikawa as a sort of liaison officer between the Kempei-Tai and the unarmed city police. Horikawa had the official job of squelching any recognition of the bestiality of the Jap soldiers by keeping civilian complaints off the police blotters. He visited the various stations, and when he found records of complaints he had them destroyed. His customary order, mimicked everywhere in the streets in Manila, was: "Jap soldiers not do. Take them out."

Finally he despaired of trying to kill all charges personally — ranging from murder and rape to attacks on small children — and issued a blanket order that the civil police would handle only cases involving Filipinos. Any cases involving Japanese soldiers would be verbally transmitted to him personally and he would "take care of it." The charges ended there.

While Homma was in his San Fernando headquarters organizing fresh troops for the attack on Bataan, the temptation of the comforts to be had in Manila was too great for his staff, and so they set up 14th Army headquarters in the city — a typical example of the peculiar lack of coordination between a commander and his staff, characteristic of the Jap Army. However, an inspector from Tokyo, who later came to inquire about the "delay" in the Bataan battle, concluded that the staff was carrying this sort of thing too far. As a consequence the chief of staff was relieved by Tokyo for having forsaken the field battle in the midst of a campaign.

Lieutenant General Morioka, who became responsible for the occupation of Luzon while General Homma continued with the battle, immediately started searching about for those who could be set up as a "friendly government, since it is much easier to rule a people under puppet government, if the idea that it is their own can be sold to them." The Japs had long since laid the groundwork for their puppet organization in the Philippines.

The idea of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was already well known and an effective fifth column, both from a military and political operational point of view, had been well established. The fifth column had been developed by espionage agents operating as tourists, fishermen, merchants and diplomats. For decades the Japs had increased their interests in the Philippines, particularly in all classes of shipping. At the outbreak of the war they controlled 80 per cent of all deep sea activities in the island waters.

So it was, that while the battle was still raging on Bataan, military headquarters, established in the hastily vacated building of the United States High Commissioner, situated on Manila Bay, sent out word that the Jap commanders wanted to meet a number of prominent Filipinos. This was the first move to set up a puppet civilian government in the capital of the Filipinos and ultimately led to the formation of a Philippine Executive Commission with Jorge B. Vargas as chairman. This Commission exercised executive and legislative powers until the middle of 1943.

The Kempei-Tai found Jai-Alai Club unsatisfactory, and moved its headquarters to Villamor Hall, conservatory of music at the University of the Philippines. This building, too, was found too exposed and open to public view for the brutality which was practised there, and in a short time the police squad moved again to grim, silent Fort Santiago, with its dark and musty underground dungeons built under the bed of the Pasig River decades before by the Spaniards.

Shortly after the capture of Manila, the Japs gave up their sotto voce propaganda and became more blatant. They made it increasingly clear that, in their opinion, the Japanese were superior to Filipinos, and that it would ill betide those Filipinos who failed to cooperate with the Japanese. From the very beginning, the Japs were obviously of the opinion that they could control the Philippines by harshness. But they eventually learned that this brought them no measure of success at all, and they tried changing their propaganda line to one emphasizing "brotherhood."

"Asia for the Asiatics" became the cry, and "Drive out western imperialism," the slogan. But by the time the Japanese had made the change in their propaganda tactics they found that would not work either. It all boiled down to the simple proposition that the Filipinos would not be enslaved.

In April, 1942, the Japs saw a dramatic and powerful demonstration of what they could expect in trying to get the Philippines to go along with their plans. Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos, of the Philippine Supreme Court, had preferred to remain in the islands and take his chances, rather than leave with President Quezon. Accordingly, the president had named Justice Santos as his personal representative in the still unoccupied islands of the archipelago. During Easter Week, Justice Santos was on an inspection trip in Cebu, when two trucks loaded with Japanese soldiers suddenly appeared. He was surrounded and seized. Justice Santos admitted his identity and was unceremoniously rushed to the city of Cebu where he was held for more than a month, being interrogated again and again.

Corregidor had not yet fallen when he was spirited away and shipped from place to place in an effort to break him down and force him to join the Japanese side, but he remained adamant. Finally the Jap commander sent for him and delivered an ultimatum: Unless he decided to work for the Japanese in establishing Jap rule he would be killed. His answer was still no. Five minutes later Justice Santos was executed by a firing squad. Even the calloused Japs were impressed by this great man's willingness to die for his principles. A Japanese officer told Santos' son, when he took the young man to see his father's grave: "There your father lies; he died a hero's death."

Immediately after the fall of Corregidor, General Homma made a triumphant entrance into Manila. But his days of "glory" were numbered. The Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo was far from happy at having had the Japanese military juggernaut stopped by the untrained, poorly supplied, and unsupported USAFFE, and they were planning to make him accountable.

Less than two months after his triumph, General Homma was ordered to return to Tokyo and a successor was sent to take his place in the Philippines. Homma knew that his force had been outfought for a while by the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor, but he didn't expect that he "should be removed at the height of my success." The "Conqueror of the Philippines" left Manila on July 6, 1942, and after a stopover at Formosa, went on to Tokyo. On August 12, 1942, he reported to Emperor Hirohito. This was an awe-inspiring moment in the mind of the Shinto general. The Emperor politely presented to him a rescript citation and thanked him for his "trouble and worry." Then Premier Tojo summarily retired Homma from the Army on August 31, 1942.

The Philippine command was taken over by sick and ailing Lt. General Tanaka, who held the job of Commander-in-Chief for about eight months. It is still rumored in the islands, though the story has not yet been verified, that Tanaka was shot by guerrillas while making a tour of inspection of Samar and was secretly rushed to Japan either in critical condition or dead. In any event, the Japs announced that Tanaka was being relieved because of ill health and Lt. Gen. Kuroda replaced him.

Kuroda had his subordinates ruthlessly carry out the orders of Tokyo in the program of total subjugation, but personally spent most of his time playing golf at the Wack Wack Country Club, a game in which he was reasonably proficient. However, when the threat of invasion of the Philippines by General MacArthur was imminent, golf-loving Kuroda was promptly snatched back out of the islands by Tokyo and the "Tiger of Malaya," Lt. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, was sent in to relieve him.

By the middle of 1942, the Japanese military government had set up its headquarters in the Finance Building in the capitol area, the military GHQ was in the High Commissioner's Building, and the Kempei-Tai was esconced in Fort Santiago. From GHQ Propaganda offices came orders which were to result in one of the humorous experiences of the terror-filled occupation. The Jap soldiers were directed to repetitiously use the English phrase, "Japanese love Filipinos." Unable to handle the "l" in speech (it became an "r") and having great difficulty with the "v", it turned out that the Jap soldiers were going around saying

"Japanese rob Firipinos." The Filipinos would smile and reply, "Soldier, you are telling the truth," and the Japs felt their idea was a great success.

In October, 1942, Japan's warlord general, Premier Tojo, made his "triumphant" entry into Manila. Four weeks before his arrival, the Kempei-Tai stretched out its death-like hands everywhere to make certain of a forced draft reception. Schools were ordered closed so that all children "could" attend. Flags and banners fairly smothered the city.

The Japanese had experienced great difficulty with the public schools. Taking over the educational system, they immediately started to teach their ways of life and thought, and the Japanese language. Everything in the textbooks which did not agree with their ideas was excised. Then they discovered that school attendance had fallen off more than sixty percent. Parents, it developed, preferred not to have their children educated at all. Jap solicitation and even pressure failed to bring them back to school.

During his visit, Premier Tojo outlined a dim plan for Philippine "Independence" under Jap benevolence. He put the whole in motion for the drafting of a constitution and the election of a new government, but nothing of consequence happened in this respect for nearly a year. Ultimately the Japanese program of independence for the Philippines was renewed with a barrage of propaganda followed by an announcement of Premier Tojo before the Japanese Diet that he had "categorically promised" independence to the Philippines. This was on June 12, 1943.

Two days later, a new entity was ordered into existence to prepare a constitution for the formation of a Philippine republic under Japanese control. The agency that selected this Preparatory Committee for Philippine Independence, was the Kalibapi Association, originally formed by the Japs in December, 1942, to cultivate the objectives of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. But the warlords soon changed it from a cultural and social organization into a political party, and ultimately it became the sole officially recognized political party of the Philippines — the so-called "People's Party."

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Using their usual high-handed methods, the Kalibapi selected a 20-man commission for the framing of the constitution and the establishment of a republic. The proposed constitution was reported out of the committee and signed on September 4, 1943. Three days later a Kalibapi convention ratified the document without recourse to a popular vote by the people. The Kalibapi then promptly launched another propaganda program to sell the new constitution and the republic to the Filipinos. On October 14, 1943, the republic was inaugurated, and Jose P. Laurel, who had served as chairman of the Preparatory Committee, took office as president.

Under the comouflage of the co-prosperity talk, Japanese systematically stripped the Philippines with a program of "exploitation through cooperation." Japanese educators, medical savants, scientists, agriculturists, and industrial, cultural and propaganda experts poured into the Philippines to do the job. Their task was to exploit the islands to the maximum, without causing a total collapse of the whole economic structure and consequent loss to the Japs' war needs. Standard of living went down in the Philippines and much of the population soon below the subsistence level. The economic looting to satisfy the insatiable men of the Nipponese war machine extended to every segment of island life. The Japs considered the Philippines to be territorial booty, of the highest order, to be stripped of food resources and completely exhausted of minerals and metal. Prices, of course, soared. By September, 1943, coffee was the equivalent of $12.00 a pound, tea $15.00 a pound, carabao meat $1.50 a pound, chicken $1.00 a pound, eggs thirty cents each, fish $2.00 per pound, cigarettes $3.50 per pack, matches forty cents a pack. Rice — the mainstay — and sugar became almost impossible to obtain.

Occupation money, a Jap innovation for legalizing large scale looting, made its appearance with the first troops. Backed by nothing and pegged to nothing, the Japs forced it upon the people at the value printed on its face. All the genuine Philippine money was vailed on and ordered out of circulation. This Jap stuff had no real value but was the only permissible medium of exchange. It was soon nicknamed "toy money," and eventually bundles of thousands of pesos of it had to be carried around just to do ordinary shopping. Later it became known as "Mickey Mouse" money.

PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES

The principal Japanese prisoner-of-war camps on Luzon were located at Camp O'Donnell, near Capas, in Tarlac, and Camp Cabanatuan, near the town of the same name in Nueva Ecija both of which had been Philippine Army training camps prior to the war. Many prisoners of war also were incarcerated at Bilibid prison, Manila, which served as a hospital and disposition center, base from which prisoners were distributed throughout camps in southern Luzon and the Visayas, where they were used to build airstrips and on other work details. Prisoners bound for Japan also passed through the prison. There were two other large prisoner-of-war camps for the southern islands at Davao and Casisang, both in Mindanao. Several hundred prisoners of war were imprisoned in Puerto Princesa, capital of Palawan, where they were used to build an airstrip. Five hundred prisoners, mostly Americans, were kept initially on Corregidor island.

The principal concentration camp for alien civilians was Santo Tomas University, Manila. The agricultural school at Los Baños, on the southern shores of Laguna de Bay some 50 miles southwest of Manila, also served as a civilian internment camp. There was a camp for senior American officers, generals and colonels, at Tarlac, and the Japanese police prison was at Fort Santiago, Manila.

After the fall of Bataan in April, 1942, some 51,000 prisoners of whom 12,000 were Filipino soldiers, were taken to Camp O'Donnell. The remainder of Bataan's 64,000 who were still alive at the time of surrender, were either in the hospitals on the peninsula, had escape, been massacred or were among the hundreds who died on the death march to the camp. Thousands more died during the first weeks in O'Donnell.

The twelve American general officers and sixty-four colonels imprisoned at O'Donnell after the fall of Bataan were later transferred to the Camp at Tarlac, which also had been a Philippine Army training camp. Its population was small, consisting only of the high-ranking officers and a small group of enlisted men to help run the camp. It was closed down late in 1942 when the senior officers were transferred to Formosa.

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Camp O'Donnell, with an original capacity of only 10,000 men, consisted of bamboo from barracks with grass roofs. Each one was designed to hold forty-eight men but the Japanese filled the camp to five times its capacity and each building thus was crowded with more than 200. Many of the occupants had to sleep on the ground underneath the raised floor. From the time it was first opened on April 10, 1942, until it was closed down early in the following year, more than 30,000 prisoners died at Camp O'Donnell. In 1942 between April 11 and August 4, 29 180 deaths were recorded by a prisoner who worked in the camp office. This included 3,182 Philippine Scouts, 1,600 American soldiers, 49 American sailors, 24,492 soldiers of the Philippine Army and 857 civilians who had been employed by the Army and were taken prisoners with the soldiers.

Conditions in O'Donnell were also beyond description. Food was inadequate at all times, consisting usually only of rice, sometimes with a little lard, sweet potatoes or vegetables added. Meat was rarely served. Water had to be carried two miles from a muddy stream and had be to be boiled before drinking. Many men drank without boiling, and consequently much diseases resulted. The Japanese never furnished any clothes, in spite of the fact that many of the prisoners arrived in camp almost naked. There were Filipino doctors in the camp, but their efforts were ineffective because they had no medicines, instruments or hospital facilities. There was no soap and the hospital units as well as the other barracks were extremely filthy. The latrines were merely open pits and hordes of flies cause a rapid spread of dysentery. Death and terror stalked the camp, hand in hand, and there was a never-ending procession to the graveyard where bodies were put in common graves.

The Japanese began releasing Filipino prisoners from Camp O'Donnell late in 1942. From time to time, the sickest prisoners were allowed to go home on parole, the object being to avoid taking care of them in the camp hospital. By March, 1943, most of the prisoners there who had managed to stay alive had been released under this policy. Only a few were kept as caretakers at the camp. Of the total of 48,000 Filipino soldiers sent to camp (6,000 additional had arrived after the fall of Corregidor) 18,000 survived and eventually gained their freedom. By the time the

American forces returned to Luzon in 1945, Camp O'Donnell had entirely disappeared except for its cemeteries, in which so many heroes were lying.

American soldiers were transferred from O'Donnell at the beginning of June, 1942, to the prison camp at Cabanatuan. Another 5,000 arrived at Cabanatuan from Corregidor at the same time. The Cabanatuan war prisoner camp was initially operated in three separate units. These were known as Camp No. 1, Camp No. 2 and Camp No. 3. Camp No. 1 was located nine kilometers east of the city of Cabanatuan; No. 2 was six kilometers east of No. 1; and Camp No. 3 another six kilometers east of Camp No. 2. From the start, it was found impossible to get water at Camp No. 2 except by transporting it in 50-gallon drums on trucks, and so this camp was abandoned. Camp No. 3 was abandoned in October, 1942. All three areas were initially under the direction of Lt. Col. Shigeti Mori.

The total enrollment at Cabanatuan was approximately 12,000 Americans. Before the survivors were to be rescued in January, 1945, more than 2,600 were dead. The Japanese at Cabanatuan were ruthless with prisoners. At Camp No. 1 on June 6, 1942, six American soldiers were shot for "attempted escape." Actually only two or three of these men were guilty of having left the camp area and they did so only to secure food, being captured as they attempted to reenter the camp after making purchase at a nearby barrio store. When a barracks check was held at the time, three or four others were found to be missing; they were asleep outside their barracks. Nevertheless, when the six were found, all were summarily shot.

At Camp No. 3 the first executions took place on May 31, when four soldiers found walking the main road toward Cabanatuan were captured. A number of soldiers succeeded in making successful escapes, however, and on July 10, 1942, the camp commander issued an order that all prisoners would be divided into ten-man groups and if anyone of the group escaped the remaining members would be executed. Subsequently, all prisoners were ordered to sign an oath to the effect that they would not attempt to escape.

The building at Cabanatuan prison camp were of sawali, 50 feet long, 20 feet wide and about 10 feet high. Seventy-eight men were assigned to each building, sleeping on bunks made of bamboo slats. Many of them had no blankets or even shelter halves. The men used their own mess gear but there were no facilities for sterilizing it. The kitchens were open sheds with nipa roofs; there were no screens and the floors were of dirt. The food was prepared in 50-gallon drums and in big shallow iron pots. Flies were everywhere, swarming all over the food and the utensils, carrying disease and death.

The Japs permitted the opening of a commissary in the camp in July, 1942, and there the prisoners could buy merchandise brought in by Filipino and Japanese merchants. A limited amount of merchandise plus lack of money with which to buy prohibited any great benefit from this enterprise. Nevertheless, through the commissary the Americans were able to secure some additional food that, to many of them, meant the difference between life and death.

By the end of 1942, nearly 1,000 prisoners had been transferred from Cabanatuan to the prisoner-of-war camp at Davao Penal Colony, Mindanao. Another 2,200 or more had been transferred to Japan, and nearly 400 more to Bilibid Prison, Manila, to be sent out on work details to other parts of the islands. In 1944, Japs began shipping thousands of prisoners out of Cabanatuan to Japan. Several of these prison ships were unknowingly sunk by American submarines in the China Sea with the loss of hundreds of lives. Many other prisoners, whose ships got through to Japan, died enroute because of overcrowding on the stench-laden vessels.

A special detail of 120 men of the Sixth Ranger Battalion, guided by guerrillas, rescued the surviving prisoners at Cabanatuan on January 30, 1945, but there were only 512 still there.

The women of Luzon played a heroic role in getting life-saving food to the starving soldiers at O'Donnell, Cabanatuan and Corregidor. These were most effective organizations and though the women faced sudden death if caught, they sent supplies of food into the camps almost daily. Perhaps the most difficult job was the one accomplished by a group organized by Maria Martinez, businesswoman, of Manila, who managed to get food and money to the 500 Americans on the isolated island of

Corregidor where the prisoners were being used to haul guns and scrap iron to the docks for shipment for Tokyo.

The prisoners called her the "Pipe line to Corregidor," and wondered how she managed to get vessels to make the secret rendezvous on the island. On one occasion she arranged an audacious escape attempt for them but the plan went afoul when Jap sentries suddenly appeared and the escape boat had to make a dash for the sea.

Elements of the 81st, 61st, 101st Philippine Army Divisions, the 3rd Philippine Constabulary, the 93rd Infantry Regiment, PA, and the 3rd Infantry Regiment, Philippine Scouts, which surrendered on May 14, 1942, in Mindanao, were confined temporarily in the localities in which they surrendered. Eventually, however, most of the units were gathered at Camp Casisang, Malaybalay, in north central Mindanao, a Philippine Army installation originally designed for the 101st Division. It had a capacity of 10,000 men, and was never overcrowded, because most of the USAFFE soldiers in Mindanao had taken to the hills rather than surrender. As a matter of fact only about 7,000 men surrendered out of the whole force. Most of these were housed at Casisang.

Conditions at Casisang were infinitely better than those at Camp O'Donnell, in all respects. In the first place, Casisang was not overcrowded. Secondly, there was never a lack of food. Initially, the prisoners used their own food stocks, which were quite large. After that the Japanese provided some food, and this was supplemented by items that the prisoners secured from the neighboring civilians. That part of Mindanao being cattle-raising country, there was never a lack of fresh meat.

In the six months period between May and November only two soldiers were executed by the Japanese. There were two Filipinos who were caught making an attempt to escape. In the same period, only nineteen other prisoners died, and all as a result of wounds received prior to the surrender. There were no known deaths resulting from malnutrition or disease.

The population of Casisang included about 1,000 Americans and 6,000 Filipino soldiers. In October, 1942, more than half of the American prisoners at Casisang were sent out to Japan. The remaining 400 Americans were sent to Davao Penal Colony.

At the same time, almost 1,000 Americans from Cabanatuan on Luzon also were sent to the Davao colony, which the Japanese attempted to set up as a self-supporting camp. Davao Penal Colony had been a penal farm for long-term criminals in time. From the first, the colony was strictly conducted. The farm labor was hard, the Japanese overseers harsh, and many Americans died as a result of the treatment they received working there.

At the same time that the Americans were transferred from Casisang to Davao, some 2,500 of the 6,000 Filipino soldiers were transferred to Camp O'Donnel, on Luzon. Most of them were released by the end of January, 1943. Camp Casisang itself was closed down shortly thereafter. The remaining Filipinos were transferred to Davao to work in the town and some were taken to Davao Penal Colony.

Fort Santiago, in Manila, was built by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century and prior to the outbreak of the war in 1941, served as quarters for part of USAFFE. When the Japanese arrived in January, 1942, they took over the old fort for the Kempei-Tai, their secret police. Suspects, principally guerrillas, were detained there, questioned and tortured. It was commonly said when a man was taken to Fort Santiago, he should be considered dead. Few prisoners, man or woman, ever returned from it alive. Every torture — water, fire, hanging by the thumbs, the rack and clubbing — was used.

Santo Tomas University, in Manila, was first used by the Americans as a concentration camp for many alien Japanese immediately after the Japanese attack on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese arrived in Manila on the second of January, 1942, the Japanese civilians who had been interned there of course were released, and the Japanese immediately untilized the same area as an internment camp for enemy aliens whom they found in the city.

Internees at Santo Tomas who had influential friends on the outside or who had money of their own, lived fairly well most of the time in comparison to the soldiers of O'Donnell and Cabanatuan. They were permitted to purchase food from a market inside the fence to supplement the limited issue ration. By the end of 1944, however, with inflation rampant as liberation of the islands became imminent, the prices for such items became so exorbitant that it was impossible to get enough food to eat without a tremendous amount of money.

Inside Santo Tomas the prisoners were able to conduct religious services and for long time were allowed to present entertainment of their own making. They had their own internal organization, with various groups to supervise health and sanitary measures, preventive medicine regulations and hospital facilities.

In May, 1943, 800 internees from Santo Tomas were sent to Los Baños Internment Camp on the southern shores of Laguna de Bay. Another internment area at Sulphur Springs, on the outskirts of Manila, was set aside for ailing internees who were not ill enough to obtain admittance to the hospital. The "Guest" had to pay for staying at this rest camp.

Men of the First Cavalry rescued the internees at Santo Tomas at 7:00 P.M. on the night of February 3, 1945. Civilian internees at Los Baños concentration camp were rescued on 23 February, 1945, by elements of the 11th Airborne Division.

GUERRILLAS IN NORTHERN LUZON

The history of the guerrilla movement in northern Luzon is one of the epic chapters of guerrilla history everywhere.

Starting from nothing, guerrilla bands sprang up spontaneously to harass and annoy the Japs in some of the most difficult terrain in the world. These independent groups were organized by American and Filipino officers who had escaped from Bataan. There was finally created a fully organized force of nearly two full divisions right in the midst of the enemy.

This force was named the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon, and within three years was to take virtual possession of the mountain stronghold into which General Yamashita was to retreat for a last ditch holdout against the American forces. In that battle the enemy was actually delivered into the hands of the USAFIP, NL, but the guerrillas were kept from the final attack by the surrender of the Emperor of Japan in Tokyo.

It may properly be said that the nucleus from which the ultimate USAFIP, NL, grew was the scattered USAFFE elements which had been cut off in the mountains during the retreat to

Bataan. These included the 11th Infantry elements which had been sent north to help rout the Japs from Tuguegarao; the 71st Infantry and 91st Infantry elements which had been cut off by the Lingayen Gulf landings, Troop C of the 26th Cavalry which had been sent to Baguio, and elements of the 101st Infantry which had been in the north.

USAFFE headquarters on Corregidor managed to contact many of these elements by radio in January, 1942, and assigned harassing missions to them. This contact was shortlived, of course, ending with Corregidor's fall.

One of the leaders contacted during this period was Maj. Everett L. Warner, who had assembled elements of the 11th, 71st and 91th Infantry Divisions, PA, cut off after the landings at Lingayen. After the fall of Corregidor, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Warner surrendered in compliance with General Wainright's order, though Guillermo Z. Nakar (also later a Lieutenant Colonel) one of his battalion commanders, took part of the force to Nueva Ecija.

There Nakar contacted SWPA by radio and was authorized to form the 14th Infantry Regiment. However, Nakar's headquarters near Cabanatuan were captured and he was executed in November 1942. The remainder of his forces were taken by Lt. Col. Manuel Enriquez, commander of the 2nd Battalion.

The first blood to be drawn from the Japs by guerrillas in northern Luzon was accomplished by a force under the leadership of Walter Cushing who was the operator and part owner of a large mine in Kalinga at the outbreak of the war. He organized his employees and they filtered into the province of Abra where they found stores of arms left behind by the Philippine Constabulary after the Japanese landing at Vigan. He organized troops in Abra, Ilocos Norte, and Ilocos Sur, and on January 3, 1942, the day after the fall of Manila, he was ambushing enemy truck columns along the critical coastal route, Highway No. 3. Cushing who soon became a guerrilla major, did much to stimulate the organization of additional guerrilla units throughout northern Luzon because of his overwhelming success.

In February, 1942, Col. John P. Horan who had been the commander of Camp John Hay, at Baguio, when it was bombed on December 8, 1941, organized the 121st Infantry. He had originally attempted to withdraw the Baguio forces to Bataan but had been cut off. Immediately upon having received authorization to reorganize he started building his men into the 121st Infantry, incorporating some constabulary units from the sub-provinces of Bontoc and Ifugao with part of the 43rd Infantry, PS, which had been the Camp John Hay garrison. He also included the organization formed under Major Cushing, by this time known as "Cushing's guerrillas."

Col. Horan's 121st Infantry held the Bontoc-Kalinga area until the fall of Bataan when heavy enemy forces, released from that battle, were sent into Baguio and Bagabag, causing him to order a withdrawal to a new line through Lubuagan after destroying the Lubuagan-Bontoc Road. During this withdrawal, the Japs tried to hit Hotam's forces from the rear but Cushing's guerrillas fought a prearranged delaying action in the Abra Valley to give him complete protection.

At the same time the enemy drove into the Cagayan Valley in force. The remnants of the 14th Infantry, which also had been organized among other troops from Baguio, was forced to split up, one group going into Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela and one group going into Benguet.

Troop C, of the brilliant 26th Cavalry, PS, commanded by Captain Ralph Praeger, attempted to prevent enemy movements into the Mountain Province from the west coast, under the direction of Col. Horan, was in charge of the whole Baguio area. Captain Praeger received permission to go into the Cagayan Valley and was finally established there in February, 1942, with a force of Philippine Army troops that he had assembled in addition to his cavalrymen. With his combined infantry-cavalry force he made a spectacular attack upon the Japanese airfield at Tuguegarao, destroying a number of enemy planes and killing a great number of Jap personnel. Not satisfied with this, he proceeded with his "army" to Aparri and staged another attack against the Jap airfield there. From then on, he moved from one Jap stronghold to another, killing and destroying.

Captain Parker Calvert, a battalion commander, in the 43rd Infantry at Camp John Hay at start of the war, rounded up a number of Philippine Scouts and Philippine Army soldiers who

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had been cut off, enrolled a number of civilian volunteers, and established his own guerrilla band in the vicinity east of Baguio. He called his force "Detachment, 43rd Infantry."

With the fall of Corregidor Col. Horan, like other American army commanders in the islands, received an emissary from General Wainright bearing instructions for a surrender. Col. Horan obeyed the orders and turned over much of his newly organized 121st Infantry. However, a number of elements of the 121st, particularly along the coast, disappeared into the hills or into the mountains. Among these was Major Cushing's unit.

Major Cushing declined to accept command of these remnants of the 121st, which immediately sought to reorganize, and Captain George Barnett took over. Captain Barnett was an American mining engineer at the outbreak of the war, and had been commissioned by Colonel Horan. Captain Barnett, who was to prove one of the most deadly and effective guerrilla commanders serving in USAFIP, NL, accomplished an extraordinary complete reorganization of all the unsurrendered elements.

By June, 1942, American officers who had escaped the Mariveles massacre and the Bataan Death March, and who had survived their infiltration through the Jap lines, began to arrive in the Mountain Province. In the vanguard were two lieutenant colonels, Martin Moses and Arthur Noble, who reached Benguet.

Being the senior officers in northern Luzon, the two colonels eventually took command of the guerrilla forces, including organized military units, semi-military units and civilian groups. They discovered that, among others Captain Calvert's "Detachment, 43rd Infantry" had not been included in Col. Horan's surrender and they took over his forces.

Major Russell W. Volckmann, West Point graduate, and regimental commander and G-2 in the 11th Division, PA, on Bataan, had also managed to escape. He joined Colonels Moses and Noble at Benguet along with Captain Donald D. Blackburn, former signal officer of the 11th Division, PA, who had accompanied him.

Major Volckmann was told to take command of three of the guerrilla units at the same time that Colonels Moses and Noble announced they were assuming command of all of northern Luzon. Together they worked out a large scale offensive against the enemy. Despite inadequate communication, they managed to con-

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trol a sufficiently large number of units to cause the Japanese no end of trouble. After having lost scores of men and large quantities of equipment, the Japs, at the point of desperation, massed two full regiments in Benguet and launched an attack against Moses and Noble. This attack was so intense that it forced the guerrilla forces into hiding by mid-November, 1942. The two commanders were forced to flee to Ifugao where they were met by officers of Major Praeger's command, carrying word that Moses and Noble should continue on north to Praeger's headquarters at Apayao where they could establish contact by radio with Southwest Pacific Area GHQ in Australia.

They finally established radio communication with GHQ in January and February, 1943, and were told that GHQ is placing them in command of all forces north of the line through Lingayen, in Pangasinan, and San Jose, in Nueva Ecija. They were ordered to suspend operation against the enemy and concentrate on the establishment of organization and communication, and the collection of G-2 information for transmittal to SWPA, pending further orders. They were directed to organize another infantry regiment.

The two colonels started the home journey to their command, along foot paths through the Jap-held areas. But the Japanese had wind of their movements. They had been back with their command but a short time, perfecting plans, when they were captured on June 1, 1943.

The Japanese took them to Baguio and forced them to order all guerrilla forces under their control to surrender. Then the Japs scattered copies of the surrender order in the vicinity of all suspected guerrilla installations and plastered all the barrios with them. But the guerrilla groups did not surrender. What happened to Colonels Moses and Noble remains a mystery to this day. The last information was that they were sent to Fort Santiago to be tortured into talking. That they did not talk is evidenced by the fact that the Japs appeared to possess no additional information as a consequence of their capture. They are presumed to have been killed and their bodies disposed of at the fort.

Major Volcksmann, who was destined to be one of the few survivors of that little band of American officers who provided the leadership for the great resistance of the Filipinos in North Luzon, took command when Moses and Noble were captured and announced that henceforth the organization would be known only as USAFIP, NL, and that he would organize and train it as a single all-inclusive unit. As the G-2 of USAFIP, NL, he had divised the intelligence system on which the October, 1942, guerrilla offensive had been based. In addition to this and his command duties, he had been undercover contact man between elements of the north and south, and in Ifugao had organized his own personal guerrilla unit, which was titled the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry.

The new commander also issued a direct order that any soldier of the USAFIP, NL, who voluntarily surrendered to the enemy or allowed himself to be captured due to his own negligence would be shot on sight. This was promptly followed by an order that any soldier or civilian in northern Luzon who surrendered arms to the enemy would be executed.

Major Volckmann became a lieutenant colonel and his command was immediately accepted by all of the guerrilla forces in the north. He first devoted himself to establishing message centers approximately 6 hours apart (hiding time) through which messages could be relayed day or night. His second step was a complete reorganization of the whole establishment. He divided North Luzon into seven districts as follows:

1st District—Benguet area, commanded by Maj. Parker Calvert, CO, 66th Infantry.

2nd District — Provinces of La Union and southwestern Ilocos Sur, under Major George Barnett, CO, 121st Infantry.

3rd District — Provinces of northern Ilocos Sur, Abra and Ilocos Norte, commanded by Major Barnett. (This was an expansion, since there were no known guerrillas units there. Major Barnett was to organize them.)

4th District — Apayao and Cagayan Area, commanded by Major Ralph Praeger, CO, Troop C, 26th Cavalry, PS. (Later Praeger's command was destroyed and the district was consolidated with the 7th District.)

5th District — Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya, commanded by Major Romeo Enriquez, CO, 14th Infantry.

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6th District — These portions of Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan north of the line Lingayen-San Jose commanded by Robert Lapham, guerrilla leader to the south. (It later developed that Lapham kept his forces south of the line and failed to participate in the northern operations.)

7th District — Subprovinces of Ifugao, Bontoc and Kalinga. (Lt. Col. Volckmann retained personal command of this district, in addition to his other duties, until he moved to Benguet, when Captain Blackburn took charge.)

District commanders were given authority to create commands in their areas and to consolidate existing organizations. This was necessary only in Benguet where the 43rd Infantry, the 2nd Battalion 11th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry, were combined to form the 66th Infantry.

Gradually an organization was created by Major Barnett in the Third District and the 15th Infantry was established there, with Major Robert H. Arnold in command. When it developed that Major Praeger's Fourth District command had been virtually wiped out by the enemy, Capt. Blackburn was relieved of his duties at USAFIP, NL, headquarters and sent there to take command. Captain Blackburn created the 11th Infantry, PA, and made it a full regiment.

Meanwhile, the mission of obtaining intelligence went on relentlessly and no Jap could make a move in North Luzon without going to headquarters, USAFIP, NL. This organization had grown to the strength of two divisions without any assistance whatsoever from the outside. GHQ, SWPA knew only of its existence, but not of its strength, because since Major Praeger's headquarters had been destroyed USAFIP, NL, was unable to establish radio communication with Australia. Eventually, a home-made radio, driven by the power of a mill wheel, was put in operation and contact was made with SWPA. It was a great day in USAFIP, NL, for they learned that the return of General MacArthur was soon to materialize.

Lt. Col. Volckmann launched his guerrilla forces into an intensive training program. Previously the troops had been allowed to live in barrios and impersonate civilians when the enemy was in neighborhood. This setup did not please Volckmann. In order

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to protect the lives of his troops and of the civilian populace he put his soldiers into hidden platoons and company camps. Few of the secret training camps were ever located by the enemy. One company stayed in its training camp through the occupation, blowing bugle calls and holding reveille and retreat ceremonies each evening and morning.

By early 1943, Col. Volckmann noticed morale started to fall off among his men because they were impatient for a fight — a consequence of orders from GHQ to refrain from engaging the enemy. Morale soared immediately when limited attacks were authorized for the purpose of training and securing arms. All of the attacks were successful.

With radio contact re-established arrangements were made for a submarine from Australia to put in at one of two rendezvous, Darigayos near Luna, in La Union, or San Esteban, in Ilocos Sur. Contact was successful but the rendezvous was not accomplished. Late in November, 1944, another rendezvous was arranged and the submarine *USS Garr* unloaded 20 tons of supplies at Darigayos. The sub also brought four American officers and 10 Filipino radio operators and enlisted men to help Volckmann. In December the *Garr* again returned and landed twenty-four tons of additional supplies. With radios and demolition materials, the five regiments of USAFIP, NL, were now ready for D-Day, January 9, 1945. They were on the spot, trained, equipped, and ready to pave the way for General MacArthur's forces when they landed. This they did, joining the Americans as the "Mountain Division," striking terror into the heart of the enemy and destroying him.

GUERRILLA FORCES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN LUZON

More so than any other part of the Philippine Archipelago, Central and Southern Luzon was filled with a heterogenous mass of guerrilla groups, over-lapping in their fields of operations, quarrelsome over authority, and never — even after the American forces had returned to Luzon — organized into one single unit under an overall headquarters.

Credit must be given to several American officers who made attempts to consolidate all of the anti-Japanese forces and bring some semblance of order out of chaos. Among the first of these was Col. Claude A. Thorpe, who was killed in October, 1942. Col. Bernard L. Anderson and Col. Cyles Merrill also tried, but with only limited success. The task from the start was an almost hopeless one.

By the middle of 1945, when the American forces had secured Luzon, Colonel Anderson had the largest and best coordinated organization, which he commanded with authority. Nevertheless, his group was only a fraction of all the guerrilla forces in the area. The other groups consistently refused to accept his leadership and in many cases were hostile.

Within a year after the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, guerrilla organizations had grown up all over the island of Luzon. Most of these groups were poorly orgnized and in most cases refused to cooperate with one another at all.

Before the fall of Bataan, in January, 1942 — even before General MacArthur and his USAFFE headquarters evacuated to Australia — Major Claude A. Thorpe had been called into a conference at the USAFFE headquarters. He was ordered to go to Central Luzon and to organize guerrilla activities behind the Japanese lines. Thorpe made his way northward into the Zambales Mountains on the west coast of Central Luzon, and established his headquarters near Mt. Pinatubo. When Bataan fell, he had already divided Central Luzon into several commands under his overall direction. His headquarters was known as the "USAFFE Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces."

When Bataan surrendered, a number of officers and men who escaped eventually found their way to Major Thorpe's headquarters. Among these were Captain Bernard L. Anderson, an Air Corps officer. Thorpe assigned Anderson as the Chief of Staff for the East Central Luzon Area. In the spring of 1942, Anderson and Lieutenant Edward Ramsey, another officer who had escaped from Bataan, were sent to the east central provinces to effect a better overall organization of the units there.

In October, 1942, Colonel Thorpe and Captain Joseph R. Barker II, commander of Thorpe's East Central Luzon Area, were captured and executed by the Japanese. Captain Anderson, in the absence of orders from Southwest Pacific Area Headquarters,

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took over command of the East Central Luzon Forces. Ramsey, however, refused to submit to Anderson's command, and set up his own organization. From his headquarters in Montalban, Rizal, Ramsey eventually came to control a widely scattered command with elements in Manila, Western Nueva Ecija, Eastern Bulacan and Cavite.

Another large elements of Thorpe's command — the western sector — originally under Captain Ralph McGuire of the 26th Cavalry, eventually formed the bulk of a loose-knit command organized by Lt. Col. Cyles Merrill, also of the 26th, in May of 1943, several months after McGuire's death.

Before the Americans returned to the Philippines, Merrill from his headquarters in the Zambales Mountains, claimed control of a force of 8,000, but only 500 of these were armed. Captain John Boone, a former corporal of the 31st US Infantry, organized a force in the Bataan and Southern Zambales area which cooperated with Merrill's forces.

Reviewing his situation after Thorpe's death, Captain Anderson came to the conclusion that continued harassment of the Japanese by the guerrilla forces under his command could only result in severe punitive measures against innocent civilians in revenge so he announced a "lay low" order, instructing his men to concentrate on intelligence and propaganda work, preparing for the time eventually when they would be able to fight in the open.

By the time his organization was complete, about the middle of 1944, Col. Anderson had become a legend among the citizens of Central Luzon. Symbolizing the attitude of his men toward him, Anderson's code name was *'Tatang,'* which is the Pampango word for father. He was also known affectionately as the "Old Man of the Sierras" and as the "Great Guerrillero."

His organization was divided into a number of areas. There was the Salt Military Area, embracing the province of Tayabas; The Ball Military Area, the province of Bulacan; the Batangas Military Area, the province of the same name. A number of intelligence groups operated for Anderson in Manila under the command of Lt. Antonio L. Bello. In Southern Luzon, there was a Bicol Area under Major Barros. The Texas Military Area, under Major Robert Lapham, was all of northern Nueva Ecija,

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Tarlac, Pangasinan, and Nueva Vizcaya, but it was separated in August, 1944. The "Rice" Sector of Laguna Province, the "Birth of Victory" command was in Southern Nueva Ecija.

Anderson's coordinating activities were greatly complicated by the fact that in the same area in which he was operating there were such other groups as the FAIT (Fil-American Irregular Troops), The Markings, the Hunters, ROTC and President Quezon's Own Guerrillas. There were also hundreds of small independent or semi-independent units whose leaders would not submit to the authority of another commander. Theses included outfits known as the Chinese Anti-Jap Guerrilla Force, the Old-Timers, the Texans, the Highlanders, the McKinley Brigade, and innumerable others.

One of the largest independent groups was the Hukbalahaps, with a background dating back years before the war. They were a political-economic movement organized against the powerful landowners of the Central Plains (and any others who symphatized with the landowners). This group, although they carried on some action against the Japs, considered the landowners their pièce de resistance. By late 1944, they had 5,000 men under arms, their main stronghold being Mt. Arayat. They never cooperated with regular guerrilla groups.

One of the prominent guerrilla organizations in Central Luzon, the Marking's were organized in April, 1942, under the leadership of Marcos Villa Agustin and a Filipina woman named Yay Panlillo. In 1944, the Marking's had united with many other groups including some of the Fil-American Irregular Troops in Manila, and their forces spread out through Rizal, Laguna, Batangas, Tayabas, Bulacan, Cavite, Tarlac, Pangasinan, and Mánila, comprising 5,000 armed men and many thousand of other sympathizers.

In the middle of 1944 — Anderson's command changed its name from the "East Central Luzon Guerrilla Forces" to the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, Kalayaan Command, "*kalayaan*" being the Tagalog word for freedom.

In June, 1944, Colonel Anderson received his first radio, a small transmitter not capable of broadcasting to Australia, from a Visayan sailboat that landed near Laguiongbayan on the coast

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of Tayabas. With this Anderson was able to contact relay stations on the Bondoc Peninsula in Southern Luzon and on Samar. These in turn could relay his information or requests to SWPA Headquarters. Before this time Colonel Anderson received his first radio message from the Commander-in-Chief, General MacArthur: "I commend you and the men who have stood loyally with you for the courage and fortitude you have shown."

Earlier in March, Anderson had sent Lt. Bello, commanding officer of the intelligence units in Manila, to Col. Fertig's headquarters in Mindanao to carry the first intelligence and operations report from Anderson since the fall of Bataan and Corregidor. Colonel Fertig in Mindanao and Colonel Kangleon in Leyte then had the only radio sets capable of making contact with SWPA Headquarters. At Fertig's headquarters, Lt. Bello contacted Lt. Col. Narciso Manzano, an uncle of Capt. Jaime Manzano, Anderson's executive officer. Col. Manzano had the task of gathering intelligence from all over the islands but since he wasn't in continuous contact with Luzon at this time he authorized Col. Anderson to coordinate intelligence work for all the USAFFE units in Central Luzon.

In September 1944, when the United States submarine *Norwalls* arrived off Masanga, Infanta on the Tayabas coast, Anderson received several powerful radio sets capable of giving him direct contact with SWPA. From this time on, Anderson served as the funnel through which many of the principal intelligence agencies in Central Luzon submitted reports to SWPA.

When the arms, ammunition, food, medicine and clothing were received from the submarine, Colonel Anderson sent out orders for all sector commanders to report at Masanga with sufficient men to take out their share of the supplies. Two more submarines arrived on October 23, 1944, and November 2, 1944, respectively, with tons of additional supplies. Anderson took the responsibility of distributing this to all USAFFE guerrilla units in Central Luzon. The Markings, the ROTC, the Hunters, the FAIT. President Quezon's Own Guerrillas, and other groups, all received allotments of the new weapons which included carbines, mortars and bazookas as well as rifles and pistols, along with American food, cigarettes, magazines and medical supplies.

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When the Hukbalahaps realized that the USAFFE forces in Central Luzon were receiving large quantities of new arms and equipment, the long rivalry between the groups blazed with new fury. There was violent warfare between the USAFFE commands and the Hukbalahaps squadrons. Despite these difficulties, however, the USAFFE units, under the guidance of Anderson's command, steadily continued to train their men in sabotage, demolition, signal communication, reconnaissance, and in the use of the new weapons.

By the middle of December, 1944 — by which time the campaign on Leyte had been under way for two months and it was known that an invasion of Luzon was imminent — Anderson ordered his sector commanders to be ready to receive more arms and supplies to be dropped by air. Orders were also given out that frequent intelligence reports on the enemy situation in all areas be submitted regularly by the area commanders to Anderson's headquarters at Masanga so that the Allied command could be kept constantly informed.

On Christmas Day, 1944, in anticipation of events soon to develop, General MacArthur sent Major Anderson this message:

"It is my Christmas prayer that a merciful God will continue to preserve and protect members of this fine command and return each and everyone of you safe and well to your beloved homes."

Colonel Anderson gave the signal for action on January 4, 1945, five days before the US Forces landed at Lingayen Gulf. The orders were for all units immediately to begin harassing the enemy, destroying roads, blowing up bridges, cutting communications and demolishing supply dumps.

As the guerrillas became active, their efforts were aided by the bombing and strafing of US planes, acting on information provided by the guerrilla intelligence agents. The Japs in Central and Southern Luzon were confused and demoralized. The more isolated Japanese rear area garrisons put up only mild resistance. Soon they were fleeing to the mountains, and the guerrillas took over many towns before the American forces were even near.

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With the return of the American forces, Col. Anderson was advised to form a battalion for activation into the Philippine Army. Thus began the first Anderson Battalion, which from January, 1945, until September of the same year was to perform effectively and commendably, building up a record of 3,000 Japanese killed and another 1,000 captured. In forming this unit Colonel Anderson drew upon the cream of all the outfits under his command.

Company A was composed of members of Col. Manzano's veteran Squadron 29. B, C and D Companies were formed from the best of the guerrillas in the Salt Military Area. E and F Companies came from the command of Alberto Guerrero in the Dingalan-Bitulok Area of Tayabas. R Company, later to be redesignated G Company, was the unit of Captain Ponciano Redor, Fil-American Irregular Troops leader, which had a commendable record.

The First Military Police company of the Anderson Battalion was organized from among the Polillo and Infanta units of the Anderson command, while the Second Military Police Company — not activated until June, 1945 — came from the Cabanatuan area of Nueva Ecija, the command of Commander Gonzalo A. Guizon's 3rd Battalion, Birth of Victory Regiment. Captain Manzano was made commander of the Battalion and promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.

In March, 1945, rivalry between the USAFFE and Hukbalahaps broke out at San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Several Huk Squadrons under Colonel Catindig clashed with Anderson's San Isidro outfit, commanded by Commander Irineo Alberto. The fighting lasted three days, with many casualties on both sides, and was brought to an end only when American officers of the invasion forces intervened.

In the Bicol Peninsula there were just as many guerrilla organizations as in the Central Luzon provinces but they were all smaller. Guerrilla activities in the peninsula began almost from the very moment that the Japanese landed at Legaspi on December 12, 1941. These activities caused the Japanese considerable trouble for some time, but after the first flame of resistance had begun to die down, the dozens of units began quarrelling

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among themselves over matters of authority and jurisdiction. Some of them turned to banditry against their own people.

Of the score of local guerrilla leaders who fought to gain over-all authority in the old Philippine Army's Fifth Military District, which was comprised principally of the Bicol Peninsula, there were three who stand out. These included Lt. Col. Montano M. Zabat who before the war had been a traffic policeman and who had joined the Philippine Constabulary at the outbreak of hostilities. Colonel Zabat operated in Albay province, and by the beginning of 1944 had a considerable force under his command.

Major Licerio P. Lapus, another contender for the title of guerrilla CO of the Fifth District, had been a provincial inspector of the Sorsogon Philippine Constabulary and had evacuated to the hills on orders from headquarters when the Japanese invaded the Peninsula. His guerrilla unit was in operation before the fall of Bataan, and he had cooperated with the USAFFE forces in Leyte and Samar under Colonel Tomas Cornell. After the surrender of the Leyte-Samar headquarters in May, 1942, the Japanese began punitive operations against Lapus' sizeable band. The Major broke up his unit and ordered it to lay low until Japanese activities should die down. Late in 1942, Lapus began to reorganize. By August 1944, he commanded the "54th Infantry" with a strength of 2,600 well trained men and had collected considerable intelligence for GHQ.

While Lapus' "lay low" order had been in effect, Salvador Escudero, pre-war governor of Sorsogon began to build up his own organization. Lapus had assigned a police guard to Escudero, who was considered the "free governor" of the province. Using this as a nucleus, the governor formed a group of his own.

When Lapus began reorganizing, friction developed between members of the two units. By March, 1944, Escudero was able to drive all of Lapus' men from Sorsogon province and by April was providing intelligence to GHQ through Lt. Col. Charles N. Smith, on Samar. When the Americans were ready to return to Leyte, Escudero had more than a thousand men in his camp.

The friction among the contenders for command of the Fifth Military District was encouraged perhaps unwittingly by the efforts of Col. Macario Peralta, commanding officer of the Sixth Military District, on Panay. Alternatively the Sixth Military District Headquarters had encouraged each of the three to unify the command of the peninsula. By October of 1943, each of these guerrilla leaders had letters from Panay acknowledging him as the commanding officer of the district if he succeeded in unifying it. The Sixth Military District dealings were probably motivated by the hope of obtaining more intelligence to be channeled to GHQ, but nevertheless the result was an unhappy one.

GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN THE VISAYAS

Almost every populated island in the Philippine archipelago had a guerrilla organization. In some cases, such as in Panay and Cebu, these organizations were highly efficient and made trouble for the Japanese throughout the occupation. In other cases, where they were too weak to fight the enemy openly, guerrilla units gathered intelligence for SWPA, helped to protect civilians from banditry and eventually when the American forces returned, served as guides and scouts. In still other cases the value of guerrillas was practically nil, though their very existence, however, inconsequential, provided a headache for the enemy.

With a few exceptions, the development of guerrilla units followed the same pattern on almost all of the islands. First, many diverse groups sprang up. They often fought among themselves as much they fought the Japs — sometimes more. Eventually, for the most part, often under the guidance of an intelligence agent from SWPA Headquarters, they formed a unified command in their respective islands to assist the American landings.

When the Japanese invaded Panay on April 16. 1942, and General Christe received orders to surrender his 61st Division, many of the outstanding Filipino officers and men of the unit took off to the hills with supplies and equipment. Only the American officers and a handful of Filipinos surrendered.

The unsurrendered men organized many small guerrilla bands, and by August, ten weeks after the capitulation, Captain Macario Peralta assumed over-all command and was acknowledged almost immediately by all of the guerrilla forces then existing.

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Within four months the 61st Division had been reactivated and the Japanese on the island were contained in three garrisons. By November radio contact had been established with SWPA Headquarters in Australia. The organization under Peralta, despite minor disputes over authority within the interior of Panay and in the adjacent islands over which Peralta assumed jurisdiction, eventually became one of the best examples of a completely Filipino guerrilla organization in the whole archipelago.

Captain Peralta, a 30-year-old Philippine Army officer who had been G-3 of the 61st Division, was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on January 13, 1943, and to Colonel on August 6, 1943. His authority on Panay and adjacent areas was recognized by SWPA in February, 1943, when he was appointed commanding officer of what had been the Sixth Military District.

Before the Americans returned to the Philippines, Peralta had assisted in the organization of guerrilla outfits in Masbate, Marinduque, Romblon, Mindoro and Palawan. He did this initially with the intention of establishing his own authority all over the Visayan Islands, planning to call the area the Fourth Philippine Corps. When this ambition was squelched by SWPA, Peralta nevertheless continued to assist organizations in these other islands, both by sending supplies and detailing officers to help them organize.

In addition, Peralta had established one of the widest and most effective intelligence systems of any guerrilla outfit in the Philippines. Intelligence agents from Peralta's headquarters were scattered throughout the Visayan Islands and all over Luzon. Peralta's agents were usually favorably treated by the various other Visayan guerrillas because of the supplies and other assistance that had been received from his headquarters. Nevertheless some of Peralta's agents ran into difficulties and several were killed by local guerrillas whose leaders were jealous of Peralta's authority.

The Luzon intelligence networks of Peralta were designed to provide a cross-check on information through the duplication of agents and agencies. Intelligence from Luzon was channeled through two base points to Peralta's headquarters in Panay, from where it could be relayed to Southwest Pacific Area headquarters. Through these base points, by April, 1944, Peralta had sent agents to the Mountain Province, to Abra, La Union, Cagayan, the Ilocos Provinces, Isabela, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Pampanga, Bulacan, to Nueva Ecija, Laguna, Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, Albay, Sorsogon, and Nueva Vizcaya, Tayabas, Zambales, Bataan, Manila, Cavite, Rizal, even to the tiny island of Corregidor.

The total monthly operating expenses of this network were in excess of 10,000 pesos, three-quarters of which was paid in Japanese military currency and the rest in Panay emergency currency of guerrilla issue. This amount included 10.000 pesos of aid each month to support the cooperating intelligence networks of Major Lapus, Col. Merritt, Col. Zabat and Col. Miranda, guerrilla leaders in the Bicol Peninsula, and to other organizations in Laguna and Isabela.

Side by side with Peralta's military organization on Panay was a free civil government headed by Tomas Confesor, former governor of Iloilo province, who took over jurisdiction of all three of Panay's province when the two other governors surrendered to the Japanese.

Though there was some friction between Confesor and Peralta, the two organizations cooperated to a considerable extent, and from Confesor the people received considerable help. Often at odds with Peralta, Confesor nevertheless turned over to Peralta some three-quarters of the taxes collected by his free government.

Confesor, an inspired leader, was popular not only among the citizens of Panay but throughout the Philippines. Known as the "stormy patrol" of the Philippines, Confesor became the champion of all freedom-loving Filipinos in 1943 when in reply to a letter from a Japanese puppet governor asking him to give up his "foolish" resistance, Confesor wrote:

"I firmly believe that it is not wise and statesmanly for our leaders, in this darkest hour, to teach our people to avoid suffering and hardships at the sacrifice of fundamental principles of government and the democratic way of life.

"On the contrary, it is their bounden duty and responsibility to inspire our people to willingly undergo any kind of difficulties and sacrifices for the sake of noble principles that they nourish deep in their heart.

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"Instead of deppressing their patriotic ardor, the people should be inspired to be brave and courageous under all kinds of hardships and difficulties in defense of what they consider righteous and just.

"We shall never win or deserve the esteem and respect of other nations if we lack principles, and if we do, we do not possess the courage and valor to defend those principles at any cost."

Confesor's reply was reprinted and distributed widely throughout the islands.

The Japanese occupied the east, central and west coast cities of Cebu Island in April, 1942. USAFFE units on the island retreated into the mountains with a large quantity of arms and supplies and guerrilla units were quickly formed. Most of the puppet officials set up by the Japs became liaison agents for guerrilla units; those who did not were usually eliminated.

By May, 1942, northern Cebu guerrilla units were under the command of Harry Fenton, whose real name was Aaron Feinstein, a former radio announcer at Cebu City. In southern and central Cebu, Lieutenant Colonel James Cushing, a former mining engineer and brother of Walter Cushing in Northern Luzon, who was commissioned a captain by General Bradford Chynoweth, had succeeded in setting up a unified guerrilla organization. Shortly after this, Fenton and Cushing organized a combined headquarters with Fenton as administrative chief and Cushing as the combat head. Their efficient organization long enjoyed the reputation of having killed more Japs than any other guerrilla organization in the islands.

In March, 1943, the Japs launched large-scale attacks against guerrillas on Cebu. After suffering a great many casualties, Cushing and Fenton decided to hide out. Later, Fenton and Cushing began to reorganize. In July, Cushing decided to go to Negros and seek help from Major Jesus Villamor who had come to the islands from SWPA on a special mission. When Cushing returned in October, not having succeeded in obtaining help from Villamor, he found that Lt. Col. Ricardo Estrella, his executive officer had taken over command and Fenton had been executed. Cushing threw Estrella out of the organization and Estrella was later executed under circumstances not yet uncovered.

Cushing then went to work to reform his organization in the face of heavy Jap attacks that occured in December, 1943, and January, 1944. Early in 1944, he received supplies from SWPA and established radio contact with GHQ. By April his force had been reorganized into four regiments: the 85th, 86th, 87th and 88th, with a total strength of 5,700 men. By the end of October, 1944, the Japanese had evacuated southern Cebu and Cushing began operation against the Japanese in the central part of the island.

Although Cebu was the most important Jap base south of Manila and well garrisoned by the enemy, Cushing's force was one of the most effective guerrilla units in the Philippines.

Until late in 1942, the varied guerrilla units on the island of Negros operated independently with many of the leaders struggling to attain island command. However, with the ascendancy late in 1942 of Lieutenant Colonel Salvador Abcede, a unified organization began to develop.

By the time of the American return Lieutenant Colonel Abcede, as recognized commanding officer of the Seventh Military District, controlled some 13,000 men organized into two divisions. In addition, Negros had a free civil government headed by Alfredo Montelibano, pre-war governor of Negros Occidental, who was later to become Secretary of National Defense when the Commonwealth was reestablished.

Abcede had been a battalion commander in the Negros area under Colonel Roger Hilsman at the time of the surrender. From the remnants of this battalion in July of 1942, Abcede organized a guerrilla unit in the central and southern Negros Occidental. Major Jesus Villamor arrived in Negros Occidental in January, 1943, on a special mission from Southwestern Pacific Area; Abcede became one of Villamor's chief supporters. Villamor was appointed commanding officer of the Seventh Military District, which was comprised of Negores, on May 14, 1943. When he gave up his command in July of that year he turned it over to Abcede.

Other guerrilla units on Negros later to come under Abcede's command included those formed by Lieutenant Colonel Ernesto S.

Mata, another battalion commander under Hilsman in northern Negros, Major Hermenegildo Mercado in Negros Oriental; Lt. Col. Gabriel Gador in the Concepcion Libertad Area of Negros Oriental; and Major Henry Roy Bell, an American on the Silliman University staff at Dumaguete, and Major Placido A. Ausejo who worked together in the Dumaguete Area. An independent guerrilla group known as the Puring guerrillas was led by two brothers, one of whom was an ex-convict. This group indulged in clashes with other guerrilla organizations, as well as with the Japanese, and plundered civilians. It finally dissolved in September of 1944.

The many guerrilla groups in Leyte, half of which were organized for patriotic reasons and the other half for the more personal reasons of banditry and looting, began early in 1942. Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Balderian, formerly a second lieutenant in the 91st Division, organized a force in northern Leyte which eventually became the 95th Guerrilla Regiment. Major Ciriaco Centino and his son, Isabelo, organized a guerrilla unit in northeast Leyte. A former USAFFE soldier, Antonio Cinco, who assumed the rank of colonel, formed a band in the east central Leyte part of the island. In the southern area, a unit was organized under "Lieutenant" Gordon A. Lang, a former yeoman in the United States Navy.

On Panaon Island, just south of Leyte, Major Porfirio H. Jain and Lieutenant Jose Nazareno organized a guerrilla group. Major Jain took over later Lang's group, and the combined forces subsequently became the 94th Guerrilla Regiment. In northeast Leyte there was a group under Brigadier General Blas Miranda. a former lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary, whose organization eventually became the 96th Regiment.

Lieutenant Colonel Filemon Pabilona, a former USAFFE first sergeant, controlled the guerrilla group in the vicinity of San Miguel, Babatagon and Alangalang. Lieutenant Colonel Felix Pamanian, former USAFFE technical sergeant, headed a small group in northern Leyte, that was later joined by units from Biliran Island under Captain C. Corpin.

Colonel Ruperto Kangleon, commanding officer of the 81st Infantry, at the outbreak of the war, had surrendered in Mindanao in May, 1942. He escaped from the prison camp in December, 1942, and returned to southern Leyte, where he took over the job of unifying all the units there. By the time of the Allied landings 3,200 men were organized into what was known as the 92nd Division.

The various guerrilla organizations in Samar were not organized into a unified command until October, 1944, when the Americans had returned to adjacent Leyte and a GHQ representative had been assigned to do the task. By this time there were only two outstanding guerrilla groups on Samar. The first of these was under Col. Pedro V. Merritt, a Philippine Army officer who originally had been with the Leyte provisional regiment at Ormoc. He controlled northwest Samar with the exception of the Japanese occupied towns of Calbayog and Catbalogan, with his 93rd Division, which had a strength of 1,700. Merritt set up a civil administration under Governor Gregorio V. Abogado, an ex-member of the Philippine House of Representatives.

In southern Samar by the time of the American return, Lt. Col. Juan Causing, who had served as commander of the Leyte provisional regiment during the 1941-1942 campaign commanded another large guerrilla outfit.

In September, 1944, just before the Americans landed in Leyte, Major Charles M. Smith was sent from GHQ, SWPA, to Samar. He succeeded in bringing Merritt and Causing together and formed a unified group. As the Americans commenced the liberation of the Philippines, there were 8,000 to 9 000 men, two-thirds of whom had pre-war military training, under his command.

Nurtured by the Japanese, a small guerrilla group known as the Pulahanes operated in the north and central Samar, fighting against Merritt and the other legitimate units. Throughout the occupation the Japanese occupied Samar only lightly, since the island was not of great strategic importance. Consequently, a large part of the island was dominated by the guerrilla forces.

Although Palawan is the fifth largest of all the Philippines, with an area of 4,149 square miles, its strategic importance to the Japanese was small. Thus, they occupied only Puerto Princesa, the capital and only town of importance. Consequently, guerrilla organizations were also to operate without much hindrance. However, none of these organizations became powerful and activities were for the most part limited to occasional ambushes of Japanese patrols and the procuring of intelligence. They also helped support the free civil government, and were able to keep order and protect civilians from banditry.

One of the first guerrilla groups to be organized in the Palawan Islands was under Carlos Amores, a policeman in the Manganese mines on Busuanga Islands when the Japanese took over. Amores secretly organized more than 200 of the workers and when his organization became known to the Japanese he led a surprise uprising that resulted in all of the Japanese at the mines being killed. Before the Japanese reinforcements could arrive, Amores' men had blown up the mine entrance and dispersed, Amores fleeing to the island of Sibaltan with 100 men. Later he returned to become commanding officer of Company C of the Palawan Special Battalion.

The Cobb brothers, Alfred and Paul, American mestizos, were cattle ranchers on Dumaran Island. They organized their own group in April and May, 1942, to establish civil order and local government in northern and eastern Palawan and the adjacent island of Dumaran. The Cobb brothers persuaded the peacetime governor of Palawan, Gaudencio Abordo. who was in hiding from the Japanese, to set up a civil government. The Cobb organization was forced to disband in May, 1943, when the constabulary guerrilla group under Baldomero Garcia gained the ascendancy after several armed clashes.

In southern Palawan, guerrilla activity was centered at Brooks Point, around the nucleus of three U.S. sailors and three U.S. marines who had escaped from the Japanese prisoner-of-war camp at Puerto Princesa. They were joined by other Americans who had lived at Brooks Point settlement.

Guerrilla resistance on Mindoro island began immediately after the unresisted Jap landings. The small Philippine Constabulary garrison, the only troops on the island during the war, fled into the hills and began to organize as separate guerrilla units. By November, 1942, Major Lawrence H. Philips arrived from SWPA and was able to bring together the two largest guer-

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rilla forces in Mindoro, one under Major Jose N. Ruffy and the other under Esteban P. Beloncio. But when Major Philips was killed by the Japs in March, 1944, Beloncio and Ruffy immediately renewed their rivalry and the organization broke up. In spite of admonitions from GHQ the two factions were still fighting each other at the end of 1944.

Two principal guerrilla groups developed in Bohol after the Japanese landing in May, 1942. The larger was "Behind the Clouds" units in the northern part of the island under 3rd Lieutenant Ismael P. Ingeniero. The other was the "East Bohol Battalion," in the eastern and southern parts of the island. These were organized into a unified command under Ingeniero in November 1942, and since the Japanese had occupied only Tagbilaran, the capital, and the manganese mines at Guindulman and on Panglao Island, the guerrillas operated freely with considerable support from the civilian populace.

Ingeniero assumed the rank of major and set up his headquarters at Carmen in the center of the island. He converted the Volunteer Guard, organized before the surrender, into a bolo battalion. He had a Women's Auxillary Service and published a newspaper. He also set up sentry posts on most of the roads and maintained close connections with a free civil government which was constituted late in 1942.

Ingeniero, however, was not popular, and in June, 1944, a plot developed to kill him. At that time Ingeniero left and Jap punitive forces landed at several points to penetrate throughout the whole island, looting and killing and thoroughly disorganizing the guerrilla. When the Japs left at the end of July, Captain Esteban Benido, second in command to Ingeniero, began to reorganize. Ingeniero himself returned a month later. By the end of September, 1944, Ingeniero's force had been reorganized into the 84th, 85th and 86th Regiments, with a total strength of 8,000 poorly armed men, and these began attacking the small Japanese garrison left on the island.

There were originally three principal guerrilla units in Masbate, but the island in July, 1943, came under the control of Colonel Peralta, Commanding Officer of the Sixth Military District, who sent Major Vicente A. Tansiongco to Masbate to become

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island commander. Tansiongco, after a conflict with some of the original guerrilla leaders, established himself and by March, 1944, was in command of Masbate Battalion which in turn was part of the Second Combat Team, Sixth Military District. The headquarters of this CT was in northeast Panay under Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Serran. The Second Battalion, late in 1944, had a strength of about 1,000 men or over. It had radio communication and a weekly courier service with the Bicol Peninsula, and to Samar, Leyte and Panay. The same headquarters served as an intelligence channel through which information from southeast Luzon and the eastern Visayas could flow to Peralta's headquarters, thence to SWPA.

Captain Donato, one of the original guerrilla leaders on Masbate, who became executive officer to Major Tansiangco, after receiving a support from Captain Zabat in the Bicol area, finally in July, 1944, declared the Masbate guerrillas to be no longer part of the Sixth Military District, forced Tansiangco to return to Panay, and took over as commander of the Masbate forces. They operated under him until the return of the American troops.

The first guerrilla organization in the Romblon Islands group was organized by Captain Constantino C. Raval, a former officer in the Philippine Merchant Marine. He operated under Peralta's Sixth Military District, and in February, 1943, was replaced by a new commander, Major Enrique L. Jurado. Jurado maintained a radio base and intelligence center to relay information from southern Luzon. Late in 1943, the Japanese raided Tablas Island and shortly after, Sibuyan Island. Many of the guerrillas were captured. Jurado escaped but his organization broke up and his equipment was destroyed. Jurado later became commander of the Mindoro guerrillas and set up a new intelligence center there. Early in 1944, Captain Sofronio P. Untalan, commander of the Marinduque guerrillas took over the Romblon command. But its guerrilla activities were not effective after this.

Sergeant Charles Hickock, an American radio technician who was in Marinduque Island at the time of the surrender in May, 1942, by September of the same year had organized a guerrilla band of about thirty men. He went over to Tablas to work in the intelligence center there, leaving his command under Captain Cudilla.

Later, Captain Untalan, the Philippine Constabulary commander on Marinduque who had surrendered to the Japs but had been released from the prison camp, forcibly took command with the support of Peralta's Sixth Military District. He developed an organization of 400 men, one fourth of them armed, and he seldom engaged in action against the enemy.

MINDANAO

The entire enemy situation on Mindanao, southernmost of the principal islands in the Philippines, was altogether different from that elsewhere in the archipelago.

Mindanao had always been looked on as the backdoor of the islands in the event that military forces on Luzon were ever forced to capitulate. It served this backdoor role, thanks to the guerrillas, very successfully.

When General Sharp, commander of the Visayan-Mindanao forces of the USAFFE, surrendered the island after General Wainright's emissaries had contacted him following the fall of Corregidor, only a portion of his command went into the enemy hands. The bulk of his soldiers took off into the hills later to be reorganized into a formidable guerrilla unit.

At the time of the surrender, there was somewhat more than a Jap division in the Mindanao area. The Jap elements making the original landing at Davao, in December, 1941, had been contained by General Sharp's forces in the vicinity of the city. The Jap force which had landed at Zamboanga, in March, 1942, had done little more than occupy Zamboanga Peninsula and the three Jap regiments in the final attack at the end of April, 1942, following Bataan's fall, had joined forces with the others and held lines paralleling the limited highways network only.

This was roughly the picture when the guerrillas commenced to take over. Scores of guerrilla organizations sprang up in both the Christian and Mohammedan portions of the island and by September 18, 1942, a consolidation had been commenced by Lieutenant Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, a United States Army reserve officer, who had come to the Philippines as a mining engineer in 1936.

He had been ordered to active duty as a Captain in June, 1941, and assigned to the construction division of the Corps of Engineers, with principal duties in the North Luzon area. He built airfields in Luzon and Bataan and in the battles of Bataan took command of the forward echelon of the Engineer troops. In the last hours before Bataan's fall he took a special detachment of engineers to Corregidor to extend the Malinta Tunnel and to maintain the blasted road network of the island open. On April 29, he was sent by PBY to Mindanao to enlarge the air fields there, serving as assistant to the USAFFE's chief of engineers. Engaged in demolition work when General Sharp surrendered, he went to Lake Lanao and contacted the already organizing guerrillas forces made up of unsurrendered troops.

A lieutenant colonel by this time he took command of the entire island of Mindanao and commenced setting up his army on the basis of weapons available. Gradually his guerrillas commenced smashing the Jap lines until the enemy was finally obliged to consolidate in strong points. From then on the guerrilla forces actually held a full ninety percent of the island until the return of the United States Army in 1945.

Fertig's guerrilla force, by authority of President Quezon, even printed its own money and set up military law and military government, helping in reestablishing the civilian economy of the island by close cooperation with civil authorities. The American and Filipino flag flew high throughout the entire occupation.

On December 4, 1942, Colonel Fertig sent a volunteer expedition to SWPA, GHQ, in Australia, consisting of Captain Jordan A. Hammer, and Captain Charles M. Smith, in a very small boat. Out of contact since the surrender, the existence of the powerful guerrilla force on Mindanao then became known to GHQ.

General MacArthur sent a submarine to Mindanao shortly thereafter with Commander "Chic" Parsons, formerly a Manila businessman, as a special observer. The craft carried tons of supplies. Commander Parsons went ashore at Tukuran, Zamboanga, in February, 1943, and found that the guerrilla force had things under such control that he could return to the submarine with the American flag flying.

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From that time on hundreds of tons of supplies, including the all important radios, poured into Mindanao by submarine and the guerrilla headquarters there were never again out of contact with GHQ.

In preparation for General MacArthur's return to the Philippines, Col. Fertig had established by January 1945, some seventy radios on the island in a master communication network. He had airfields at Dipolog, Labo, Lala and Barobo. His command was called the Tenth Military District and his troops, numbering more than 37,000, were divided into six divisions, based on the strength of pre-war Philippine Army Divisions.

These divisions had a total of more than eleven thousand rifles, six thousands carbines, nearly 500 automatic rifles and machine rifles, more than 700 Thompson submachine guns, and sixty .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, ten field pieces, a score of mortars and some 1,200 pistols.

Documents

Last Letter of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi to the Viceroy of New Spain, dated 11 August 1572*

Through Don Juan de la Ysla, who set sail from the Panae river bound for New Spain on 31 July 1570, I rendered my account to Your Excellency of everything that happened in that place. And as Juan de la Ysla proclaimed in our camp that the fresh supply of provisions sent by the king through him from Spain was intended for the troops of our army in this camp, our soldiers have the honor of strongly urging those concerned that these provisions be immediately distributed. Trully conscious of their dire poverty and lack of resources, they are constrained, much to their regret, to be solicitous on their own behalf and to be in constant negotiation with the royal, military and religious authorities of this camp specially considering that the portion of the provisions consisting of weapons, hand guns, coats of mail, swords, daggers, and helmets would be lost if they get rusty and could not properly be maintained if they are not distributed.

It is a matter of common knowledge that in the Philippine Islands, weapons and everything made of iron usually rust and do not last long if they are not cleaned very often, and that, by way of reminding, they ought to be all apportioned to the rank and file at moderate prices. And so that His Majesty would not lose and be obliged to pay for the loss, because it was impossible to make them pay at the time, instead of weapons; they should be given shirts and shoes which were what they needed very badly. Having done this, every one would be obliged to pay for what he received. The difficulty, however, lies in that some have died afterwards without even having funds for their own burial; others have died without being able to pay their debts and still others there were who met death still keeping what they have collected. The king's officials insist in collecting and demanding priority payment of debt whenever some one dies and enforce this imposition with great severity. These men who have served in the royal army for eight years without any salary and have died while in the service of His Majesty, these men who did not even have money left to pay for a mass to ease their souls, should not any more be molested for a debt of a paltry sum of ₱40.00 or ₱50.00 which they got and spent in his royal service.

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* Translated by Vicente del Carmen from the Spanish text published in W. E. Retana's *Archivo del Bibliofilo Filipino,* Vol. V, p. 458-477.

May Your Excellency be kind enough to intercede for these poor soldiers to His Majesty to give these provisions as a gift to them because they received it while in his royal service, at least to those who have died and to those who might die without receiving any benefits from the government, nor with something with which to pay their debts which is certainly an act approved by the Lord.

In the month of November of the year 1570, I left Panae to go to the island of Cubu where a town of Spaniards was founded in the name of His Majesty (the king of Spain), which was called the Town of the Holiest Name of Jesus with 50 white inhabitants to start with and among whom were apportioned the natives of that district who made peace overtures with the invaders in accordance with what His Majesty had decreed. There was some confusion in the process of apportionment because the Spaniards have no idea either of the number of towns or the number of people inhabiting those neighboring islands who made peace with them. The only information they have were the recollections and accounts of military leaders and other persons who have roamed around the islands and who determined that so many inhabited each island so that, while yet undivided, other interested persons may take advantage of such data. Then, when they have actually seen the islands and found out the actual count of their inhabitants, they can apportion what each one shall have. This haphazard mehod of securing data gave rise to many complaints and hardships because the information about the number of inhabitants was erroneous and did not reach even 1/6 of the actual number in some places.

Having accomplished the mission in Cubu, I returned to Panae leaving the Treasurer of the Expedition, Guido de la Bezares, in the new town so that he would take care of it and supervise the building of a fort around the place. Upon arrival in Panae, I asked my men to hurry up and finish the construction of a small, swift galley so that I could proceed to Manila. When the vessel was finished, I hastened preparations and left the Panae river in April of the year 1571 with the small galley on which I rode, the tender, *San Lucas,* a frigate, a junk and 23 local light boats manned by native oarsmen. Our expedition as a whole numbered 210 Spaniards more or less. I left in Panae the carpenters and the calkers so that they could finish the construction of a small galley with 12 or 13 oarsmen. I also left the accountant in order that he could furnish the needed supplies and provisions; and the artillery captain and some soldiers to safeguard the artillery pieces and the munitions left behind. Our trip from Panae to Manila took one month more or less for the reason that the boats manned by the natives did not move fast enough so that our vessels were forced to wait for them in every port. On the way, we gathered many recently circulated reports that Manila is very strongly fortified, that it had a big fresh supply of men and provisions, that it had many ships which came from Burney, that its defenders would not wait for us to land but would meet and fight against us at sea. These reports proved fictitious, because when we reached a port 2 leagues away from Manila where I stayed for 3 days waiting for some of our boats which lagged behind, we found none of the circulated reports to be true. On the first day of my stay, 2 native boats came from the river of Manila to examine us closely even from so far a distance that they are beyond the range of a cannon charge. On the second day, a native who knew me in Panae came on a local boat, and I believed that he might be a spy because he said that nobody sent him; and that he came to see me to know if I came with the fleet because they could not believe it in Manila that I would. I asked him how the people of Manila thought of my coming and he replied that two native chiefs desired peace but that a third one Rajah Soliman by name wanted to wage war because he feared that what the white commander did last year might be repeated. I gave a gift to the native and sent him back to inform his chiefs that they could remain very tranquil and peaceful in their homes and that they should not be afraid because I did not come to do them any evil or any harm but that on the contrary I came to do them much good and benefit. Thus the native messenger departed contented. From the port where I stayed for 3 days, I sailed directly to the Manila river and when the natives saw us coming, they burned their houses which were but small cottages which they rebuilt in the same place where they were burned the year before. The people crossed the river which is the town of one of the 3 chiefs whose name is Lacandola where they kept their artillery and which they planned to fortify and defend.

Seeing what they intended to do, I then sent a boat ahead with my commander on board to the mouth of the river to tell them that they should not burn their houses and that I did not come' to do them any injury. The Spanish commander talked to the natives at the river bank with the aid of an interpreter explaining the purpose of the coming of the Spaniards.

The two native chiefs, Rajah Matanda and Lacandola decided to come to see me and rode in one of their boats and sailed out to sea to where our ships were about a quarter of a league away. They boarded the small galley where I was and I received them cheerfully to make them feel at ease and gave them a few gifts. They said that they were very much pleased with my arrival because they already knew that I favored the natives very much; that I meant to do no harm to anybody; that they would do whatever I order them to do and that Raja Soliman did not dare to come because of what happened last year.

I made them understand that I came by order of my King to work for their welfare, to dispense justice to them and to give them such other things that would redound to great benefits for them. I told them that I am pardoning Raja Soliman for what happened last year and what has been done up to this day, if from now on he would promise to be a loyal and true friend, and that he can safely come before me without fearing any retaliation from us.

So that they might believe that we would do them any harm, I told them that I would not proceed to the town of Lacandola where all their men were quartered but would remain at the end of the river where the natives burned their houses as a pledge of good faith, and that I would do everything to save them from worry and pain.

Consequently, the native chiefs showed great satisfaction with tokens of gratefulness. And so it came to pass that the native chiefs proceeded to Lacandola's own while I and my men stayed on the opposite bank of the river where the native evacuees burned their cottages where we remained many days.

Then Rajah Matanda and Lacandola revisited me to inform me that next time they would bring Rajah Soliman along and that all of them would become vassals of the King of Spain and would do whatever they are ordered to do in his name. The day came when Matanda, Lacandola and Soliman and many more native chiefs paid me courtesy calls and with all of them an equitable peace agreement was mutually adjusted and concluded, and we took possession of this whole island in the name of His Majesty under the conditions that Your Excellency will perceive in the herein attached testimony and documents.

After having concluded peace terms with the chiefs of Manila, messengers were despatched to neighboring territories so that they too might adjust peace terms and friendship like what the inhabitants of Manila had done. Some came but others did not want to saying that they did not feel obliged to make or have peace nor friendship with us, and they even scolded and blamed the Manilans saying that they are like women for having subjected themselves to so few people like we were. There was specially a province called Macabebe which came with 2,000 heathens riding in 40 vessels who stationed themselves in sight of Lacandola's town before our very eyes where they stayed for 3 days threatening us and making fierce threats and bravadoes, and even when I sent emissaries to invite them many times to come to me and conclude peace terms and not to be foolish, they failed to take advantage of my offer to them, but instead they made fun of the Manilans for having yielded to so few of us and that they alone would be enough to slay all of us saying further that they would not return to their houses without doing so.

It seems that Lacandola made an understanding with them that the Macabebes would fight against the Spaniards and if they could kill 100 or even 50 of us, that he would rise in rebellion against us and be the ally of the Macabebes. With this agreement formed between them, Lacandola pretended to support them and even offered some of his men to fight with them.

After several days, I sent a Spanish interpreter to require to come and adjust peace with us, but they did not come saying that they would rather fight against us and that they challenged me and all my men to come out to the sea to find out if their god is more powerful than ours, or if ours is more potent than theirs. They then took to their boats and made out to the sea. I cannot do anything but accept their challenge and although I could not send many men because I have only 9 boats ready and the commander was in one of them and the men who could be put in the other had to be in a hurry yet they managed to face the enemy. When my men arrived within sight of the enemy fleet, the heathens attacked our boats impetuously, discharged their artillery with settled regularity and released charges from the bronze cannons that they brought, but the mercy and kindness of God were evident because He did not allow the enemy artillery to give us any injury and harm in spite of their superiority in number and even when they fired near our positions.

Then my troop of archers commenced functioning and God permitted that the enemy would be so put in disorder that they had to flee in confusion and thus we attain victory with little loss on both sides. The commander of the heathens lost his life and he was the very one who obstinately rejected my peace overtures. We took some enemy natives as prisoners and from 10 to 12 of their vessels were captured, and if the darkness of the night did not work against us we could have bagged more of their vessels and possibly none could have escaped. Among the captives were some followers of Lacandola and there were two of his nephews who gave alibis that they did not side with the enemy in order to fight but to see how the Spaniards fought. The general opinion regarding Lacandola's men was to punish them but I decided that in order to retain the loyalty of such new friends it would be better to be lenient to them and so all of Lacandola's followers who were captured were set free.

On the feast day of St. John the Baptist, a town for Spaniards was founded on the banks of this river in the name of His Majesty. It has its own institutions of justice, its own governmental machinery and other functions of a republican nature. It was given the name of the City of Manila of the Province of Nueva Castilla in relation to a small town which is 10 leagues from this place which has been named after this ancient country although it is small enough to have only 30 houses to his honor and reverence.

It seemed to me that this province should be called Nueva Castilla and although of little importance in relation to the name, I put the town subject to His Majesty because I cannot suffer that anybody except the king be the lord of similar name.

Other towns of this territory seemed averse to coming to cement friendship with us, relying upon the forts which they felt certain to be good and strong enough because they are surrounded by palisaded moats with water and which are provided by a rampart. No matter how often I entreated them to be our friends, the more they show arrogance and displayed rudeness and went as far as saying that we cannot dare to come to their towns as they were not like the Manilans who had to surrender without fighting.

Since I am waiting for them so long even entreating them to be our friends, they found courage enough to tell us that because we dared not come to their towns that instead they would come to Manila and would kill all of us. I considered it necessary to send them some of our strongest convincers who succeeded in bringing the recalcitrants to our side with little trouble and we owe it to God that everything is now smooth and peaceful once more round about, with the exception of some mountaineers who came to attack and cause harm to our new friends, a practice that they often resort to. I have started to apportion the friendly natives among the residents of this City, and when everyone has been given his share, many complaints and complainants cropped up. There are those who complain that their share was very small and there are even those who said that they have none. Your Excellency must understand how hard it is to please everybody.

After having pacified all this territory, I dispatched certain men of mine by land to the mines which are called Paracali which are reputed to have rich ore deposits. They are about 40 leagues distant from Manila, and because there are no opened land routes between Manila and Paracali, and because they were deceived by their guides by bringing them over mountains and marshes and then later abandoned, our messengers suffered great deprivations of hunger and fatigues before they reached the mines in question.

They found, upon arrival, the mines deserted although they found the houses well stocked with provisions and the mines well taken care of and orderly. Some of the mine sites are very deep while others are not so, and in the opinion of my messenger the mines are in good condition and they found some gold nuggets as big as peas and some of smaller sizes.

Realizing that they could do nothing more, as the natives did not want to approach them nor talk to them, my emissaries decided to return to Manila because some member of the group got sick and in fact four soldiers died of excessive fatigue. Some are in serious condition due to taking improper medication.

With regard to the mines, I believe that there is no way by which they can be worked and operated profitably until the peace and order conditions of the country improves and until quiet and security can be attained. These country folks are so deceitful and malicious that the greatest pride that they can aspire for was to kill somebody treacherously and hung his head on a pole and display it near his doorway, a practice that they take much pride in. This was how some of our men met their fate when they left camp or when they lost their way. Such were also the lot of some encomenderos who were returning to their estates with their companions. It is for this reason that I say that these mines could not be worked or operated profitably at present. And there are also gold mines in many different parts of this island that are famed for their being rich.

When I sailed last year from Panae bound for Manila, I found when passing the island of Mindoro and its suburbs many Chinese captives who were made slaves by the natives, who captured them the year before from two junks which crossed the seas and lost their way at the mouth of the Bonbon river, and had been sold all over the territory.

Believing it a seasonable opportunity to offer friendship and to enter into trade relations with the Chinese, I ransomed and bought all those available and set them free so that they returned to their native land. There were over 30 of hem whom I put on board one of my vessels and shipped to their country. The Chinese were very appreciative of the good treatment and the freedom that I had given them and promised that they would always come to establish commercial relations wherever I would like to be. True to their word they came later in the same year bringing merchandize loaded in 10 junks, 3 of which went to Manila, 3 to Mindoro, 2 to Balayan and the rest to other islands. They have sold and traded with more freedom and security that they enjoyed when they were prisoners. Many of them have returned to China while other are still here because they have not yet disposed of their merchandise, and they said that next year, more junks will come bringing a greater variety of goods. They further said that they only brought samples on the present trip of theirs in order to find out what we would like more and that what they had brought was limited in quantity because they were not sure if they could sell them. They brought embroidered damask imitations, tafettas of every color, twisted and untwisted silk, skeins of raw silk, gilt-edged and white porcelain wares, sugar, oranges, sweets, black pepper, sugar candies, wheat flour, licorice, musk and other odors, mercury, painted stewing pans and many other trinkets and money traps, a little of every thing.

I talked to them about sending two priests with them on their return trip so that they could arrange and conclude perpetual peace and amity with their King, but they say that their monarch lives so far, far away in the interior of their vast country, so vast that the trip would take them 3 months. They also claimed that the priests would not be allowed to land without the permission of the government. So I just sent a letter through them to ask the permission required and they promised to bring me back the reply of the governor. The Chinese also gave me a painting of the coastline of the towns which came to trade with these islands, that is, from Canton up to Lan-yi-con, and they assembled the pieces of the painting beside me without any measure, order of height or grade.

I am enclosing the said painting with this report so that Your Excellency might see if he could understand what the Chinese meant with them. I believe that from here to the land of the Chinese would be a distance of more than 150 leagues because it took them 8 days in going from here to their country and 10 days in coming from there to these islands.

I did not want to send men there so as not to disturb their way of life and because the coming of the Chinese to this country to trade was of their own free will.

One of the Chinese that I liberated last year and who came back in the same year, informed me of his visit to Canton and of his conversation with the Portuguese residents of the same island. He told the Portuguese of the nice treatment that he received from me in his liberation and how the Spaniards came to occupy and build towns in the island of Luzon. He further said that the Portuguese told him not to put their trust in us, that we were corsairs who came to attack and rob and that they were going to drive us away from here. Without avoiding reproach, the celestial came directly here.

When I arrived in the river of Manila, we found here around 40 Chinese who at one time resided peacefully in their homeland with their wives and children and are engaged in businesses offered to them. But for some reason they were forced to go to Japan and from there they came to the Philippines never to return to their country anymore. Among these emigrants, there were two baptized Christians, one of whom was named Anton and the other Pablo who said that they were baptized in Japan by a Theatin father, and that they have not received the holy oil nor had been confirmed there being no such things in Japan. They did not also know the Christian doctrine and knew nothing more than to make the sign of the cross and to kneel upon seeing the cross and image of the Holy Virgin.

Here they have learned the Christian doctrine, have received the Holy oil and have been confirmed besides having their wives and children and many other Chinese baptized, and all in all, there were more than 40 baptized Chinese. Many, also, among the native Manila infidels have been baptized and may it please God our Lord and His Majesty our King to know that our efforts are now bearing fruit and the holy Catholic Faith has been increased. I prayed to God that He should guide and push forward such a good start. Rajah Matanda, who was one of the 3 native chiefs of Manila and the one with the best disposition of all of them, fell ill and while in such a condition, he asked that he be baptized, was baptized and later died. I once more prayed to God to pour His loving kindness upon the 3 sons of Lacandola, the other native chief, and they likewise became Christians. And thus, little by little, had they been steadily multiplying. I prayed my thanks to God.

On the 29th of June 1571, the two boats, the *Santiago* and the *San Juan* on which came General Juan Lopez de Aguirre, entered Panae and anchored therein, and 16 days afterwards, I received in Manila, his dispatches which said that he is sending me by boat from Panae the written requests of army officers and ships pilots stressing the necessity for their boats to be repaired, to be cleaned and painted due to the distance they have covered and the damages they have sustained on the way. As soon as I received the SOS I asked the camp to return right away to Panae and inform General Aguirre to send the damaged vessels and the men to Manila, because it was only Manila which had facilities not only to repair but also to clean and adorn vessels. A month and a half later or at the end of August the vessels arrived in town and as it was observed by all, the repairing and the mending done was no little job and was still good at the present time. The camp commander Don Julian de Arbolanche, could very well attest to the quality of the work done on the vessels because he is a good and trustworthy man, who gave all the cooperation that he could in spite of the poor condition of health which has followed him when he came to the Islands and which had, in a way, prevented him from giving the best work that he could give.

The reenforcements sent by Your Excellency on board the two ships were sent at the most opportune time and at the most proper opportunity and for all of these, I kiss the hands of Your Excellency in the name of this my camp. The division of the soldiers brought over by Juan Lopez de Aguirre and Lorenzo Chacon in order to reorganize and invigorate the companies in the Philippines, in accordance with your instructions, gave rise to several ill-feelings and offensiveness which showed lack of discipline on their part, because they left the home base united and disciplined but arrived here disunited and unmindful of their responsibilities. Neither would I like soldiers in my camp who are disgusted which is indeed very inconvenient especially in a conquered land. To solve this problem, I had apportioned the company of General Juan Lopez de Aguirre, which is bent on returning to their own vessels, between my officers, Luis de la Haya and Andres de Ybarra and decided that Lorenzo Chacon would remain as commander of his forty soldiers with the officers that he brought along from there. My camp commander and Juan de Salcedo did not receive any reenforcement and just to please me remained content.

On 31 May of the succeeding year, Don Pedro de Luna arrived at the bay and river of Manila on board the vessel *Espiritu Santo* whose arrival together with the royal decree of Your Excellency, late though it might be, gave much pleasure to this camp. With him came Juna de la Ysla who, having proceeded directly from the Spanish court, did not even take the trouble of bringing along either a letter or a decree from His Majesty, nor from the Council of the Indies, nor from any court dignitary. Neither did I receive any reply from those to whom we write. You will perhaps understand the difficulty we, who are serving here, encounter and experience if we receive no order from His Majesty as to what we ought to do during the eight years that have passed. Not a single letter had we been favored by our King, or from the Council either, and our only consolation reposes in Your Excellency whose solicitude and benevolence has helped us a great deal. I prayed to God that I may be given the chance to serve Your Excellency more.

The ship brought us the goods which were included among its cargo, which were sent from Spain and which apparently had been left in the port of Acapulco which they unloaded after they have been processed. But the goods are not the kind preferred by the natives in this country because here it is hot and the majority of them wear cotton dresses in various colors which could be surely sold here as the royal finance officials had written.

With respect to the choice of a vessel for the expedition and discovery that Your Excellency has ordered to be done, some doubts and difficulties have come up, all with sincere devotion and the desire to better serve His Majesty, and the resumption of the trip should be ascertained from the schedule of the vessel *Espiritu Santo* which arrived this day, because it is better planned and prepared than any other plan. Thus the vessel remains in this river and at the beginning of the year, God willing, it will be dispatched with the best preparation possible like Your Excellency orders.

As soon as Don Pedro de Luna arrived in this river, he delivered the soldiers he brought along under him and in compliance with what Your Excellency asked me to tell that he would confer with Pedro de Chaves his ensign. I then conducted him to the captain and left him 50 soldiers among those who came under him and I am sure that Your Excellency considers him the most Christian of princes and one fit to serve His Majesty not only personally but also with their properties, and that they must be honest and talented. For this reason, I propose to confer with the persons who compose the retinue of the King for them to consider the choice of persons like Felipe de Salcedo who during the eight years that he has served has spent his own property and that of his parents without a salary or any other aid. I say this because I am reminded of what you have written to me that Pedro de Chaves spent a part of his fortune in serving the King, and because of this, I appeal for mercy on the part of His Majesty for Felipe Salcedo in the same way that he received from you every mercy and favor which perhaps is responsible for his success in his position.

With respect to the possibility of profit that the traders would have if they come to this land, it seems to me to be too early and that they must wait until there is more peace and order in the place. The demand for items of our merchandise here is rather small because every one here is penniless, as none of them possesses as much as 20 pesos in his pockets, nor do they have anything to pay for what they buy. The neighboring encomenderos, moreover, did not have more time and chance to come and buy than now. Very little, if ever, could be expected from the natives. Perhaps, later on, when they already have the means the goods will be of value to them, and will be able to spend, something that they do not, and cannot do now. Since they dress up in cotton shirts, what people here can export and sell there are cotton goods, wax, threads, and some gold, and then later on, when Chinese trade will increase in bulk, it will be convenient for traders to come, sell or exchange their wares. The most useful goods that can be brought at present are, in my opinion, toasted bread soaked in oil, something that is very much liked by both the natives and the Chinese and who would not barter them for anything.

The priests who came last year had a good trip and arrived in perfect health except one who is going back on the return trip due to sickness and I believe that others will prefer to return. It is not surprising that priests who are ordained in this New Spain do not feel so much at home here as in there, because of the great difference in the conditions and the church work between this land and New Spain. Here there are neither churches nor monasteries and other things sorely needed for their retreat and comfort, although they, being servants of God, take it in stride and act and bear up with fortitude. It also seems to them that here they can make so little progress in their church work because the dialect of the natives is rather foreign to them. There are a dozen religious ministers who are actually assigned here together with other four or five novices who have taken their novitiate here. It seems to me that what we have shall be enough for the present and that there will not be any need to send more.

There are several persons of Portuguese parents who claim Spanish citizenship, having been born and reared on Spanish soil, over whom a controversy has been started alleging that they cannot stay here. I would like to know if what His Majesty has ordered applies to them, in other words, if they could stay here.

I respectfully request if Your Excellency can inform His Majesty that the Spanish nationals residing here up to this time still have no heirs who will inherit the property given to them by the King and the natives attached to this property. Neither do they expect such a thing to happen in the future because they are not married in view of the fact that there are no Spanish women here. Moreover, the natives who are obliged to stop working in case the owner of the encomienda falls sick or dies have to be given and distributed to the various persons who have worked in them, similar to what they do in Guatemala; otherwise, the Spanish communities which they have inhabited could be supported and conserved. His Majesty should likewise be informed that of the 50 Spaniards who were left by me in Cubu one and a half years ago, 10 or a dozen have died; several others have fallen sick and crippled and the rest have expressed a desire to abandon the place saying that they do not venture to live among the natives because they are so few. It is certainly necessary, and will speak well of the service of His Majesty and of those who live in this land that this matter be adjusted the soonest possible time.

MIGUEL LOPEZ DE LEGASPI

Manila, 11 August 1572

Notes and Comments

What Are Historical Gaps?

Celedonio O. Resurreccion

Any discussion on gaps in Philippine history is apt to encounter certain fundamental concepts. I use the term "encounter" not merely to denote a chance meeting or a coming upon but also the idea of involvement. This conceptual definition provides justification for my present intention to involve myself with the meaning and nature of certain terms, terms which we often employ but which as often we take for granted, and these are: gaps, history, events, historical facts, history as a continuing process, no finality in history, knowledge of documents, valid conclusions, honesty of historians and their moral responsibility.

What do we mean when we speak of gaps in Philippine history? The lexical definition of *gap* is: "an interruption of continuity: a blank space; hiatus; lacuna." These definitions taken collectively suggest that a gap is a wedge, and a wedge appears as a discontinuity *within* a historical dimension. In other words, the locus of a gap cannot be outside history.

A gap cannot take place at the beginning, that is, in the age of primordialism, which is *prehistory*. Prehistory refers to that period before the advent of recorded human experience. Since the events were unrecorded in whatever form, no one can presume to know what happened in prehistoric times. Without documents to work with, a historian has no *raison d'etre*. To borrow a phrase from Alfred North Whitehead, he becomes "a useless bore" in the exercise of his craft. There is no such creature as historian of prehistory, clearly a contradiction of terms.

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* Delivered at the Seminar of Provincial Historical Committees at the Philippine Cultural Center on Sunday, February 1, 1970, upon invitation from Mrs. Carmen Guerrero Nakpil, Chairman of the Philippine Historical Commission.

Professor Celedonio O. Resurreccion is executive secretary of the Institute of Graduate Studies of Far Eastern University and a governor of the Philippine Historical Association. This paper is a reconstruction of the extemporaneous remarks he made as one of two official discussants on the paper of Professor Teodoro Agoncillo, "Gaps in Philippine History." It incorporates relevant illustrations which for lack of time were omitted in the extemporaneous remarks but reserved for the open forum.

Neither can a gap occur at the "end" of a historical period, for history has no end. To end history is to terminate human existence; it means the atomization of the world. History is a continuous process of becoming and being. As long as there are human societies, men will continue to interact in varied and complex relationships in the ceaseless politics of life. "Politics is present history and history is past politics," so goes the popular saying. It suggests that history is perpetually being made. There is no finality in history as a process. Finality is a Marxist illusion, and an illusion is devoid of reality.

I have belabored the points that prehistory is essentially not a gap and that history is a continuum, therefore without an end 'that creates a continuum, therefore without an end that creates a void. Let me take up the third point, which is: since history is a continuum, it is inconceivable for it to develop a gap within. The conclusion logically inferable is: there is no such thing as gaps in history. This I contend to be the correct view.

This is not to say that because there can exist no gap in history, there are no historical gaps. There are. A simple gap and a historical fact are differentiated poles apart by the eminent historian Carl L. Becker.

A simple gap is physical in nature and is characterized by the absolute absence of documentary evidence. If there is no existing evidence, no record to deal with, the historian has nothing to recreate or reconstruct, and no amount of historical scholarship can bring forth something that did not exist, or whose existence is unknown and unverifiable. The historian's ignorance is invincible and permanent; the gap is irremediable.

On the other hand, if there exists documentary evidence in whatever form whose existence is not yet known to the historian, his ignorance is vincible and temporary; the gap is remediable. All that is needed is historical research and historiography.

I have disposed of the first encounter. Let me take up now the second — the difference between a simple fact and a historical fact. A simple fact is a past event, the event as it was, as it took place. It is now beyond reach and the historians cannot deal directly with it. What can he do and what does he do? He recalls the simple fact and attempts to recreate it by employing his personal resources in historical imagination and historical reasoning. In other words, the historian deals with a *statement about* a past event. In his hands, the simple fact *is now* a historical fact. Becker emphasizes the capital importance of the distinction between "the ephemeral event which disappears" (simple fact) and "the affirmation about the event which persists" (historical fact). The historical fact is then a symbol of hundreds of unmentioned details, which enables the historian to recreate it imaginatively.

The distinction is recognized by the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, who makes an absolutely valid point that there is "an essential difference between what happened and why it happened, between the chronicle-like records of past events and historical narrative in which these happenings are interpreted and/or explained."

Let us illustrate. Magellan was killed in Mactan. This was an event, a simple fact simply stated. It is beyond the reach of any living person for that matter, it having occurred in 1521. That Magellan was killed in Mactan is almost meaningless except for the idea it conveys. So what if he died? This simple fact can become a historical fact in the hands of a historian when he recreates it imaginatively by interpolating the details, taking into account the feud between two native chieftains, Humabon and Lapulapu, the arrival of the Magellan expedition, the friendly welcome accorded by Humabon, the demand of Magellan on Lapulapu to pay tribute, the latter's immortal defiance, and the tragic encounter.

It is therefore in the use of the historical imagination, in the recreative reconstruction of the past, that the human mind exposes itself, revealing its strength and weakness, its virtues and shortcomings, its tone and temper. It is in the exercise of the historical imagination that a historical gap can happen and does happen.

We have clarified one more concept and that is: what we call gaps in Philippine history are gaps in historiography, gaps in historical thinking and writing. In short, they are *historical gaps.* This view is consistent with the use of the term *gap* in historical discussions. It is compatible with the accepted meaning of history.

We move on to our next encounter. What is history?

The Greek word *historiae* means inquiry, interpretation, analysis of events. History is therefore not a mere collection of past events, not a mere record of what happened. History is an interpretive recreation of past events.

"History is a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past." (Edward Hallett Carr, *What Is History?*)

"History is the spiritual form in which a civilization renders to itself an account of its past. (Johann Huizinga, "A Definition of the Concept of History.")

"The history we read, though based on facts, is, strictly speaking, not factual at all, but a series of accepted judgements." (G. Barraclough, *History in a Changing World.*)

"History is the record of what one age finds worthy of note in another." (Jacob Burckhardt, *Judgements on History and on Historians.*)

History then consists of reasoned judgements resulting from the historian's reflections on the past. It is not a simple chronicle, a litany of events. Here I take the liberty of expressing dissent from Croce's view that "history is living chronicle, chronicle is dead history; history is contemporary history, chronicle is past history." Chronicle is not history but a mere narration of events in an orderly way according to the time (*kronos*) of occurrence. I do agree, however, with Croce's statement that "history is principally an act of thought, chronicle an act of will."

Let us move for the next encounter. Why are there historical gaps in the sense that we defined it a while ago? If historical gaps and gaps in historical research and historiography, to what specific reasons may they be attributed?

The first is that historical construction is necessarily selective. The multiplicity of past events at the disposal of the historian gives him no alternative but to make a choice, according to his biases and prejudices, for critical evaluation. There are historical gaps between because historians have not explored certain unappreciated aspects of Philippine history. Whether they are rummaging in the vast storehouse of the past in "The Search for a Usable Past" (title of Henry Steele Commager's work, 1965) or in "The Search for a Usable Future" (title of Martin E. Marty's book, 1969) or, to add our own, "for a usable present," we apply our value judgments and in the process exercise our prerogative of rejection and retention. Inevitably, the rejections overwhelmingly outnumber the retentions.

Gaps may be attributed, secondly, to the fact that historical writers possess diverse backgrounds and different character traits. Some are better prepared to locate and handle historical problems. Others, being not equally gifted with a sixth sense of intuition, are simply incapable of seeing the historical mote in a corner of their eyes. Still others are ill-prepared for historical research passing on as history the various strands of data lifted from different sources. R. G. Collingwood (*The Idea of History*) describes this last group as "paste-and-scissors historians."

Thus, to illustrate this case, let us not content ourselves with the knowledge that the Spaniards, unlike the Americans, did not attempt to impose upon our native ancestors the Spanish language but, instead, assiduously studied the native dialects, compiled dictionaries, and wrote local grammars, thus preserving our native tongues. The historical question that calls for historical imagination is: Why did the Spaniards not destroy our native dialects as they did in the Latin Americans? Why did they not teach the natives to speak and write in Spanish as they did to the Spanish *indios?* Why was there a change in Spain's policy of conquest?

The point I am driving at is that unless Philippine, specially Filipino, historians discard their historical chauvinism they would be incapable of treading on greener pastures and contributing to the reduction, if not elimination, of gaps in Philippine history. As Henry Pirenne wisely observed:

> The comparative method alone can diminish racial, political, and national prejudices among historians. These prejudices inevitably ensnare him who, confined within the narrow limits of national history, is condemned to understand it badly because he is incapable of comprehending the bonds attaching it to the histories of other nations. It is not due to *parti pris* but because of insufficient information that so many historians lack impartiality. (From "What Are Historians Trying to Do?")

The kind of educational preparation of the historian gives the fourth cause for the existence of gaps. The Filipino historian confines his professionalization to the reading of books, articles, and reviews on historical publications as if such readings constitute the alpha and omega of historical scholarship. They have not learned, and they have not cultivated the appetite to know the ancillary disciplines that would make them better historians. The standard aids to the historian's craft include the study of chronology, palaeography, sigillography, epigraphy, numismatics, archaeology, geography, sociology, economics, philology, and political science. Many, if not most, of our historians take a half-hearted interest in politics, yet politics is a fountainhead of history. Remember the famous couplet of Dr. Seeley:

> Politics without history has no root,
> History without politics has no fruit.

How can our history scholars fill the historical gaps if they do not have a bowing acquaintance with palaeography and philology? What do the records in Malacca say about the pre-Spanish relations between that sultanate and the ruling family of Tondo? What do the records in Borneo reveal? Considering the fact that the Calatagan artifacts include porcelain from the province of Suwankhalok (Thailand), what materials on the Philippines are available in Thai archives? Without knowledge of the language and writing of countries in South-East Asia, how can our historians employ creatively and profitably their historical imagination?

We have gaps in Philippine history because our professional historians have not cultivated a philosophical bent of mind. All that they do is to discover a clue, if they can, but fail to pursue it imaginatively. They write *of* events and not *about* events. There seems to be a general impression that a person who writes of events is a historian, that a writer of a history textbook is a historian, that a member of a historical association is a historian. This is the kind of fallacious thinking that is sterile and unhistorical. The historical mind assumes, hypothesizes, examines, analyzes, evaluates, accepts or rejects, and concludes. (G. Kitson Clark, *The Critical Historian*, 1967). The historical mind is scientific, systematically creative. The historical imagination is a reasoned imagination and remains reasoning. Without it, historical gaps are perpetuated.

Consider the educational reform of 1863. The historical question is: Why did the educational reform come only in 1863, after almost three hundred years of Spanish colonial administration over the Philippines? Was there also a tardy development of the educational system in Spain and other European countries? How does the introduction of the educational reform of 1863 compare, in point of time and quality, with educational reforms in British, Dutch, and French colonies? We do not have a ready answer. But the historian who philosophizes can, and he should prepare himself for surprises. Discoveries—I don't mean serendipities—have their beginnings in philosophizing.

Consider, lastly, one additional case. The Spaniards called the archipelago "Filipinas" in honor of King Philip II of Spain, who was impelled to approve of the colonization of the Philippines without legal and moral basis, just so he could promote his own glory. The name "Filipino" was exclusively reserved for pure-blooded Spaniards born in the Philippines. The lowly native, for want of a name, was called in *indio*. The historical question is: Why do we call ourselves today "Filipinos" when we are not Spaniards and not under any obligation to honor a Spanish king? With only one exception I know (Dr. Domingo Abella), there is hardly any thinking done on the evolution of the *indio* to Filipino. Also with only one exception within my knowledge, I know of no other who has made a historical philosophizing on the need of changing our national name to one that represents the people's, hence autochthonous, choice.*

Before concluding, a summary of what has been said appears to be in order.

First, that prehistory is not a gap in history since prehistory itself is outside history.

Second, that history is a continuum and therefore has no terminus from which a gap could begin, and because of historical continuity there is no such thing as gaps in history.

Third, that though there be no gaps in history, there are historical gaps — gaps in historical research and historiography.

Fourth, that there is, similarly, an important distinction between a simple fact and a historical fact, between a simple statement: *of* a past event and a statement *about* the event, the latter being the product of the historian's thought about the subject.

Fifth, that history is not a mere collection of past events, not a mere record or chronicle of what happened; rather, history is an interpretative reconstruction of the past.

Sixth, that historical gaps are caused generally by inadequate and unsatisfactory historical research and writing arising from ill-preparation and wrong attitudes of those who practice the historian's craft.

I do not hink there is any need for me to dwell on the good traits of a good historian. Suffice it here to repeat Collingwood's idea of the prime duty of the historian as "a willingness to bestow infinite pains on discovering what actually happened." Any historian who meets this test should be good, for he is accurate and credible, he is thorough and determined, he is objective and truthful, he is imaginative and creative. The test assumes ignorance to be the starting capital of the historian. According to Lytton Strachey, "ignorance is the first requisite of the historian, ignorance which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits." Rather than stress the nature of his task, I would rather underscore his moral responsibility, "to enable man to understand the society of the past, and to increase his mastery over the society of the present."

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* See C. O. Resurreccion, "Why We Should Change the Name *Philippines*?", *Historical Bulletin,* Vol. XI, No. 2, p. 153-168. — Ed.

In conclusion, I should like to assure you that the essence of my discussion is perfectly compatible with the substance and spirit of the lecture on "Gaps in Philippine History." All I have done is to amplify the significance of certain selected terms for a better appreciation and more profound enjoyment of the message contained in the lecture. That message is for you who are in the field of history to pick up the challenge and eliminate the so-called gaps. By your acceptance you can contribute toward hastening the development of historical consciousness, which opens the floodgates of the national spirit without which no people can ever hope to have a great future.

Clearing up the Confusion on the Old Kings of Manila

Ildefonso Santos

I read with great interest the English version of the Will of Fernando Malang Balagtas published in the June, 1967, issue of the *Historical Bulletin.*[1] Mariano A. Henson deserves commendation for his preparation of the accompanying Genealogy of the Rulers of Central Luzon, together with his Notes which must have been the result of much painstaking research.

It seems, however, that certain points in the Notes need further clarification. In the following paragraphs, let us take up these points one by one.

According to Henson's Note (c), Salalila, identified by H. O. Beyer as the Admiral Suleiman described by Pigafetta in 1521, was also the Suleimen I, founder of Manila, whom Legazpi met here in 1571. In the absence of a positive proof, the supposed meeting between Legaspi and Salalila is much to be doubted. This is based on the following computation: In his Will signed on the very day of his death, March 21, 1589, Fernando Malang Balagtas "stated his actual age to be eighy-six years, three months and five days, including today." Therefore, he must have been born on December 16, 1502. It follows that he was 68 years and 5 months old on May 16, 1571, the date of Legazpi's disembarkation in Manila.[2] Assuming that his father, the Great Malansic, was 20 years old when Fernando (formerly Pansonum) was born, we can estimate Malansic's age at no less than 88 years. Approximately, this must have been the age of Suleiman (Soliman) II, his first cousin and Fernando's uncle. Assuming further that Salalila was 20 years old when his son Soliman II was born, we can see that former's age must have been 108 years by the time he was supposed to have met Legazpi. In those days of widespread ignorance in matters of health, nothing short of a miracle could have prolonged Salalila's life to that incredible age. As we shall find out later, he was not the Old Raja of the meeting in question.

In Note (d), Prof. Beyer is quoted as saying in his *Philippine History Quarterly,* 1919, that Macayabongdili married Sebastian Cahia, nephew of F. M. Balagtas. In view of the great disparity in age and of the traditional respect that ancient Filipinos had for their elders, it was most unlikely for S. Cahia to have married his grandaunt. Besides, despite the apparent typographical error in the published text of the Will (p. 179 of *HB*), it is clear that it was Gatbonton, the first child of Lady Lahat and Principal Timog, who married Macayabongdili, his first cousin.

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[1] Vol. XI, p. 176-189.

[2] Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, *The Philippine Islands,* Vol. III, p. 155.

In Notes (e) and (f), Henson presented sufficient historical evidence of the three kings of Manila whose number and identities have confused such eminent historians as Fr. Manuel Buzeta, D. Isabelo de los Reyes, Dr. Ferdinand Blumentritt, Prof. Jaime C. de Veyra, Prof. H. O. Beyer, Dr. Luther Parker, and Dr. Eufronio M. Alip. Even Henson himself seems to be puzzled. He says:

"Salalila, according to the Sp. v., had three children, namely, Lacandola junior and the two rulers, Ladiamora. The Tag. v. says they were Lacandola junior, Sa Matanda and Ladiamora. Now, if according to Prof. Beyer, Lacandola is the same Ladiamora, who are then the Ladiamoras of the Sp. v. and Tag. v. If there is Lacandola junior, who is the senior?"

In answering his questions, two things should be borne in mind:

(1) That the Tagalog version came direct from F. M. Balagtas' mouth and should, therefore, be given more credence than its free translation in Spanish;

(2) That the terms "Sa Matanda" (sic Raja or *Ladyang Matanda*) and "Ladiamora" (*Ladyang Mura*) are not names of persons but titles of nobility.

Ladyang Mura is the Tagalog equivalent of the Malay *Raja Muda* which means either heir apparent or junior raja.[3] In this second sense, *Ladyang Mura* could well apply to Lacandola junior or *Lakandulang bata,* who is a different person from the *Ladyang Mura* specified in the Tagalog version of the Will. Since obviously this second *Ladyang Mura* cannot be Lacandola senior or *Lakandulang Matanda,* we can safely conclude that the latter is none other than "Sa Matanda" or *Ladyang Matanda* in the Tagalog text. Soliman II is, of course, the second *Ladyang Mura,* and it would thus appear that he was not the oldest of the three famous brothers as indicated in the Genealogy.

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[3] R. J. Wilkinson, *An abridged Malay-English dictionary* (7th ed., London, 1948), p. 162 and 193.

There is nothing strange in Salalila's giving the same name to two of his children, for he himself gave his own Mohammedan name Suleiman to another son (Soliman II), who, in turn, did the same to his son Soliman III. It was perhaps for having the same Tagalog name that, according to Dr. Luther Parker, Ladyang Matanda and Lakandula were both baptized as Carlos.[4]

Jointly with Ladyang Matanda, Soliman II ruled Manila proper south of the Pasig while on the opposite bank Lakandula junior ruled Tondo, then a separate kingdom. But evidently, and contrary to the common belief, Soliman II was not the young Ladya Soliman who, in 1570, met Master-of-camp Martin de Goiti for the first time on the shore of Manila. This particular Ladya Soliman was probably Soliman III, for how could he have been Soliman II who, as reckoned above, was already an octogenarian? Moreover, this young Ladya Soliman was the nephew, not the brother, of Ladyang Matanda as may be noted below:

> "The Master-of-Camp immediately landed with the Spaniards to meet him. Immediately an uncle of the ruler, who also bore the title of king, advanced...Soon after came the other ruler, his nephew, who was a younger man than he who first came. Soliman assumed an air of importance and haughtiness, and said that he was pleased to be the friend of the Spaniards, but the latter should understand that the Moros are not painted Indians. He said that they would not tolerate any abuse as had the others; on the contrary they would repay with death the least thing that touched their honor."[5]

A few days later, having been outwitted by De Goiti, Soliman and his men were defeated in battle by the invading Spaniards, and their Village was set on fire.[6]

There is no doubt this Soliman III, not the II, was the "Raxa Soliman" who, along with his uncle and through the intercession of Ladya Lakandula of Tondo, another uncle, met Legazpi on May 16, 1571. Here is a portion of what transpired:

> "The governor having arrived in the port of Manila one day in the middle of May at two o'clock in the afternoon, Alcandora (sic) came out

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[4] Luther Parker, *Pampangan ethnography*, vol. 1, 1922, p. 168 and 173 (Beyer collection).

[5] Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

in a little boat to welcome him in peace and friendship and speak to him in behalf of Raxa Soliman and Laya (sic), begging that he would treat them with friendship, pardon them for having taken up arms the past year against the master-of-camp. The governor received him very well, and told him through an interpreter . . . to come the next day with the two Raxas, saying that he would make peace with the latter, and would treat them as sons, for he had no ill-feeling against them, but rather regretted that they had resisted the master-of-camp . . . The next day the governor disembarked in Manila and the three chiefs came to talk with him and declare themselves his friends."[7]

In the foregoing account of the meeting, which practically tallies with that of Zuñiga,[8] Alcandora is Lakandula junior, sometimes called La Candola or Lacandora, and Laya is Ladyang Matanda who, in other documents, is referred to as Delaya. By way of explanation, Malay words, when adopted in Tagalog, undergo changes in pronunciation and spelling if not in meaning. In the case of *raja,* its *j* which in Malay is pronounced as in English, is changed to *dy* and its *r* to *l.* Hence ladya.[9] The words *laya* and *delaya* are mere corruptions of *ladya* by Spanish authors.

As to why Soliman II played no role whatsoever in all the momentous events of 1570-1571, we can only conjecture that maybe he either had died or had abdicated in favor of Soliman III. As regards the question of whether or not the latter was killed in the battle of Bangkusay on June 3, 1571,[10] no available record has so far given a satisfactory answer. Says Henson:

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[7] *Ibid.,* p. 153-155. (Note: On p. 155, it is definitely stated that Legazpi's disembarkation in Manila took place on "the sixteenth of May of the year one thousand five hundred and seventy-one." As may be noted above, Legazpi met the three chiefs on the same day. The document, *Conquest of Luzon,* that gives this date was written "in the year one thousand five hundred and seventy-one... on the twentieth day of the month of April." If the "peace pact" took place on May 18, 1572 as stated in the so-called letter of Legazpi quoted by Henson, I wonder how it could have been included in the said document).

[8] Joaquin Martinez de Zuñiga, *An historical view of the Philippine Islands,* (Filipiniana Book Guild, Manila, 1966), p. 48-49. (Note: This is an English translation by John Maver of the author's *Historia de las Islas Philippinas,* Manila, 1803. Zuñiga's date of the "pact" is May 18, 1571).

[9] Cecilio Lopez, *A comparison of Tagalog and Malay lexicographies* (Institute of National Language, September, 1939) p. 47. See also Juan de Noceda and Pedro de Sanlucar's *Vocabulario de la lengua Tagala,* (1860 ed., Manila), p. 163. (Note: For some time after the abolition of the office of native king in the Islands, the term *ladya* continued in circulation, but took on a modified meaning—"un principal antiquo llamado asi.")

[10] Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.,* p. 156-157.

"In all the books and documents I have read in Spain about the incident never did I find out the account of how Raxa Soliman was killed in action."[11]

But if it is true that Soliman III was not killed in action, has any reliable information been dug up to the effect that "the greatest king of Manila" was seen alive after that disastrous battle? Let us just leave this matter for other researchers to clarify.

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[11] Henson, M. A. "The Genealogy of the Rulers of Central Luzon." Historical Bull., vol. XI, p. 196.

Book Review

THE PORTUGUESE SEABORNE EMPIRE, 1415-1825, By C. R. Boxer. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1969. xiv, 415 pp. 16 illus. 7 maps.

This is the sixth book published on the series, *The History of Human Society* put out by Borzoi Books. The previous volumes were *Prehistoric Societies, The Dutch Seaborne Empire* (also by Professor Boxer), *The Spanish Seaborne Empire, Pioneer America,* and *The Greeks.* Professor Boxer is an authority on the Portuguese colonial empire, having published books and monographs such as *The Tragic History of the Sea,* an account of the Portuguese carracks in their voyages to India, *The Golden Age of Brazil, Portuguese Society in the Tropics, Fidalgos in the Far East, South China in the Sixteenth Century, The Christian Century in Japan,* and others.

The present book is a comprehensive survey of the rise, the flowering and the fall of the Portuguese empire that once extended from Tidor in the Moluccas to Goa in India and Pernambuco in Brazil. Prof. Boxer points out that the Portuguese were the first European race for colonies in the era now called as the "Age of Discovery", mainly due to Infante Dom Henrique's (Prince Henry the Navigator) aggressive and far-reaching outlook. He synthesizes the four main motives that impelled the Portuguese to expand their empire outside the Iberian peninsula as follows: 1. Crusading zeal against the Muslims; 2. The desire for Guinea gold; 3. The quest for Prester John; and 4. The search for Oriental spices.

These motives are similar to those of Spain half a century later; although the Spaniards had already conquered the Moors in their own land, and myth of Prester John in what is now Ethiopia had already abated. The crusading zeal of the Castilians for God, gold and the spices propelled her sons to the conquest of Mexico, Peru and the Philippines.

The Portuguese, of course, started their imperialist expansion on the West Coast of Africa for gold in the Guinea, elephant tusks and slaves. After Vasco de Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1485, the sea route to India and the fabulously rich land of India and spices was opened to Portuguese traders. Lusitanian enclaves in Mozambique, Ormuz, Goa, Malacca, Macao, Amboina and Ternate, furnished the stream of goods that enriched the mother country, while from across the Atlantic Ocean, the gold and sugar of Brazil fattened the purses of the nobility who directed the destinies of this burgeoning empire. The entry of the British and the Dutch in the imperialist race for conquest and riches spelled eventual disaster for the Portuguese; these two glutted Europe with spices, and the Portuguese empire shrivelled. "What had risen like a meteor, fell like one. Soon they were left with unprofitable patches of East and West Africa and a handful of trading stations — Luanda and Mozambique in Africa, Goa in India, Timor in the Celebes and Macao hard by Canton . . . Of all the great empires of the West, more of Portuguese endures . . . It was the first; it is the last."

Several years ago, Prof. Boxer was execrated in Portugal for having pointed out that racial prejudice existed among its overseas colonies. Distinguished contemporary authorities had stressed that the Portuguese had no "racial prejudice worth mentioning." But these authorities did not explain why the Portuguese for centuries laid such emphasis on the concept of *limpeza* or *pureza de sangre* (purity of blood), not just from a racial standpoint, and why terms such as *razas infectas* (contaminated races) were so frequently found in official documents and private correspondence until the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The Portuguese government banned Boxer's works, and launched a campaign of vilification against him. But the facts remain, and impartial historians must side with the view that race prejudice *did* exist in the colonial empire of Portugal, in the same way it did in the Spanish overseas possessions including the Philippines. Boxer cites that native Hindus, Chinese or Americans were rarely admitted to the regular clergy (that is, the monastic orders) and rarely given posts of influence or importance in the empire. Perhaps the Portuguese and the Spaniards did not exhibit as strong a racial prejudice as the English or the Americans towards their colored subjects, but that they exhibited this lamentable trait cannot be denied.

The expulsion of the Jesuits from Portugal and all its colonies, which found an echo in the Philippines several years later, was made in 1759-60 by the Marquis de Pombal, prime minister to King Joseph. Pombal, the counterpart in history of Oliver Cromwell in England, or Joseph Stalin in Russia, is better known in his country than the recent Portuguese dictator Salazar. He developed a pathological hatred of the Jesuits, believing that the backwardness of Portugal and its colonies was almost entirely due to the machinations of the Society. He published a book called *Chronological Deduction* in 1767-68, advancing his thesis about the Jesuits, and had them as widely circulated as the present-day *Thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung.* Pombal's move was followed by the other adjoining countries of Europe (Spain, France and Italy) leading to the suppression of the order all over the world.

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
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